UNIVERSITY    OF    CALIFORNIA    PUBLICATIONS 

IN 

HISTORY 

Vol.  1,  No.  1,  pp.  1-98  November  23,  1911 


COLONIAL  OPPOSITION  TO    IMPERIAL 

AUTHORITY  DURING  THE   FRENCH 

AND    INDIAN  WAR 


BY 

EUGENE  IRVING  McCORMAC 


BERKELEY 
THE  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  PUBLICATIONS 

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OTTO  HARRASSOWITZ,  R.  FRIEDLAENDER  &  SOHN, 

LEIPZIG  BERLIN 

Agent   for   the   series  in  American  Agent   for   the   series  in   American 

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HISTORY.— H.  Morse  Stephens,  Editor. 

Cited  as  Univ.  Calif.  Publ.  Hist. 

Vol.  l.      l.  Colonial  Opposition  to  Imperial  Authority  during  the  French  and 
•   Indian  War,  by  Eugene  Irving  McCormac.   Pp.  1-98.   Novem 
ber,  1911 75 

PUBLICATIONS  OF  THE  ACADEMY  OF  PACIFIC  COAST  HISTORY. 

Vol.  1.      1.  The  San  Francisco  Clearing  House  Certificates  of  1907-1908,  by 

Carl  Copping  Plohn.    Pp.  1-14,  1  plate.    January,  1909 .10 

2.  The  Official  Account  of  the  Portola  Expedition   of  1769-1770, 

edited  by  Frederick  J.  Teggart.  Pp.  17-29,  1  plate.  [Intro 
duction,  Spanish  text,  and  translation.]  August,  1909 .10 

3.  Diary  of  Gaspar  de  Portola  during  the  California  Expedition  of 

1769-1770,  edited  by  Donald  Eugene  Smith  and  Frederick  J. 
Teggart.  Pp.  33-89,  1  plate.  [Introduction,  Spanish  text, 
and  translation.]  October,  1909  50 

4.  The  Narrative  of  the  Portola  Expedition  of  1769-1770,  by  Miguel 

Costanso,  edited  by  Adolph  van  Hemert-Engert  and.  Fred 
erick  J.  Teggart.  Pp.  93-159,  1  plate.  [Introduction,  Spanish 
text,  and  translation.]  March,  1910  50 

5.  The  United  States  Consulate  in  California,  by  Rayner  Wicker- 

sham  Kelsey.    Pp.  163-267.    June,  1910  .75 

6.  Diary  of  Patrick  Breen,  One  of  the  Donner  Party,  edited  by 

Frederick  J.  Teggart.    Pp.  269-284,  1  plate.    July,  1910 .15 

7.  Papers  of  the  San  Francisco  Committee  of  Vigilance  of  1851,  I, 

edited  by  Porter  Garnett.    Pp.  285-353,  1  plate.     July,  1910     .50 
Index,  pp.  355-358. 
Volume  1,  1909-1910,  complete,  358  pages,  with  6  plates ....  $2.50 

Sewed  (paper  covers)    2.75 

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Vol.  2.  1.  The  Portola  Expedition  of  1769-1770.  Diary  of  Vicente  Vila, 
edited  by  Robert  Selden  Rose.  Pp.  1-119,  1  plate.  [Intro 
duction,  Spanish  text,  and  translation.]  August,  1911  ., 75 

2.  Papers  of  the  San  Francisco  Committee  of  Vigilance  of  1851,  II, 

edited  by  Porter  Garnett.  Pp.  123-139,  1  plate.  August, 
1911  25 

3.  Expedition  to  San  Francisco  Bay  in  1770.    Diary  of  Pedro  Fages, 

edited  by  Herbert  Eugene  Bolton.  Pp.  143-159.  [Introduc 
tion,  Spanish  text,  and  translation.]  August,  1911 .25 

4.  The  Portola  Expedition  of  1769-1770.    Diary  of  Miguel  Costansd, 

edited  by  Frederick  J.  Teggart.  Pp.  163-327, 1  plate.  [Intro 
duction,  Spanish  text,  and  translation.]  August,  1911 1.25 


UNIVEESITY  OF  CALIFOENIA  PUBLICATIONS 

IN 

HISTORY 
VOL.  1  No.  1 


COLONIAL  OPPOSITION  TO  IMPERIAL 

AUTHORITY  DURING  THE  FRENCH 

AND  INDIAN  WAR 


BY 


EUGENE  IRVING  McCORMAC,  PH.D. 
Assistant  Professor  of  American  History  in  the  University  of  California 


BERKELEY 

THE   UNIVERSITY  PRESS 
November,   1911 


El 


COLONIAL  OPPOSITION  TO  IMPERIAL 

AUTHORITY  DURING  THE  FRENCH 

AND  INDIAN  WAR 

EUGENE  IRVING  McCORMAC 


I.  GENERAL  VIEW 

From  the  standpoint  of  constitutional  history  the  period 
covered  by  the  French  and  Indian  War  deserves  a  more  careful 
and  exhaustive  study  than  has  been  given  it  by  those  who  have 
written  upon  American  colonial  history.  Only  recently  has  a  book 
appeared  that  seems  to  grasp  the  true  relation  of  this  period 
to  the  stormy  one  which  followed  it.  Beer  in  his  British 
Colonial  Policy,  1754-1765,  has  given  a  valuable  treatment  of 
the  policy  of  the  mother  country,  and  has  incidentally  touched 
upon  the  peculiar  ideas  and  characteristics  of  the  colonists;  but 
the  subject  with  which  he  deals  necessarily  does  not  include  a 
study  of  constitutional  development  within  the  colonies. 

Many  writers  have  pointed  out  a  connection  between  this 
war  and  the  American  Revolution  by  showing  how  the  expulsion 
of  the  French  and  the  incurring  of  a  war  debt  furnished  an 
excuse  for  the  new  colonial  policy  inaugurated  by  the  Tory 
party  in  England.  There  are,  however,  many  other  questions 
which  connect  the  two  movements  as  vitally,  if  more  remotely, 
as  those  usually  discussed. 

In  a  recent  publication  it  is  explicitly  stated  that  "England 
and  America  entered  on  a  dispute  as  to  the  distribution  of 


2  University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL. l 

power  and  the  principles  of  government"1  with  the  passage  of 
the  Stamp  Act.  It  is  more  nearly  true  to  say  that  the  Stamp 
Act  and  others  which  followed  it  were  the  result  of  disputes 
which  arose  in  connection  with  every  phase  of  the  war  with 
France.  It  is  not  contended  that  all  of  the  anti-imperial  and 
independent  ideas  of  the  colonists  originated  during  this  war, 
for  many  of  them  appeared  earlier;  but  never  before  had  the 
Americans  so  thoroughly  elucidated  their  ideas  on  constitutional 
questions,  and  never  before  had  they  so  clearly  defined  the 
position  which  they  meant  to  maintain. 

Hardly  an  issue  which  disturbed  the  relations  between  col 
onies  and  mother  country  between  the  passage  of  the  Stamp 
Act  and  the  Declaration  of  Independence  was  new.  These  issues 
had  in  one  form  or  another  been  thrashed  over  in  the  contro 
versies  of  the  various  assemblies  with  their  governors,  and  the 
opinions  of  the  colonists  concerning  them  were  formed  and 
crystallized.  The  grounds  upon  which  the  colonists  claimed 
exemption  from  British  taxation  and  restrictions  in  the  later 
period  were  by  no  means  new;  they  had  been  asserted  again 
and  again  in  substantially  the  same  terms  during  the  war  with 
France.  The  conditions  in  the  two  periods  were  similar  and 
they  called  forth  similar  ideas,  protests,  and  demands  on  the 
part  of  the  Americans.  In  both  cases  the  mother  country  at 
tempted  to  procure  assistance  and  to  exact  obedience  from  the 
colonies,  and  these  attempts  were  resisted  by  the  latter,  who 
contended  that  such  interference  by  England  was  an  attack 
upon  their  long  cherished  li rights."  That  a  declaration  of 
independence  and  a  separation  did  not  come  in  the  earlier  period 
was  due  more  to  the  want  of  a  well-defined  policy  on  either  side 
of  the  Atlantic  than  to  an  absence  of  independent  ideas  in  the 
colonies.  This  tendency  to  resist  authority  was  more  pronounced 
in  some  colonies  than  in  others,  and  it  took  some  time  to  develop 
a  policy  of  concerted  action;  but  it  existed,  nevertheless,  in  all 
of  them,  and  it  needed  only  additional  pressure  on  the  part  of 
crown  officials  to  develop  this  tendency  into  armed  resistance. 

i  McLaughlin,  The  Confederation  and  the  Constitution,  313-314. 


1911]  McCormac:  Colonial  Opposition  3 

The  object  of  attack  depended  upon  the  character  of  the 
colonial  government,  in  other  words,  upon  the  source  of  out 
side  restraint.  In  proprietary  colonies  it  was  the  alleged  usur 
pations  of  the  proprietor  which  must  be  opposed  and  defeated. 
If  the  proprietor  could  be  overthrown  entirely,  so  much  the 
better.  In  these  colonies  there  were  usually  unstinted  profes 
sions  of  loyalty  to  the  king,  whose  good  will  might  be  of  service 
in  overthrowing  the  proprietor.  In  royal  colonies  it  was  the 
governor  who  was  continually  accused  of  trampling  under  foot 
the  "rights  of  his  Majesty's  faithful  and  loyal  subjects."  In 
the  charter  colonies  there  was  little  friction  between  the  legis 
lative  and" executive  branches  of  government,  for  both  were 
elected  by  and  responsible  to  the  people,  but  there  was  the  same 
determination  to  preserve  all  charter  rights  and  to  acquire  others 
if  possible.  Whatever  the  source,  all  outside  authority  must 
be  resisted.  When,  at  the  close  of  the  French  and  Indian  War, 
Parliament  became  the  instrument  for  enforcing  such  authority, 
the  colonies  at  last  united  in  common  effort  to  resist  and  finally 
to  overthrow  all  British  control. 

But  coupled  with  this  tenacious  insistence  upon  acquired 
rights  was  another  trait  of  the  colonists  which  weakened  mater 
ially  their  power  of  resistance.  This  was  their  utter  _lack  of 
unity,  their  limited  horizon,  and  their  jealousy  of  one  another.2 
The  spirit  of  patriotism  and  national  loyalty  in  the  modern 
sense  seems  to  have  been  almost  entirely  lacking.  In  a  sense 
they  gloried  in  being  Englishmen  and  they  hated  the  common 
enemy ;  but  whenever  the  general  welfare  of  the  empire  required 
them  to  sacrifice  any  of  their  cherished  rights  (however  small) 
or  to  abandon  a  profitable  trade  with  the  enemy,  they  invariably 
chose  the  policy  best  suited  to  their  own  individual  interests. 
This  want  of  unity  continued  during  the  period  which  followed 
the  war  with  France,  but  it  was  overcome  in  part  on  the  eve  of 


2  Burnaby,  whose  account  of  actual  conditions  is  more  valuable  than 
his  prophecies,  wrote  in  1759:  ".  .  .  .  fire  and  water  are  not  more  hetero 
geneous  than  the  different  colonies  in  North  America.  Nothing  can 
exceed  the  jealousy  and  emulation  which  they  possess  in  regard  to  each 
other. ' '  Travels,  in  Pinkerton,  Voyages,  xiii,  751-752. 


4  University  of  California  Publications  in  History     tv°L- l 

the  Revolution  by  the  efficient  work  of  the  committees  of  corre 
spondence.  These  committees  were  effective  instruments  of  agi 
tation.  They  aroused  public  opinion  and  centered  it  upon  the 
common  danger.  They  caused  local  grievances,  such  as  the 
closing  of  Boston  harbor,  to  be  adopted  by  other  colonies.  By 
spreading  information  and  molding  public  opinion  they  created 
enthusiasm  for  the  cause  and  overcame,  for  a  time  at  least,  the 
indifference  which  was  so  apparent  during  the  French  war. 

When  Governor  Dinwiddie  of  Virginia  learned  from  the 
defiant  answer  given  to  Major  Washington  in  1753  that  the 
French  meant  to  back  their  pretensions  by  force,  he  called  upon 
the  other  colonies  for  assistance.  ' '  But  the  colonies,  alas ! ' ' 
exclaimed  a  contemporary  writer,  "were  sunk  into  a  profound 
lethargy;  and,  resigned  to  stupidity  and  slumbering,  appeared 
insensible  of  the  threatening  danger."3  This  charge,  though 
severe,  is  substantiated  by  the  records  of  the  various  colonies. 
They  underrated  the  power  of  the  French.  They  knew  little 
and  cared  less  about  the  western  country,  and  they  even  ques 
tioned  the  title  of  the  British  crown  to  these  lands.4 

None  knew  better  than  the  French  the  unprepared  condition 
of  the  English  colonists  and  their  want  of  unity.  The  French 
considered  early  occupation  and  a  defensive  position  of  greater 
importance  than  the  larger  numbers  of  the  English.  "They 
declare  without  reserve,"  wrote  Governor  Dinwiddie,  "that 
altho'  we  are  vastly  superior  to  them  in  Numbers,  yet  they  can 
take  and  secure  the  Co 't  'y  before  we  can  agree  to  hinder  them. '  '5 
Still  stronger  evidence  is  found  in  a  letter  from  Duquesne  him 
self  in  which  he  said  "The  Governors  of  New  England  [mean- 


3  Review  of  Military  Operations,  in  Coll.  Mass.  Hist.  Soc.,  ser.  1,  viii, 
72,  73. 

4  Ibid. 

s  Dinwiddie  to  Secretary  Eobinson,  June  8,  1754.  Col.  Bee.  of  N.  C., 
v,  129.  In  writing  to  Governor  DeLancey  of  New  York  for  troops,  Din 
widdie  says  that  if  the  colonies  concur  "I  shall  hope  the  Consequences 
will  be  to  show  our  Enemies  how  far  they  were  mistaken  in  their  Sar 
casm  they  threw  out,  that  tho '  they  owned,  We  could  bring  two  men  to 
their  one,  yet,  that  we  were  too  slow,  and  disconnected,  to  hinder  the 
progress  of  their  Undertakings."  Jan.  29,  1754.  Pa.  Arch.,  ser.  2,  vi, 
179-180. 


1911]  McCormac:  Colonial  Opposition  5 

ing,  probably,  all  the  English  colonies],  besides  being  independ 
ent  one  of  the  other,  cannot  levy  troops  without  an  order  of 
the  King  of  Great  Britain,6  and  you  will  have  observed  by  Mr 
Washington's  Journal  that  all  the  Provinces  have  furnished  a 
quota  to  his  detachment.  I  know,  moreover,  that  the  Quakers, 
who  never  make  war,  have  also  furnished  their  contingent."7 
The  obvious  meaning  of  this  letter  is  that  he  considered  such 
measures  illegal,  and  mere  bluster  on  the  part  of  the  colonists. 

The  French  colonists  and  army  were  more  directly  under 
the  control  of  the  king,  and,  as  they  did  not  possess  so  many 
"rights"  which  must  be  defended,  their  military  operations 
could  be  conducted  with  secrecy  and  dispatch.  In  the  British 
colonies  every  plan  had  to  be  fought  over  in  the  assemblies 
before  it  could  even  be  attempted,  and  the  enemy  always  had 
ample  opportunity  to  learn  its  details  in  advance.8 

As  Virginia  took  a  greater  interest  in  the  Ohio  country  than 
the  other  colonies,  she  was  naturally  the  first  to  act  in  its  de 
fense,  and  her  governor,  Dinwiddie,  at  once  took  steps  to  repel 
the  invaders.  But  his  enthusiasm  was  checked  from  the  begin 
ning  by  his  reluctant  assembly.  They  voted  £1000  for  raising 
and  equipping  three  hundred  men  for  defending  the  frontier, 
but  the  governor  complained  that  they  "were  much  divided" 
and  failed  to  do  as  much  as  he  had  asked.9  The  surrounding 
colonies,  however,  were  still  less  generous,  for  Dinwiddie  had 
written  only  a  week  before  to  Secretary  Robinson  that  "every 
Gov't  except  No.  Caro.  has  amus'd  me  with  Expectations  that 
have  proved  fruitless,  and  at  length  refused  to  give  any  Supply, 
unless  in  such  a  manner  as  must  render  it  ineffectual. 

The  Pennsylvania  assembly  answered  their  governor's  appeal 
for  aid  with  a  reply  that  was  characteristic  of  their  attitude 
throughout  the  war.  They  refused  to  vote  assistance  because 

s  War  was  not  formally  declared  until  May,  1756. 
7  Pa.  Arch.,  ser  2,  vi,  173.    Duquesne  to  DeMachault,  Oct.  28,  1754. 
s  Coll.  Mass.  Hist.  Soc.,  ser.  1,  vii,  161-162. 

vCol.  Eec.  of  N.  C.,  v,  110.     To  President  Eowan  of  North  Carolina, 
March  23,  1754. 
10  Ibid.,  129. 


6  University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL. 1 

it  had  not  been  made  clear  to  them  that  the  subjects  of  a 
foreign  prince  had  erected  forts  "within  the  undoubted  Limits 
of  this  Government."  The  limits  "had  not  been  ascertained 
to  yeir  satisfaction."11  As  the  war  progressed  it  seemed  difficult 
to  prove  this  or  anything  else  to  their  satisfaction.12 

The  assembly  of  New  York  required  equally  strong  proof 
of  ownership  before  they  would  vote  aid  to  the  king.  "It  ap 
pears/'  they  said  in  an  address  to  the  lieutenant-governor,  "by 
papers  your  Honor  has  been  pleased  to  communicate  to  us,  that 
the  French  have  built  a  fort  at  a  place  called  French  Creek, 
at  a  considerable  distance  from  the  river  Ohio,  which  may,  but 
does  not  by  any  evidence  or  information  appear  to  us  to  be  an 
invasion  of  any  of  his  Majesty's  colonies."13  This  was  rather 
an  impertinent  stand  to  take  when  the  British  government  had 
already  decided  that  its  territory  had  been  invaded.  The  as 
sembly  finally  decided  to  vote  £1000  for  the  purpose  of  sending 
two  companies  to  Virginia,  but  the  money  was  to  be  raised  in 
a  manner  which  the  council  declared  contrary  to  the  king's 
instructions  and  therefore  refused  to  allow.  The  perennial  quar 
rel  over  a  permanent  salary  for  the  governor  was  also  in  progress, 
and  when  the  present  bill  was  not  allowed  by  the  council,  the 
assembly  refused  to  pass  another.  DeLancey  thought  that  the 
council  was  also  at  fault  in  not  waiving  its  grounds  during  this 
critical  situation,  but  the  king  severely  criticised  the  assembly 
for  their  declaration  and  their  refusal  on  such  ' '  trifling ' '  grounds 
to  grant  aid.1* 

n  Pa.  Arch.,  1748-56,  ii,  235.  Besolution  of  the  assembly,  March  8. 
1754. 

12  Another  excuse  given  for  refusing  aid  was  that  the  Earl  of  Holder- 
nesse  had  asked  for  aid  against  the  French  within  their  respective  prov 
inces,  and  as  the  boundary  line  between  Pennsylvania  and  Virginia  had 
never  been  settled,  they  feared  that  they  might  invade  Virginia  in  pur 
suit  of  the  enemy.  They  would  wait,  therefore,  to  see  what  Virginia 
would  do.  The  governor  explained  that  the  earl  had  meant  to  ask  for 
aid  to  defend  all  of  the  king's  lands,  and  that  the  governor  of  Virginia 
had  asked  for  assistance,  but  the  assembly  refused  to  be  convinced  and 
adjourned  without  granting  the  aid.  Pa.  Col.  Eec.,  v,  763-765. 

^Coll.  Mass.  Hist.  Soc.,  ser.  1,  vii,  72-73.  Address  of  the  New  York 
Assembly,  April  23,  1754. 

14  pa.  Arch.,  ser.  2,  vi,  188,  192,  196.  Letters  of  DeLancey  and  Secre 
tary  Robinson. 


1911]  McCormac:  Colonial  Opposition  1 

During  the  entire  summer  of  1754  Governor  Dinwiddie  was 
unable  to  procure  sufficient  assistance  to  enable  him  to  assume 
the  offensive.  Governor  Sharpe,  on  November  5,  wrote  to  Lord 
Bury  that  Dinwiddie,  having  secured  but  three  hundred  men 
from  Virginia,  two  companies  from  New  York,  one  from  South 
Carolina,  and  three  hundred  men  from  North  Carolina,  was 
forced  to  abandon  his  plans  for  the  present.15  It  will  be  shown 
later  that  even  this  nominal  assistance  was  of  little  value. 

When  we  consider  that  the  ravages  of  the  French  and  Indians 
were  at  least  as  disastrous  to  the  colonies  as  to  the  empire  in 
general,  and  that  it  was  their  property  and  lives  that  were  at 
stake,  it  does  not  seem  that  the  requirements  of  the  mother 
country  were  unreasonable.  England  asked  that  the  troops  be 
supplied  with  provisions  by  the  colonies  and  that  the  officers 
be  conveyed  from  place  to  place.  The  colonial  governments 
were  required  to  assist  in  executing  the  orders  of  British  officers 
for  quartering  troops,  impressing  carriages,  and  equipping  forts. 
In  addition,  each  colony  was  asked  to  contribute  to  a  common 
fund  for  the  general  protection.16  Of  course  both  sides  consid 
ered  that  England  owed  the  colonies  protection  from  foreign 
enemies  in  return  for  obedience  and  advantages  she  received 
from  the  colonies17;  nevertheless  no  theory  of  this  kind  could 
excuse  the  conduct  of  colonial  assemblies  in  allowing  the  inhabi 
tants  to  be  butchered  while  they  were  haggling  over  mere  techni 
calities.  The  governors  in  many  cases  were  equally  culpable  in 
obstructing  legislation  for  trivial  reasons.  Some  of  the  gover 
nors  adhered  too  rigidly  to  the  letter  of  their  instructions,  or 
even  enlarged  upon  them,  which  tended  to  intensify  the  discord. 

The  British  government  looked  to  the  governors  to  enforce 
its  orders,  and  the  position  of  those  officials  was  by  no  means 
an  enviable  one.  In  general  the  governors  tried  to  perform  their 
duties  to  the  crown,  but  as  Dinwiddie  wrote  in  1754,  "A  Gover 
nor  in  the  Discharge  of  His  Duty  to  his  King  and  Country,  is 


Corresp.  of  Gov.  Sharpe,  i,  115. 

Ibid.,  108,     Secretary  Robinson  to  Sharpe. 

See  Beer,  British  Colonial  Policy,  1754-1765,  chap.  1. 


8  University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL. l 

much  to  be  pittied,  when  its  considered  his  Transactions  with 
an  obstinate  Assembly;  Full  of  their  own  opinions,  &  entirety 
deaf  to  Argument  &  Reason. '  '18  This  of  course  is  only  a  gover 
nor 's  side  of  the  controversy,  but  the  records  bear  out  his  state 
ment. 

From  the  beginning  the  New  England  colonies,  particularly 
Massachusetts,  showed  public  spirit  and  liberality  in  furnishing 
aid  to  repel  the  enemy,19  and  some  of  the  southern  governors 
in  desperation  asked  them  for  aid  when  the  southern  assemblies 
would  do  nothing  for  their  own  defense.  Governor  Sharpe  of 
Maryland  admitted  that  he  had  little  reason  for  expecting  as 
sistance  from  New  England  "while  they  see  us  in  a  State  of 
almost  total  inactivity  or  Supineness, ' '  but  seeing  no  other  means 
of  getting  supplies  he  asked  aid  from  New  Hampshire,  Rhode 
Island,  and  Connecticut.20  He  had  little  faith  in  the  loyalty 
of  any  of  the  colonial  legislatures,  for  in  the  same  letter  he 
added  "I  have  learnt  not  to  entertain  very  sanguine  hopes  of 
the  Resolutions  of  American  Assemblies  ...  As  often  as  they 
have  been  convened  urged  and  intreated  to  aid  each  other  in 
defending  his  Majesty's  Territories  &  their  own  Properties  so 
often  almost  have  they  as  it  were  unanimously  refused  to  pro 
vide  against  the  Dangers  that  threaten  them  or  endeavored  to 
cast  the  Odium  on  their  respective  Goverrs  by  laying  them  under 
a  necessity  of  rejecting  such  Bills  as  were  presented  them  with 
the  specious  Titles  of  Acts  for  His  Majesty's  Service  &  the 
better  Defense  &  Security  of  the  British  Colonies."  This  letter 
was  not  written  for  publication  nor  for  the  purpose  of  exerting 
influence  in  official  circles.  It  was  a  private  letter  to  his  brothers 
and  no  doubt  expressed  the  governor's  sincere  opinion  of  the 
situation.  In  it  he  seems  to  have  struck  the  key-note  of  the 
policy  of  many  of  the  colonial  governments,  particularly  of 
Maryland  and  Pennsylvania.  This  policy  was  to  make  effusive 
professions  of  generosity  to  the  king,  and  then  to  claim  that  it 


is  Corresp.  of  Gov.  Sharpe,  i,  97.     Dinwiddie  to  Sharpe,  Sept.  5,  1754. 
™  Ibid.,  110,  Sharpe  to  W.  and  J.  Sharpe. 
20  Ibid. 


1911J  McCormac:  Colonial  Opposition  9 

was  due  wholly  to  arbitrary  instructions  from  proprietors  or 
vetoes  by  governors  that  they  were  unable  to  assist.  In  the 
two  provinces  just  mentioned  the  assemblies  saw  in  the  disas 
trous  conditions  of  the  time  an  opportunity  to  weaken  if  not 
entirely  to  overthrow  proprietary  rule. 

When  the  aggressive  plans  of  the  French  became  known, 
those  in  authority,  both  in  England  and  America,  began  to  con 
sider  some  form  of  concerted  action  to  be  taken  either  by  the 
colonies  acting  alone  or  by  the  colonies  acting  under  parlia 
mentary  regulations.  The  governors,  generally,  believed  that 
little  could  be  accomplished  unless  Parliament  should  assume 
control  and  enforce  its  authority.  Such  a  plan  had  been  sug 
gested  to  Newcastle  by  Bedford  in  1748  as  a  result  of  the  inde 
pendent  attitude  of  the  colonies  during  King  George 's  War.  He 
recommended  that  a  strong  man  be  put  at  the  head  of  the  Board 
of  Trade  and  the  Earl  of  Halifax  was  chosen  for  the  position.21 
Without  a  vigorous  Board  new  laws  would  not  bring  about  the 
desired  results. 

When  Halifax  assumed  office  he  found  letters  from  various 
colonial  governors  complaining  of  insubordination  and  repub 
lican  tendencies  in  the  colonies.  The  governor  of  New  York 
could  not  "meet  the  Assembly,  without  danger  of  exposing  the 
king's  authority"  and  himself  to  contempt.22  Governor  Glen 
of  South  Carolina  reported  that  "Here,  levelling  principles  pre 
vail;  the  frame  of  civil  government  is  unhinged;  a  governor,  if 
he  would  be  idolized,  must  betray  his  trust;  ....  to  preserve 
the  dependence  of  America  in  general,  the  Constitution  must 
be  new  modelled."23  Similar  complaints  came  from  Massachu 
setts,  Virginia,  Pennsylvania,  and  New  Jersey.24  Though  some 
what  exaggerated,  these  many  charges  could  hardly  fail  to  have 
weight  with  the  home  government. 

Halifax  proceeded  with  more  energy  than  tact  to  instruct 

21  Bancroft,  History  of  the  United  States,  ed.  22,  iv,  36. 

22  Clinton  to  Bedford,  Oct.  20,  1748.     Quoted  by  Bancroft,  iv,  36. 

23  Letters  of  Glen  to  Bedford,  July  27  and  Oct.  10,  1748.     Quoted  by 
Bancroft,  iv,  38. 

24  Bancroft,  iv,  38-40. 


10  University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  1 

the  governors  to  enforce  a  more  rigid  policy,  but  as  the  encroach 
ments  of  the  French  soon  occupied  their  attention,  little  was 
attained  except  to  arouse  suspicion  in  the  colonies  and  to  make 
them  more  determined  to  oppose  any  centralizing  measures  of 
the  British  government. 

When  hostilities  began  in  1754,  General  Shirley,  who  from 
the  first  was  one  of  the  most  active  governors,  doubted  that  the 
colonies  would  ever  agree  on  quotas  and  other  matters  of  assist 
ance  unless  the  proportions  were  fixed  in  England.  Past  ex 
perience,  he  said,  taught  that  they  had  never  been  able  to  agree 
on  these  matters,  and  unless  they  were  now  fixed  by  the  king 
and  enforced  by  law,  no  adequate  protection  could  be  expected. 
Quotas  had  been  fixed  in  the  reign  of  William  III,  but  condi 
tions  had  changed  since  then.  In  his  opinion  no  union  of  the 
colonies  except  one  controlled  by  England  would  ever  accom 
plish  the  desired  results.25  Shirley  was  one  of  the  first  to  suggest 
a  union  of  the  colonies  and  he  urged  that  delegates  to  the  Albany 
convention  be  given  adequate  powers.26 

The  Albany  convention  and  the  reception  of  the  plan  there 
adopted  demonstrated  that  no  union  could  be  formed  by  the 
colonies  that  would  be  satisfactory  to  themselves  or  to  the  British 
government.  All  agreed  that  a  union  of  some  kind  was  desir 
able,  but  neither  the  colonies  nor  England  was  willing  to  con 
cede  the  things  necessary  to  bring  it  about.  The  colonies  agreed 
on  the  necessity  of  winning  the  good  will  of  the  Indians  at  this 
time,  and  nearly  all  of  them  voted  money  with  little  hesitation 
to  secure  it,  but  Massachusetts  alone  gave  her  delegates  full 
power  to  enter  into  a  union.27  New  Jersey  refused  either  to 


25  Pa.  Arch.,  ser.  2,  iv,  174-177.     Shirley  to  Holdernesse,  Jan.  7,  1754. 
Governor  Hamilton  of  Pennsylvania  had  declared  as  early  as  1753  that 
there  would  be  no  union  unless  the  ministry  should  compel  the  colonies 
to  form  one.     All  former  attempts  had  failed  because  of  the  "mutual 
and  injudicious  jealousies"  of  the  colonies.     He  added  that  the  princi 
ples  "either  real  or  pretended"  of  the  Pennsylvania  assembly  will  pre 
vent  its  entering  into  a  union  or  doing  anything  of  a  warlike  nature. 
Pa.  Col.  Eec.,  vi,  632. 

26  Pa.  Col.  Eec.,  iv,  19.    Shirley  to  Hamilton,  March  4,  1754. 

27  Pa.  Arch.,  1748-56,  ii,  137.     Commission  given  by  Governor  Shirley; 
Pa.  Arch.,  ser.  2,  vi,  213-218,  Shirley  to  Kobinson. 


1911]  McCormac:  Colonial  Opposition  11 

vote  money  or  to  send  delegates  to  Albany,  giving  as  excuse 
that  she  had  no  commercial  relations  with  the  Six  Nations.  This 
excuse  was  pronounced  frivolous  by  the  Board  of  Trade  who 
censured  the  colony  for  its  indifference  and  lack  of  obedience 
to  the  king's  orders.28  Pennsylvania  gave  full  power  to  her 
commissioners  to  conclude  a  treaty  with  the  Indians  and  to 
give  money,29  but  nothing  was  said  about  a  union  with  the  other 
colonies.30  Rhode  Island  gave  her  delegates  authority  to  consult 
on  methods  of  securing  the  good  will  of  the  Indians  and  pro 
tection  against  the  French  "And  in  General,  as  far  as  the  abil 
ities  of  this  Government  will  permit,  to  act  in  Conjunction  with 
the  said  Commissioners  in  every  thing  Necessary  for  the  good 
of  his  Majesty's  Subjects  in  these  Parts."31  This  qualified 
authority  was  little  better  than  none  at  all,  and  the  commission 
of  the  Connecticut  delegates  was  equally  devoid  of  authority. 
They  were  to  meet  and  consult  with  the  other  commissioners  and 
"to  use  and  pursue  proper  measures  in  pursuance  of  their 
(your)  instructions  from  the  said  General  Assembly."32  Even 
the  appointment  of  delegates  was  made  by  the  assembly  and 
not  by  the  governor.  The  New  Hampshire  commissioners  were 
given  full  power  to  conclude  a  treaty  with  the  Indians,  but 
none  to  enter  into  a  union.33  Maryland  voted  £500  for  the 
Indians,  but  on  any  scheme  of  defense  her  delegates  were  given 
no  authority  to  act.  They  were  simply  to  "observe  the  propo 
sitions"  and  report  all  plans  to  Governor  Sharpe,  but  to  agree 
to  no  plan  for  men  or  forts.34  Virginia  sent  no  delegates  to 
Albany  because  Governor  Dinwiddie  was  himself  negotiating 
with  the  Indians,  but  about  a  year  afterward,  when  General 


28  N.  J.  Arch.,  ser.  1,  viii,  part  1,  294-295. 

2»  The  assembly  was  willing  to  vote  "a  small  Present"  but  could  not 
be  expected  to  "make  it  very  large  at  this  Time"  on  account  of  heavy 
expenses.  Answer  to  the  governor.  Pa.  Col.  Eec.,  v,  749. 

so  Commission.    Pa.  Arch.,  1748-56,  ii,  142-143. 
3i  Ibid.,  141-142. 
wlUd.,  140-141. 
wlbid.,  138. 
34J&U2.,  139-140. 


12  University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  l 

Shirley  asked  the  assembly  to  send  commissioners  to  meet  those 
from  other  colonies,  they  "immediately  made  Resolve  against 
it"35 

It  is  well  known  that  none  of  the  colonies  accepted  the  plan 
of  union  prepared  by  the  convention  at  Albany  because  they 
considered  that  by  it  too  much  power  would  be  taken  from 
their  hands.  Some  of  them  voted  it  down  with  silent  contempt, 
while  a  few  strenuously  opposed  it  as  a  serious  menace  to  their 
liberties.  A  committee  of  the  Connecticut  assembly  appointed 
to  consider  the  plan  thought  that  the  general  taxing  power  given 
to  the  President-General  and  Council  was  *  *  a  very  extraordinary 
thing,  and  against  the  rights  and  privileges  of  Englishmen  in 
general. ' '  It  would  be  an  "  innovation ' '  and  ' '  breach  on  charter 
privileges"  and  "greatly  discourage  and  dishearten  his  Majesty's 
good  subjects."  If  the  President-General  were  given  power  to 
appoint  military  officers,  they  said,  the  "youth  would  not  en 
list.  '  '3C  The  assembly  stated  that  the  Connecticut  commissioners 
opposed  the  plan  while  at  Albany  and  refused  assent  to  it,37  but 
both  Franklin  and  Hutchinson  who  were  members  of  the  conven 
tion  said  that  it  was  unanimously  adopted.38 

Although  Massachusetts  gave  her  delegates  larger  powers  than 
other  colonies,  the  plan  of  union  when  submitted  for  ratification 
was  rejected.  A  "large  body  of  people  assembled  in  town- 
meeting"  at  Boston  to  consider  the  plan  disapproved  by  a  de 
cided  majority.  Dr.  William  Clarke,  one  of  the  number,  wrote 
Franklin  that  the  projected  plan  for  union  was  a  "scheme  for 
the  destroying  the  liberties  and  privileges  of  every  British  sub 
ject  upon  the  continent."39 

The  Pennsylvania  assembly  denied  the  binding  force  of  any 
general  union  even  in  Indian  affairs,  asserting  that  "we  con- 


35  Pa.  Arch.,  1748-56,  ii,  446. 

36  Coll.  Mass.  Hist.  Soc.,  ser.  1,  vii,  208-209. 

37  Ibid.,  213. 

38  Franklin,  Works,  i,  177;  Hutchinson,  History  of  Massachusetts  Bay, 
iii,  23.     Another  contemporary  said  that  "every  member  of  the  congress, 
except  Mr.  DeLancey, "  approved  the  plan.     Coll.  Mass.  Hist.  Soc.,  ser.  1, 
vii,  77. 

39  Coll.  Mass.  Hist.  Soc.,  ser.  1,  vi,  85-86. 


1911J  McCormac:  Colonial  Opposition  13 

sider  that  no  Propositions  for  an  Union  of  the  Colonies  in  Indian 
Affairs  can  effectually  answer  the  good  Purposes,  or  be  binding 
farther  than  they  are  confirmed  by  Laws  enacted  under  the 
several  Governments  comprized  in  that  Union. '  '40 

Rhode  Island  like  Connecticut  saw  in  the  Albany  plan  a 
menace  to  her  charter  rights  and  took  vigorous  steps  to  defeat 
it.  Her  agent  in  England  was  "directed  to  be  upon  his  watch, 
and  if  any  thing  shall  be  moved  in  Parliament,  respecting  the 
plan  for  a  union  of  his  Majesty's  northern41  colonies,  projected 
at  Albany,  which  may  have  a  tendency  to  infringe  on  our  char 
tered  privileges,  that  he  use  his  utmost  endeavors  to  get  it  put 
off,  until  such  time  as  the  government  is  furnished  with  a  copy, 
and  have  opportunity  of  making  answer  thereto."42  Parlia 
ment,  however,  took  no  action  in  the  matter. 

The  part  of  the  Albany  plan  which  the  colonies  considered 
most  dangerous  was  that  which  gave  taxing  power  to  the  Grand 
Council  and  President-General.  They  ignored  the  fact  that  this 
council  was  to  possess  the  initiative  and  that  its  members  were 
to  be  chosen  from  the  colonies  by  the  representatives  of  the 
people.  This  taxing  power  was  to  be  limited  to  the  levying  of 
"duties,  imposts  or  taxes"  for  general  purposes  only.  It  would 
make  the  general  government  self-supporting  within  its  own 
limited  sphere,  but  in  other  respects  the  integrity  and  autonomy 
of  the  separate  governments  would  have  remained  as  before. 
After  years  of  bitter  experience  it  was  found  necessary  to  grant 
such  powers  to  the  new  federal  government.  It  would  be  idle 
to  speculate  on  the  probable  effect  that  the  adoption  of  the 
Albany  plan  would  have  had  in  obviating  or  postponing  the 
Revolution,  for  there  was  never  any  probability  that  such  a 
measure  would  be  acceptable  to  either  side. 

The  British  government  and  British  officials  in  America  op 
posed  the  plan  prepared  at  Albany  because  it  did  not  give 


40  pa.  Col.  Eec.,  vi,  45. 

41  Besides  the  plan   embracing  all   of  the  colonies,  another  plan  was 
proposed   at   Albany   for  a   union   of   six   of   the   northern   colonies.     Coll. 
Mass.  Hist.  Soc.,  ser.  1,  vii,  203. 

42  Arnold,  History  of  Bhode  Island,  ii,  191. 


14  University  of  California  Publications  in  History     LVoL- l 

sufficient  control  to  the  mother  country.  General  Shirley  severely 
criticized  it  and  declared  that  powers  were  assumed  that  be 
longed  to  the  king.  He  likened  it  to  the  governments  of  Con 
necticut  and  Rhode  Island  which  were  practically  independent 
of  the  crown.  The  latter  especially  had,  in  his  opinion,  abused 
its  freedom.  He  believed  that  any  attempt  at  union  by  the 
colonies  themselves  must  prove  futile  because  of  their  "different 
conditions,  situations,  circumstances  and  tempers."  He  did  not 
believe  that  the  commissioners  who  drafted  the  Albany  plan 
had  any  expectation  that  it  would  be  adopted;  and  if  it  had 
been  adopted,  it  could  never  have  been  executed.43  Governor 
Morris  of  Pennsylvania  pronounced  the  plan  too  republican  in 
principle,  giving  the  crown  little  or  no  authority,  and  he  did 
not  wonder  that  it  "was  not  relished  at  home."  He  rightly 
observed  that  any  effective  union  must  permit  the  general  gov 
ernment  to  employ  the  colonial  forces  when  and  where  it  might 
be  necessary.44  This  was  a  point  which  the  colonists  were  never 
willing  to  concede,  and  their  obstinacy  hindered  military  oper 
ations  throughout  the  war. 

A  treaty  with  the  Six  Nations  was  the  immediate  object  of 
the  meeting  at  Albany,  and,  as  above  stated,  several  of  the  col 
onies  voted  money  and  gave  authority  to  their  delegates  on  this 
subject  while  they  refused  to  commit  themselves  on  the  question 
of  union.  The  British  government,  also,  fully  realized  the  im 
portance  of  an  Indian  alliance.  In  a  report  to  the  king  on 
the  Albany  convention,  the  Board  of  Trade  pointed  out  how 
impossible  it  was  for  individual  colonies  to  deal  successfully  with 
the  Indians,  however  good  the  intentions  of  any  colony  might 
be.  New  York  had,  up  to  this  time,  been  the  colony  chiefly 
concerned  with  Indian  affairs,  but  for  various  reasons — includ 
ing  duplicity  and  selfish  dealing  of  the  New  York  commissioners 


«  pa.  Arch.,  ser.  2,  vi,  213-218;  N.  Y.  Col.  Hist.  Docs.,  vi,  930.  Shirley 
to  Secretary  Eobinson,  Dec.  24,  1754.  Hutchinson  says  in  his  History  of 
Massachusetts  Bay  (iii,  23)  that  "some  of  the  delegates  who  agreed  to  it 
in  Albany  doubted  whether  it  would  ever  be  approved  of  by  the  king,  the 
parliament,  or  any  of  the  American  assemblies." 

4i  Pa.  Arch.,  1748-56,  ii,  499.     Morris  to  Shirley. 


1911J  McCormac:  Colonial  Opposition  15 

—the  Indians  had  lost  faith  in  the  English.  The  French  had 
grasped  the  opportunity  and  by  pursuing  the  opposite  policy 
were  winning  the  friendship  of  the  Indians.  For  these  reasons 
the  Board  of  Trade  asked  the  king  to  take  charge  of  Indian 
affairs  as  the  only  remedy  that  could  forestall  the  French.45 
Members  of  this  board  had  already  urged  the  importance  of  the 
friendship  of  the  Six  Nations  and  criticised  the  colonies  for  not 
exerting  themselves  to  secure  it.  In  a  letter  to  DeLancey  of 
New  York  they  said,  "The  preserving  and  securing  the  friend 
ship  of  these  Indians  is  in  the  present  situation  of  affairs  an 
object  of  the  greatest  Importance  it  is  from  the  steady  adher 
ence  of  these  Indians  to  the  British  Interests  that  not  only 
New  York  but  all  the  other  Northern  Colonys  have  hitherto 
been  secured  from  the  fatal  effects  of  the  encroachments  of  a 
foreign  power,  and  without  their  friendship  and  assistance  all 
our  efforts  to  check  and  disappoint  the  present  view  of  this  power 
may  prove  ineffectual."  The  advantages  of  such  a  treaty,  they 
said,  "are  so  apparent  that  we  are  at  a  loss  to  guess  at  the 
motives  for  the  conduct  of  those  Colony's  who  have  declined 
joining  in  the  treaty  with  them. '  '46  As  nearly  every  colony  had 
expressed  an  opinion  that  a  general  union  was  absolutely  neces 
sary,  and  as  a  convention  such  as  the  one  held  at  Albany  was 
the  only  method  of  forming  one,  the  Board  of  Trade  was  both 
surprised  and  disappointed  with  the  indifference  and  obstinacy 
of  the  colonies.47 

Inability  of  the  colonies  to  form  a  union  for  common  defense 
made  a  bad  impression  upon  the  Indians  whose  friendship  they 
were  seeking.  The  Indians  doubted  the  sincerity  of  the  English 
and  their  ability  to  act  with  vigor  and  unanimity  against  the 
French.  They  were,  therefore,  not  eager  to  form  an  alliance 
with  the  English.48  No  one  could  blame  the  Indians  for  not 


45Keport,  Oct.  29,  1754,  N.  ¥.  Col.  Hist.  Docs.,  vi,  917-918;  Pa.  Arch., 
ser.  2,  vi,  206-210.  This  recommendation  was  soon  acted  upon  and  Sir  Will 
iam  Johnson  was  appointed  colonel  of  the  Six  Nations. 

462V.  Y.  Col.  Hist.  Docs.,  vi,  845-846;  Pa.  Arch.,  ser.  2,  vi,  193. 

47  n>id. 

48  Sir  William  Johnson,  Suggestions,  etc.,  in  Pa.  Arch.,  ser.  2,  vi,  204. 


16  University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  l 

wishing  to  aid  what  must  inevitably  be  the  losing  side,  for  defeat 
would  leave  them  at  the  mercy  of  their  long-standing  enemy. 

With  such  want  of  unity  admitted  on  all  sides,  and  with  such 
indifference  and  jealousy  of  everything  outside  of  their  own 
immediate  localities,  it  is  not  at  all  surprising  that  the  call  for 
men  and  money  to  carry  on  the  war  met  with  opposition  in  the 
various  colonies.  In  general  they  seemed  to  look  upon  the  war 
as  a  struggle  for  empire  on  the  part  of  the  two  mother  countries. 
If  successful,  England  would  reap  the  benefits  and  should  there 
fore  pay  the  expenses.  The  colonies  most  exposed  might  see 
some  immediate  advantage  in  the  success  of  England,  but  even 
they  as  a  rule  preferred  to  let  the  enemy  do  his  worst,  and 
unhindered,  rather  than  yield  the  smallest  of  their  much  cher 
ished  "rights."  Not  only  did  they  guard  against  yielding  any 
thing  to  the  British  government,  but  even  the  most  energetic 
of  them  watched  carefully  the  actions  of  other  colonies,  each 
government  jealous  lest  it  might  do  more  than  its  share.  For 
this  reason  Governor  Shirley  urged  the  Earl  of  Holdernesse  to 
have  the  quotas  fixed  in  England.  Massachusetts  had  done  some 
thing,  he  said,  but  hesitated  to  do  more  until  Connecticut  and 
other  colonies  should  evince  a  disposition  to  do  their  share.49 
Maryland  waited  to  see  what  Virginia  and  Pennsylvania  would 
do  before  she  would  vote  supplies,  and  Governor  Sharpe  dryly 
remarked  that  Fort  Du  Quesne  "I  believe  is  too  strong  for  me 
to  reduce  by  Virtue  of  His  Excellency's  Commission  without 
either  Men,  Artillery,  Money  or  Provisions. '  '50 

Governor  Morris  of  Pennsylvania  ventured  the  opinion  in 
1755  that  Braddock's  army  need  not  have  been  sent  to  America 
if  the  colonies  had  not  been  divided  and  jealous,  and  their 
assemblies  made  up  of  men  ''unacquainted  with  the  nature  of 
government,  &  hav(ing)  private  and  selfish  ends  to  answer."51 
Morris  had  written  a  short  time  before  this  to  Braddock  that 
"The  Conduct  of  the  Assemblies  upon  the  Continent  almost 


4»  Pa.  Arch.,  ser.  2,  vi,  174-177. 

so  Corresp.  of  Gov.  Sharpe,  i,  403.     Sharpe  to  W.  Sharpe,  May  2,  1756. 

5i  Pa.    Arch.,  1748-56,  ii,  280. 


1911]  McCormac:  Colonial  Opposition  17 

without  Exception  has  been  so  very  absurd  that  they  have  suf 
fered  the  French  to  take  quiet  Possession  of  the  most  advanta 
geous  Places,  not  only  to  answer  the  Purposes  of  a  very  extensive 
Indian  Trade,  but  to  enable  them  to  protect  their  own  Settle 
ments  and  annoy  ours;  such  are  their  Forts  at  Niagara,  Crown 
Point,  and  the  several  ones  upon  Lake  Erie,  the  Eiver  Ohio,  and 
its  Branches."  The  Indians,  he  added,  had  asked  for  aid,  but 
the  colonies  would  do  nothing.52 

Such  were  the  conditions  in  the  colonies  when  England  called 
upon  them  for  assistance  in  the  war  with  the  French.  Public 
spirit  and  liberality  could  hardly  be  expected.  It  was  not  the 
expense  alone  which  the  colonies  opposed  (although  according 
to  a  contemporary  they  were  "parsimonious  even  to  prodigal 
ity"),53  but  the  whole  system  of  imperial  control.  Each  colony 
guarded  jealously  the  "rights"  which  it  prized  more  than  the 
general  welfare,  and  some  of  the  assemblies  saw  in  the  urgent 
needs  of  the  home  government  an  opportunity  to  enlarge  upon 
those  "rights." 

When  hostilities  with  the  French  became  inevitable,  the  king 
sent  orders  (October  7,  1754)  to  Governor  Shirley  of  Massa 
chusetts  to  enlist  volunteers.  All  magistrates  were  required  to 
assist  in  their  official  capacities.54 

In  the  early  part  of  the  war  royal  orders  required  that  only 
troops  of  proper  age  and  size  should  be  enlisted,55  but  before 
the  struggle  had  proceeded  far,  almost  any  kind  of  troops  was 
willingly  accepted. 

II.  NEW  ENGLAND 

MASSACHUSETTS 

In  general  the  New  England  governments  responded  with 
more  willingness  and  promptness  than  the  other  colonies.  From 


52  Pa.  Col.  Eec.,  vi,  336.  See  also  Review  of  Military  Operations,  etc., 
in  Coll.  Mass.  Hist.  Soc.,  ser.  1,  vii,  75. 

"  Coll.  Mass.  Hist.  Soc.,  ser.  1,  vii,  161-162. 

54  Pa.  Arch.,  ser.  2,  ii,  686. 

ss  Distrust  of  Catholics  led  the  king  to  issue  orders  forbidding  their 
enlistment,  e.g.  Pa.  Arch.,  ser.  2,  ii,  691-693,  700-701. 


18  University  of  California  Publications  in  History     LVoL-  * 

the  first  they  took  the  lead  in  active  military  operations.56  Both 
Massachusetts  and  Connecticut  voted  money  liberally.57  Massa 
chusetts,  especially,  under  the  leadership  of  Governor  Shirley, 
took  a  prominent  part  in  all  of  the  northern  campaigns.  Shirley 
was  more  popular  than  royal  governors58  in  other  colonies  and 
during  his  administration  the  assembly  usually  granted  muni 
tions  of  war  with  little  opposition.  Shirley's  success  with  his 
assembly  was  due  in  part  to  his  diplomatic  policy  in  dealing 
with  them.  "He  generally  urged  the  measures  which  he  pro 
posed  to  the  assembly,"  said  Hutchinson,59  "as  far  as  he  could 
without  worrying  them  and  putting  them  out  of  temper,  and 
no  further."  By  representing  to  them  that  the  money  would 
be  repaid  by  England  he  induced  many  of  the  members  to  with 
draw  their  opposition  and  vote  for  military  grants.60  In  1756. 
when  the  assembly  hesitated,  Shirley  again  induced  them  to  vote 
aid  by  urging  that  the  surest  way  to  "obtain  a  compensation 
for  what  they  had  already  done  would  be  by  a  further  vigorous 
exertion. ' '  When  they  pleaded  want  of  ability  to  borrow  money 
on  their  credit  to  meet  the  present  expense,  Shirley  met  this 
objection  by  loaning  them  £30,000  sterling  which  had  been  sent 
over  for  the  use  of  the  royal  troops.61  Mr.  Bollan,  their  agent 
in  London,  made  the  most  of  this  alleged  poverty  in  urging 
Parliament  to  reimburse  the  colony,62  and  contended  that  the 
colony  had  exhausted  its  resources  in  financing  the  Crown  Point 
expedition.  The  fact  that  several  of  the  members  of  the  assembly 


^Coll.  Mass.  Hist.  Soc.,  ser.  1,  vi,  40;  vii,  139;  Pa.  Arch.,  1748-56,  ii, 
579;  same,  ser.  2,  vi,  223-224;  Pa.  Col.  Eec.,  vi,  486. 

57  Pa.  Arch.,  1748-56,  ii,  398.     Delaneey  to  Morris,  Sept.  1,  1755. 

ss  <  <  With  respect  to  the  wisdom  and  equity  of  his  administration,  he 
[Shirley]  can  boast  the  universal  suffrage  of  a  wise,  free,  jealous,  and 
moral  people. ' '  Coll.  Mass.  Hist.  Soc.,  ser.  1,  vii,  69. 

5»  History  of  Massachusetts  Bay,  ii,  16. 
eo  ibid.,  29. 

si  Ibid.,  44,  45.  He  adds:  "The  province  was  never  in  better  credit 
than  at  this  time.  They  could  have  borrowed  enough  to  pay  the  charges 
of  the  past  and  present  year;  but  this  mode  of  proceeding  induced  many 
members  to  come  into  the  measure.  They  were  made  to  believe  it  tended 
to  facilitate  the  obtaining  of  a  grant  from  parliament. ' ' 

62  Coll.  Mass.  Hist.  Soc.,  ser.  1,  vi,  47. 


1911]  McCormac:  Colonial  Opposition  19 

were  veterans  of  the  Louisburg  expedition  made  the  governor's 
task  much  easier.63  The  appointment  of  their  governor  as  com- 
mander-in-ehief  which  gave  the  colony  a  commanding  position 
no  doubt  contributed  to  the  public  spirit  of  the  assembly.  An 
incident  occurred  in  1755  after  the  Crown  Point  expedition 
which  illustrates  their  jealousy  and  desire  for  prestige.  Shirley 
had  induced  the  assembly  to  acquiesce  in  his  appointment  of 
Colonel  Johnson  of  New  York  as  commanding-general  of  the 
expedition  by  representing  that  he  was  the  only  man  that  could 
induce  the  Indians  to  join  the  English.  Johnson  was  successful 
in  an  engagement  with  the  French  and  captured  a  number  of 
the  enemy,  including  the  French  general.  The  Massachusetts 
assembly  was  greatly  displeased  because  Johnson  reported  his 
success  to  New  York  instead  of  their  own  government.  The 
assembly  ordered  the  lieutenant-governor  to  "acquaint  general 
Johnson,  that,  as  the  Massachusetts  province  bore  the  greatest 
part  of  the  charge  and  burden  of  the  expedition,  it  ought  to 
be  considered  as  principal  in  all  respects;  and  that  all  papers 
and  advices  of  importance  ought  to  be  first  sent  to  that  province ; 
and  that  the  French  general,  and  other  prisoners  of  note,  ought 
to  be  sent  to  Boston."64 

Besides  voting  men  and  money  freely,  the  assembly  at  dif 
ferent  times  offered  liberal  bounties  to  volunteers  and  enacted 
adequate  draft  laws.  No  troops  could  be  taken  from  the  prov 
ince  without  their  own  consent  unless  the  removal  was  sanctioned 
by  the  assembly,  but  such  authority  was  readily  given  in  most 
cases.  After  Braddock's  defeat  they  met  in  extra-legal  session65 
and  made  provision  for  an  additional  force  of  two  thousand 
men.  They  were  not  so  punctilious  in  small  matters  as  some 
of  the  other  assemblies,  and  on  several  occasions  tacitly  allowed 
the  governor  and  council  to  perform  acts  which,  constitution 
ally,  the  assembly  alone  had  power  to  do.66 


es  Hutchinson,  History  of  Massachusetts  Bay,  iii,  28. 

64  Ibid.,  36. 

65  See  ibid.,  34,  for  particulars, 
ee  Ibid.,  58. 


20  University  of  California  Publications  in  History     ITOL-  * 

There  were  of  course  occasional  murmurings  concerning  the 
heavy  financial  burden,67  and  serious  trouble  with  Loudoun  over 
the  interpretation  of  the  British  quartering  act  seemed  immi 
nent  in  1757,  but  controversies  were,  as  a  rule,  amicably  settled 
and  did  not  prevent  the  assembly  from  doing  all  that  could  be 
reasonably  expected  of  it.  On  one  occasion  only  was  there  a 
threatened  deadlock  over  the  control  and  disbursement  of  money 
voted  for  military  purposes.  The  assembly  adopted  a  practice 
which  prevailed  in  several  of  the  other  colonies  of  appropiating 
money  to  be  paid  to  particular  troops  for  a  particular  service 
and  forbidding  that  it  be  used  for  any  other  purpose.  Shirley 
had  signed  such  bills,  but  Pownall  who  became  governor  in  1757 
refused  his  assent  to  a  bill  of  this  kind,  declaring  it  unconsti 
tutional.  He  held  out  for  several  days,  but  the  assembly  would 
not  yield  the  point  and  he  at  last  signed  it  under  protest.68 

This  episode  passed  unnoticed  in  England,  and  as  the  assem 
bly  had  won  their  point,  the  military  situation  was  not  affected 
by  it.  In  the  early  part  of  1758  when  a  call  came  from  Pitt 
for  troops  to  invade  Canada,  the  assembly  responded  by  a  unan 
imous  vote  to  send  seven  thousand  men  to  serve  with  the  British 
regulars.  They  had  high  hopes  of  the  success  of  the  expedition 
and  as  Pownall  wrote,  ' '  It  was  thought  proper  that  this  Province 
should  set  the  example."69  Pitt's  promise  of  reimbursement  no 
doubt  had  its  influence  on  the  members.  Although  England 
did  not  fully  repay  Massachusetts  for  the  expense  she  had  in 
curred  during  the  war,  the  specie  expended  in  the  province  and 
the  increase  in  commerce  compensated  her,  in  part  at  least,  for 
her  liberal  grants.70 

CONNECTICUT 

In  Connecticut,  as  a  result  of  popular  government,  libera^ 

67  After  the  Crown  Point  expedition  they  at  first  declined  to  vote  new 
supplies,  declaring  that  "securing  his  majesty's  territories  is  a  design 
which  his  majesty  only  is  equal  to  project  and  execute,  and  the  nation  to 
support;  and  that  it  cannot  reasonably  be  expected  that  these  infant  planta 
tions  should  engage  as  principals  in  the  affair. ' '  Hutchinson,  iii,  38. 

es  Hutchinson,  iii,  66-67. 

69  R.  I.  Col.  Eec.,  vi,  136. 

TO  Hutchinson,  iii,  79. 


19111  McCormac :  Colonial  Opposition  21 

powers  were  given  by  the  assembly  to  executive  officers.  For 
the  same  reason  the  assembly  cooperated  with  the  governor  by 
voting  liberal  grants  of  money  and  supplies.  In  1755,  when 
General  Shirley  called  on  Connecticut  to  furnish  a  quota  of 
one  thousand  men  for  the  Crown  Point  expedition,  the  assembly 
voted  to  comply  with  the  request,  although  they  considered  the 
number  relatively  larger  than  the  quotas  of  Massachusetts  and 
New  York.71  They  even  permitted  New  York  to  enlist  three 
hundred  men  in  Connecticut  for  this  expediton.72  I  have  found 
no  similar  instance  in  the  records  of  any  other  colony.  The 
estimated  expense  to  Connecticut  of  this  expedition  was  reported 
to  the  Board  of  Trade  as  over  £6000  sterling.73  When  the  Earl 
of  Loudoun  called  for  troops  in  1756  the  Connecticut  assembly 
promptly  voted  the  necessary  men.74  A  few  months  later  (Jan 
uary,  1757 ) ,  however,  they  appointed  a  committee  to  confer  with 
the  earl  at  Boston.  This  committee  was  given  authority  to 
furnish  men  not  to  exceed  one  thousand  two  hundred  and  fifty, 
but  the  number  furnished  must  be  governed  by  the  quotas  voted 
by  other  New  England  colonies.75  While  the  assembly's  fear 
of  doing  more  than  its  share  is  evident  in  the  succeeding  years 
of  the  war,  nevertheless  it  showed  public  spirit  and  loyalty  to 
the  cause.76  The  fact  that  even  the  most  loyal  colonies  felt  it 
necessary  to  make  such  contingent  grants  only  emphasized  the 
necessity  of  some  central  authority.  Acts  were  passed  for 
quartering  British  troops  and  for  protecting  them  from  exor 
bitant  prices.77  In  1755,  1756,  and  again  in  1758,  the  assembly 


71  Col.  Eec.  of  Conn.,  x,  336. 

72  Hid.,  390. 

73  Ibid.,  624. 

74  Hid.,  545,  555. 

75  Ibid.,  594-595. 

TV  Ibid.,  598-599;  xi,  93,  and  many  scattered  items  in  vols.  x  and  xi, 
for  example,  the  following  from  vol.  xi: 

March,   1758,  £30,000,  p.  100.  March,  1760,  £70,000,  p.  351. 

February,  1759,  £20,000,  p.  214.  March,  1761,  £45,000,  p.  482. 

March,  1759,  £40,000,  p.  235.  March,   1762,  £65,000,  p.  615. 

May,  1759,  £10,000,  p.  255. 

77  Ibid.,  xi,  176,  190,  216,  304. 


22  University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  1 

authorized  the  impressment  of  troops  to  complete  the  quotas.78 
In  October,  1755,  the  assembly  appointed  a  "Committee  of  War" 
and  gave  it  full  power  to  send  out  any  number  of  troops  it 
thought  necessary  to  defend  the  frontier  towns  and  neighboring 
provinces,  and  to  do  anything  else  necessary  for  defense.79  In 
striking  contrast  to  assemblies  farther  south,  they  gave  the  gov 
ernor  ample  power  in  matters  of  appointments  and  the  dis 
bursement  of  money.80  There  was  consequently  little  friction 
in  internal  affairs. 

ERODE  ISLAND 

Rhode  Island,  like  her  sister  charter  colony,  Connecticut, 
voted  men  and  money  quite  freely,  and  for  the  same  reason 
there  was  no  clash  between  executive  and  legislative  authority. 
But  here  also  is  found  the  same  determination  to  do  relatively 
no  more  than  her  neighbors.  On  January  1,  1755,  in  response 
to  a  letter  from  Sir  Thomas  Robinson,  the  assembly  promptly 
voted  one  hundred  men  and  offered  a  bounty  of  £18  for  enlist 
ment.81  They  voted  a  few  days  later  to  establish  a  lottery  for 
the  purpose  of  raising  £10,000  toward  building  Fort  George.82 
When,  in  March,  General  Shirley  requested  aid  for  the  Crown 
Point  expedition  the  assembly  immediately  voted  four  hundred 
men  and  £60,000  for  expenses,  but  the  act  was  to  be  effective 
only  on  condition  that  other  colonies  did  their  share.  A  "Com 
mittee  of  War"  was  appointed  to  purchase  supplies  and  to  look 
after  matters  of  defense.83  Despite  the  opposition  of  some 
members  who  asserted  that  Rhode  Island  had  done  relatively 
more  than  other  colonies,  additional  grants  of  men  and  money 
were  made  for  this  expedition.  Commissioners  were  chosen  to 
meet  those  from  other  colonies,  and  instead  of  dictating  every 
thing  as  was  customary  in  royal  and  proprietary  provinces,  the 


78  Col  Eec.  of  Conn.,  x,  398,  495;  xi,  121. 

70  Ibid.,  x,  319. 

so  Ibid.,  483. 

si  E.  I.  Col.  Eec.,  v,  404. 

82  Ibid.,  505. 

ss  Ibid.,  418-426. 


1911]  McCormac:  Colonial  Opposition  23 

assembly  gave  the  commissioners  full  power  to  assist  other  col 
onies  during  the  present  and  future  campaigns.84  Their  zeal 
brought  them  hearty  commendation  from  the  king.85  Governor 
Hopkins  informed  Partridge,  their  agent  in  London,  that  the 
Crown  Point  campaign  alone  cost  Rhode  Island  £15,000 
sterling.86 

Liberal  grants  were  made  in  succeeding  years.  Laws  were 
passed  to  promote  enlistment  by  giving  bounties,  to  enforce  dis 
cipline  by  court-martial,  and  to  prevent  desertion.87  Usually 
the  assembly  did  not  oppose  the  taking  of  troops  to  serve  outside 
of  the  colony.  In  one  instance  they  adopted  a  restrictive  measure 
which  called  forth  a  well-merited  rebuke  from  Loudoun,  who 
asserted  with  good  reason  that  the  service  of  colonial  troops  on 
such  terms  would  be  more  detrimental  than  beneficial.88  The 
rebuke  had  the  desired  effect,  for  a  few  months  later  (August, 
1757)  the  assembly  voted  to  send  one-sixth  of  their  militia  on 
the  Lake  George  expedition,  and  the  treasurer  was  authorized 
to  "hire"  money  for  their  support.89  The  number  of  troops 
who  served  in  the  field  in  most  cases  fell  short  of  the  number 
voted.  Dereliction  of  officers  in  charge  of  the  draft,  who  ac 
cepted  bribes  in  lieu  of  service,  nullified  the  laws  in  many 
instances,90  in  spite  of  the  good  intentions  of  the  assembly. 

On  the  whole  there  seems  to  be  little  foundation  for  the 
charge  often  made  against  the  two  charter  colonies  by  royal 
officials — that  they  were  less  loyal  to  the  interests  of  the  mother 


84  E.  I.  Col  Eec.,  v,  433,  438,  448-449,  464. 

85  Ibid.,  467. 

se  Ibid.,  500.     Memorial  of  Partridge  to  Board  of  Trade,  April  2,  1756. 

si  Ibid.,  492;  vi,  22,  34,  78,  129,  and  many  later  items. 

ss  <  *  The  confining  your  men  to  any  particular  service,  appears  to  me  to 
be  a  preposterous  measure.  Our  affairs  are  not  in  a  situation  to  make  it 
reasonable  for  any  colony  to  be  influenced  by  its  particular  interest  .  .  .  . " 
He  agrees  to  treat  the  soldiers  well,  "But  to  engage  that  I  will  employ 
them  in  this  or  that  particular  place  only,  it  is  what  I  cannot  do  upon  any 
terms;  for  I  think  it  would  be  sure  to  be  more  prejudicial  to  the  public  than 
the  whole  benefit  which  we  may  expect  from  the  provincial  forces  would 
countervail."  Loudoun  to  Governor  Hopkins,  Jan.  29,  1757.  E.  I.  Col 
Eec.,  vi,  17. 

89  E.  I.  Col  Eec.,  vi,  75,  78. 

90  Ibid.,  137.     Gen.  Abercromby  to  Lieut.  Gov.  Gardner,  March  15,  1758. 


24  University  of  California  Publications  in  History.     !TOL- l 

country  than  those  colonies  which  enjoyed  less  freedom  and 
autonomy.  Compared  with  others,  their  attitude  was  loyal  and 
generous. 

NEW  HAMPSHIRE 

Of  all  New  England  colonies  New  Hampshire  was  most  re 
luctant  in  voting  assistance  during  the  war.  While  the  other 
New  England  assemblies  responded  more  or  less  cheerfully91  to 
calls  from  the  commanding  general,  the  assembly  of  New  Hamp 
shire  always  deliberated  long  and  carefully  before  acting.  Very 
often  the  assistance  they  did  vote  was  too  long  delayed  to  be 
of  much  service.  The  disposition  of  the  assembly  to  haggle  over 
small  points  is  very  noticeable,  but  disputes  with  the  governor 
never  reached  the  intensity  of  similar  contentions  in  the  middle 
colonies.  The  harmony,  however,  was  more  apparent  than  real. 
When  they  denied  a  request  of  the  governor  they  usually  based 
their  refusal  on  pleas  of  poverty  or  on  a  different  interpretation 
of  royal  instructions.  They  did  not  deny  British  authority 
outright.  The  governor  on  his  part  did  not  resort  to  abusive 
language,  but  confined  his  arguments  to  the  letter  of  his  instruc 
tions,  and  usually  in  the  end  yielded  to  prevent  the  entire  failure 
of  desired  measures.  For  these  reasons  an  open  breach  was 
avoided. 

As  early  as  January,  1754,  Governor  Wentworth  called  the 
assembly  to  account  for  not  including  a  suspending  clause  in 
their  laws  which  would  render  them  inoperative  until  approved 
by  the  king.  In  this  province,  he  said,  no  law  could  become 
effective  until  it  had  been  so  approved.92  The  assembly  ignored 
the  protest,  and  necessity  forced  the  governor  to  allow  the  prac 
tice  to  continue. 

The  suspending  clause  was  considered  a  most  arbitrary  and 
unreasonable  thing  by  all  colonies  in  which  it  was  required,  and 
it  was  later  included  in  the  Declaration  of  Independence  as 
one  of  the  charges  against  the  king.  Like  all  veto  power  it 
was  capable  of  being  abused  and  no  doubt  was  abused  in  some 


si  N.  H.  Prov.  Pap.,  vi,  499.    Shirley  to  Wentworth,  March  16,  1756. 
92  Hid.,  232. 


19111  McCormac:  Colonial  Opposition  25 

cases,  but  England  considered  it  necessary  to  have  some  check 
qn  legislation,  especially  on  laws  for  the  extravagant  issue  of 
paper  money. 

When  first  asked  to  assist  in  the  common  defense  the  New 
Hampshire  assembly  expressed  deep  concern  and  loyalty,  but 
pleaded  poverty.93  A  little  later  they  voted  a  small  number  of 
troops  to  serve  for  a  few  months  in  defending  their  own 
province.  This  short  term  of  service  and  the  uncertainty  of 
additional  grants  made  it  impossible  for  the  governor  to  form 
any  definite  plans.94 

Much  time  was  lost  in  waiting  to  see  what  other  colonies — 
especially  Massachusetts — were  going  to  contribute.  This  made 
the  small  contributions  of  the  legislative  body  tardy  and  less 
effective.  They  voted  six  hundred  men  in  March  of  1775,  which 
they  claimed  was  a  much  greater  number  than  their  just  quota. 
They  did  it  on  account  of  critical  times  and  this  number  was 
not  to  be  a  ''Precedent"  for  future  quotas.  These  troops  were 
for  the  first  Crown  Point  expedition  and  were  to  be  "subsisted 
at  the  charge  of  this  Province  with  provisions  till  they  shall 
arrive  at  the  place  of  Gen1  Rendezvous  and  no  longer."95  The 
route  over  which  the  troops  were  marched  did  not  suit  the  assem 
bly  so  they  declined  to  furnish  additional  men.96  Some  money, 
however,  was  voted  later  which  brought  the  entire  grant  for  the 
expedition  up  to  £1,500.97 

The  most  animated  controversy  occured  in  1756  over  a  bill 
granting  £30,000  for  the  second  Crown  Point  campaign.  In  this 
bill  the  assembly  named  certain  officers,  including  agents  to  go  to 
Albany  to  look  after  the  disbursement  of  their  money.  The 


»3  N.  H.  Prov.  Pap.,  vi,  various  messages  to  the  governor. 

94  Ibid.,  319.  "It  being  uncertain  whether  the  Assembly  will  pay  the 
Troops  for  any  longer  time  than  their  Grants  extended  to,  I  think  it  proper 
that  you  give  orders  for  dismissing  both  the  Troops  posted  on  Merrimack 
and  those  on  Connecticut  Eiver,  unless  they  are  willing  to  remain  at  the 
mercy  of  the  Assembly,  which  I  cannot  advise  to."  Gov.  Wentworth  to 
Col.  Blanchard,  Nov.  3,  1754. 

as  Ibid.,  361. 

96  Ibid.,  409. 

97  Ibid.,  439-441.     Eeport  of  Secretary  Atkinson. 


26  University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  1 

council  approved  the  bill,98  but  the  governor  at  first  refused 
his  assent.  Asserting  that  it  was  an  encroachment  upon  the 
" Prerogative  of  the  Crown,"  the  governor  asked  that  the  bill 
be  altered,  but  the  assembly  denied  the  charge  and  refused  to 
amend  it."  The  governor  showed  them  his  instructions  from 
England  expressly  forbidding  him  to  sign  such  a  bill,100  but  in 
the  end  he  was  forced  to  break  his  instructions  and  sign  it.1 
Wentworth's  position  was  not  an  easy  one.  On  this  and  other 
occasions  he  showed  a  desire  to  be  fair,  but  his  instructions 
were  explicit  and  he  felt  bound  to  obey  them.  The  assembly 
cared  little  about  the  war  and  had  nothing  to  lose  by  delay,  but 
the  members  knew  that  the  governor  would  be  discredited  in 
England  if  he  should  fail  to  secure  aid  from  his  province.  They 
saw  the  advantage  of  their  position  and  made  the  most  of  it. 
They  were  not  the  only  assembly  that  denied  the  binding  force 
of  royal  instructions  and  welcomed  an  opportunity  to  nullify 
them. 

III.  THE  MIDDLE  COLONIES 

NEW  YORK 

New  York  was  already  the  scene  of  discord  before  war  with 
the  French  began.  Governor  Clinton,  a  firm  believer  in  preroga 
tive,  had  for  some  time  been  urging  the  home  government  to  curb 
the  independent  tendencies  of  the  assembly. 

In  April,  1751,  the  Board  of  Trade  made  an  elaborate  report 
to  the  Privy  Council  on  conditions  in  New  York  and  accom 
panied  it  with  a  mass  of  evidence  to  prove  that  the  assembly 
had  been  disregarding  royal  instructions  and  usurping  powers 
that  did  not  belong  to  them.  The  principal  charges  were  that 
the  assembly  had  refused  to  grant  permanent  salaries  to  royal 
officials,  and  had  taken  the  control  of  money  disbursements 


»8  N.  H.  Prov.  Pap.,  vi,  506-508. 

99  Ibid.,  509-511. 

100 /bid.,  517.  He  added,  ".  ...  if  I  could  dispense  with  the  King's 
Instructions,  the  Boyal  Prerogative  the  Powers  Authorities  and  Keserva- 
tions  of  the  Crown,  with  as  much  ease  as  you  do  in  the  House,  I  should 
find  no  difficulty  to  persuade  myself  to  consent  to  your  Bill. ' ' 

i  Ibid.,  520. 


1911]  McCormac:  Colonial  Opposition  27 

entirely  into  their  own  hands.  In  this  report  Halifax  and  his 
colleagues  stated  very  clearly  what  they  considered  the  panacea 
for  colonial  disorders. 

1 1  There  is  nothing  so  essencially  necessary  to  the  preservation  of  His 
Majty's  Governt  in  the  American  provinces,  as  the  careful  and  strict 
maintenance  of  the  just  prerogative,  which  is  the  only  means  by  which 
those  Colonies  can  be  kept  dependent  on  the  mouther  Country,  or  the  Gov 
ernors  themselves  representing  the  Crown,  maintain  any  power  over  their 
Assemblies,  or  any  agreement  with  them. 

' '  No  Govr  departed  from  the  prerogative  in  one  instance,  but  he  raised 
in  the  Assembly  a  confidence  to  attack  it  in  another,  which  as  constantly 
brings  on  contests,  which  again  create  animosities,  which  in  the  end  obstruct 
aU  Parts  of  Governt.  "2 

It  was  certainly  true  that  in  New  York  and  other  colonies 
the  assemblies  had  assumed  executive  powers.  It  was  equally 
true  that  they  made  much  of  precedent  in  justifying  their  con 
duct.  On  the  other  hand,  "prerogative"  was  a  most  indefinite 
and  mysterious  thing,  which  in  the  hands  of  an  unscrupulous 
executive  might  easily  be  used  to  paralyze  legitimate  legislative 
functions. 

About  the  same  time  as  the  above  report  the  Board  of  Trade 
advised  that  a  new  governor  be  appointed  and  given  stricter 
instructions,3  but  this  was  not  done  until  two  years  later.  In 
1753  Sir  Danvers  Osborne,  brother-in-law  of  Halifax,  was 
appointed  and  armed  with  instructions  which  were  prepared 
by  Halifax,  Townshend,  and  Oswald.4 

The  instructions5  were  prefaced  with  the  assertion  that  in 
New  York  "the  peace  and  tranquility  of  the  said  province  has 
been  disturbed;  order  and  government  subverted;  and  our  royal 
prerogative  and  authority  trampled  upon,  and  invaded  in  a 
most  unwarrantable  and  illegal  manner." 

After  specifying  some  of  the  "unwarrantable  proceedings" 
of  the  assembly,  the  governor  was  instructed  to  re-establish  good 


2  N.  Y.  Col.  Hist.  Docs.,  vi,  614. 

3  Bancroft,  History  of  the  United  States,  ed.  22,  iv,  5. 
*N.  Y.  Col.  Hist.  Docs.,  vi,  788-791. 

s  Dated  Aug.   13,   1753.     Extracts   given  in   Gentleman's  Magazine   for 
Feb.,  1754,  xxiv,  65. 


28  University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  l 

order  by  requiring  a  permanent  salary  for  crown  officials,  and 
also  that  all  money  voted  should  be  spent  by  warrant  of  the 
governor  approved  by  the  council,  and  not  otherwise.  The 
assembly,  however,  were  to  have  the  privilege  of  examining  the 
accounts  of  the  money  spent.6 

Osborne  found  that  instructions  were  more  easily  issued  than 
enforced.  Before  he  announced  the  new  requirements  he  was 
informed  by  the  city  council  that  they  would  not  "brook  any 
infringement  of  their  inestimable  liberties,  civil  or  religious." 
His  own  council  informed  him  that  the  assembly  would  never 
obey  the  new  instructions.  But  Osborne  did  not  live  to  put 
them  to  the  test.  Already  melancholy  on  account  of  Lady 
Osborne 's  death,  he  hanged  himself  on  the  night  following  this 
discouraging  news  from  his  council.7 

The  government  now  devolved  upon  DeLancey,  who  suc 
ceeded  in  effecting  a  compromise  for  the  time  being.  The 
assembly  declared  that  they  would  never  grant  permanent 
salaries  no  matter  how  many  times  they  might  be  dissolved, 
but  consented  to  yield  some  of  the  executive  powers  which  they 
had  exercised.8  They  sent  an  address  to  the  king  asserting  that 
they  had  been  "most  falsely  and  maliciously  represented"  by 
the  Board  of  Trade.  As  Osborne 's  instructions  had  been  based 
on  these  representations,  the  Board  of  Trade  submitted  another 
report  to  the  king,  April  4,  1754,  in  which  they  reiterated  the 
charges.  During  the  previous  war,  they  said,  when  the  governor 
had  been  obliged  to  assent  to  unjust  laws  or  go  without  funds, 
the  assembly  had  ' '  taken  to  themselves  not  only  the  management 
and  disposal  of  such  publick  money  but  have  also  wrested  from 
your  Majesty's  Governor  the  nomination  of  all  officers  of 
Government  the  custody  and  direction  of  the  publick  military 
stores,  the  mustering  and  direction  of  troops  raised  for  your 


6  Bancroft    erroneously   states    that    ' l  the    Assembly    should     never    be 
allowed  to  examine  accounts."  (iv,  104;  also  his  "Last  Revision,"  ii,  376.) 

7  Bancroft,  iv,  104;  N.  Y.  Col.  Hist.  Docs.,  vi,  833. 

s  N.  T.  Col.  Hist.  Docs.,  vi,  820.     DeLancey  to  Board  of  Trade,  Jan.  3, 
1754. 


1911]  McCormac :  Colonial  Opposition  29 

Majesty's  service,  and  in  short  almost  every  other  part  of  execu 
tive  Government."9 

This  brief  statement,  although  applied  to  New  York  only, 
covers  generally  the  demands  made  by  nearly  every  colony  which 
controlled  only  the  legislative  branch  of  government.  Whenever 
the  assemblies  were  asked  for  money  they  usually  insisted  on 
dictating  the  manner  of  its  disbursement.  They  did  not  ask 
simply  that  money  voted  for  a  specific  purpose  should  not  be 
used  for  other  things.  This  would  have  been  legitimate  and 
praiseworthy.  They  insisted  that  all  money  granted  should  be 
placed  in  the  hands  of  a  committee  appointed  by  themselves  and 
under  their  control.  Under  this  arrangement  the  governor  had 
to  apply  to  the  committee  for  funds  to  meet  the  smallest  expendi 
tures,  and  the  committee  in  turn  could  do  nothing  without  the 
consent  of  the  assembly.  Executive  functions  of  government 
were  made  subject  to  the  caprice  of  the  legislative  body. 

Early  in  1754  the  New  York  assembly  voted  £1,000  to  pro 
vision  two  companies  which  the  king  had  ordered  to  be  sent  from 
New  York  to  Virginia.  While  technically  complying  with  the 
king's  command,  they  had  drawn  the  bill  in  such  a  way  that 
the  council  could  not  concur  without  violating  their  instructions. 
They  informed  the  council  that  unless  the  bill  should  pass  with 
out  change  not  "a  farthing"  would  be  granted.10  When  Lieu- 
tenant-Governor  DeLancey  reported  this  matter  to  the  Board 
of  Trade  he  criticised  both  houses  for  their  obstinacy,  and  he 
blamed  the  council  especially  for  not  yielding  on  such  an  import 
ant  occasion.11  But  this  half  defense  of  the  assembly  signifies 
little,  for  DeLancey  at  this  time  was  trying  to  win  the  good  will 
of  that  body.  In  this  he  succeeded,  and  soon  used  his  influence 
over  the  assembly  to  compel  Governor  Hardy  to  sign  private 
money  bills  in  DeLancy's  favor  by  attaching  them  to  bills  for 


a  N.  7.  Col.  Hist.  Docs.,  vi,  831-832. 

10  Ibid.,  vi,  834;  Pa.  Arch.,  ser.  2,  vi,  183. 

11  N.  Y.  Col.  Hist.  Docs.,  vi,  838. 


30  University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL. 1 

defense.12  The  Board  of  Trade  supported  the  council  in  its 
refusal  to  disobey  instructions.  The  assembly,  not  wishing  to 
ignore  the  king's  command  entirely,  voted  £5,000  to  aid  Virginia, 
but  made  it  payable  to  DeLancey,  thus  depriving  the  governor 
of  any  control  over  the  money.13  On  account  of  this  trouble 
and  consequent  delay  the  New  York  companies  did  not  reach 
Virginia  until  the  middle  of  June.  The  companies  were  incom 
plete,  of  poor  quality,  and  poorly  equipped.14 

When  money  was  needed  there  were  certain  points  on  which 
the  two  houses  could  not  agree.  The  assembly  endeavored  to 
retain  absolute  control  of  disbursements.  When  issuing  bills  of 
credit  they  refused  to  comply  with  royal  instructions,  which 
required  a  clause  suspending  operation  of  the  law  until  the 
king's  approval  could  be  secured.  The  instructions  limited  bills 
of  credit  to  a  term  of  five  years,  but  the  assembly  persisted  in 
issuing  them  for  a  longer  time. 

Disputes  over  these  questions  occurred  in  all  royal  and  pro 
prietary  colonies.  Controversies  of  this  character  led  the  colon 
ists  to  formulate  their  political  theories,  to  assert  their  "rights," 
and  to  attempt  to  find  a  constitutional  basis  for  those  "rights." 

In  the  spring  of  1755  the  assembly  of  New  York  receded  from 
their  former  position  to  the  extent  of  permitting  the  council  and 
the  commander-in-chief  to  act  with  them  in  the  management  and 
disbursement  of  money,  but  they  still  refused  to  insert  a  sus 
pending  clause  in  their  bills  for  issuing  paper  money.15  After 
they  had  forced  the  governor  to  sign  a  bill  without  such  a  clause, 


12  The  assembly  passed  a  bill  for  raising  troops  to  serve  in  the  Crown 
Point  expedition  and  for  frontier  defense.     The  term  of  service  was  limited 
to  forty  days.     Another  bill  was  passed  authorizing  the  payment  to  DeLan 
cey  of  £3,787,  16s,  for  services,  not  specified.     The  governor  was  told  that 
if  he  would  consent  to  the  latter  he  might  fix  the  term  of  service  in  the 
former  to  suit  himself.     Under  the  circumstances  he  signed  both  bills.    Coll. 
Mass.  Hist.  Soc.,  ser.  1,  vii,  144-145. 

13  N.  Y.  Col.  Hist.  Docs.,  vi,  90. 
i*  Dinwiddie  Papers,  i,  245. 

is  Having  secured  the  passage  of  a  bill  for  £45,000  with  the  suspending 
clause  omitted,  they  then  voted  800  men  for  the  war,  and,  on  hearing  of 
Braddock's  defeat,  400  more.  N.  Y.  Col.  Hist.  Docs.,  vi,  940,  989;  Corresp. 
of  Gov.  Sharpe,  i,  170. 


19n]  McCormac:  Colonial  Opposition  31 

they  then  enacted  a  militia  law  which  Hardy  pronounced  to  be 
not  only  the  best  but  the  only  effective  law  of  the  kind  in  the 
colonies  at  that  time.16  The  records  of  other  colonies  seem  to 
bear  out  this  statement.  Some  of  them  for  a  long  time  refused 
to  pass  a  militia  law  of  any  kind. 

Governor  Hardy  soon  had  reason  to  see  the  force  of  what  the 
Board  of  Trade  had  said  concerning  precedent.  Having  yielded 
once  in  the  paper  money  controversy  he  was  obliged  to  do  so 
again.  In  1756  the  assembly  voted  £40,000  in  bills  of  credit  for 
war  purposes.  Hardy  endeavored  to  have  the  bills  made  payable 
within  five  years  but  was  finally  obliged  to  disregard  his  instruc 
tions  and  sign  the  bill  as  it  was  presented  to  him.17 

Having  preserved  the  most  vital  of  their  constitutional 
' '  rights, ' '  the  members  of  the  assembly  were  quite  generous  with 
both  men  and  money  in  succeeding  years.  In  1759  they  raised 
£150,000  by  loan  for  the  king's  service  and  paid  it  all  within  a 
year.18  The  ability  of  the  assembly  to  repay  such  a  large  amount 
in  so  short  a  time  indicates  that  its  opposition  to  the  five-year 
limit  on  bills  of  credit  was  not  well  grounded,  for  the  opposition 
had  been  based  on  the  inability  of  the  colony  to  cancel  its  bills 
within  five  years. 

NEW  JERSEY 

In  New  Jersey  there  was  less  friction  than  in  any  of  the  other 
middle  colonies.  Here  we  have  the  very  unusual  record  of  two 
governors — one  in  the  early  part  and  another  toward  the  close 
of  the  war — speaking  in  high  terms  of  the  loyalty  of  their  assem 
blies.  Governor  Belcher  wrote  to  Eichard  Partridge,  December 
20,  1755,  that  "N.  Jersey  is  well  alive  &  exerts  to  the  Honor  & 
Interest  of  their  King  &  Country  &  the  whole  Legislature 
(Govr,  Council,  &  Assembly)  are  in  great  harmony  among  them 
selves."  On  July  7,  1761,  the  assembly  complimented  Governor 
Boone  on  his  administration  and  expressed  a  willingness  to  vote 


i«  N.  T.  Col  Hist.  Docs.,  vii,  3.    Hardy  to  Board  of  Trade,  Jan.  16,  1756. 

i?  Ibid.,  37. 

is  Ibid.,  343,  395,  430. 


32  University  of  California  Publications  in  History     IT°L-  l 

all  necessary  funds.  On  July  28,  Boone  praised  the  assembly 
very  highly  in  a  letter  to  the  Board  of  Trade.19 

In  the  summer  of  1754,  £15,000  was  granted  by  the  assembly 
to  finance  Colonel  Schuyler  in  his  operations  in  New  York,  and 
later  five  hundred  men  were  raised  in  New  Jersey  to  go  with 
him  to  serve  under  General  Shirley  in  the  proposed  attack  on 
Niagara.20 

The  records  show  that  New  Jersey  was  far  less  jealous  of  her 
neighbors  than  most  of  the  other  colonies,  and  the  assembly  was 
usually  willing  to  permit  the  troops  to  serve  wherever  the  com 
manding  general  needed  them.  The  troops  sent  to  Niagara  had 
been  originally  intended  for  Crown  Point,21  and  there  was  no 
objection  to  having  the  governor  send  troops  to  Pennsylvania  at 
a  time  when  the  assembly  of  that  province  would  do  nothing  for 
their  own  defense.22  Their  only  protest  was  a  reasonable  one — 
that  troops  raised  and  paid  by  New  Jersey  should  be  employed 
in  her  defense  unless  there  should  be  greater  need  of  them  else 
where.23  Their  attitude  was  all  the  more  commendable  because 
their  own  province  was  almost  entirely  without  means  of 
defense.24 

Considering  the  size  and  resources  of  the  colony,  the  assembly 
was  generous  writh  money.  During  one  period  of  less  than  two 
years  £140,000  in  proclamation  money  was  granted  for  war 
purposes.25 

About  the  only  thing  that  seriously  disturbed  the  harmony 
in  New  Jersey  was  a  controversy  over  the  issuing  of  paper 
money.  In  this  matter  members  of  the  assembly  for  a  time 
asserted  their  "rights"  as  defiantly  as  the  legislators  of  any 
other  colony.  As  in  other  colonies  they  took  advantage  of  the 
financial  needs  of  the  executive  and  forced  through  issues  of 


i»  N.  J.  Arch.,  ser.  1,  ix,  287,  299. 

20  tf.  J.  Arch.,  ser.  1,  viii,  part  2,  11;  Pa.  Arch.,  1748-56,  ii,  312. 

21  Pa.  Arch.,  ser.  2,  vi,  245,  et  seq. 

22  Pa.  Arch.,  1748-56,  ii,  481. 

23  N.  J.  Arch.,  ser.  1,  viii,  part  2,  194. 

24  Ibid.,  Belcher  to  Board  of  Trade. 

25  Hid.,  ix,  167.    Governor  Bernard  to  Pitt,  March  20,  1759. 


1911]  McCormac:  Colonial  Opposition  33 

paper  by  joining  grants  for  the  war  with  those  for  paying 
old  debts.  Such  a  bill  was  passed  in  November  of  1754.  It 
provided  for  the  emission  of  £70,000  in  bills  of  credit,  only 
£10,000  of  which  was  for  the  king's  service,  the  remainder  to  be 
used  for  sinking  old  bills.  This  money  was  made  a  legal  tender 
although  the  Board  of  Trade  had  opposed  such  a  measure  on 
former  occasions.  When  the  Board  now  refused  its  assent  to  the 
present  issue  the  assembly  followed  the  example  set  by  Pennsyl 
vania  and  Maryland.  It  sent  a  petition  to  the  king  asking  his 
permission  to  emit  legal  tender  paper,  and  flatly  refused  to  vote 
any  assistance  until  the  king's  will  should  be  ascertained.26  No 
definite  settlement  seems  to  have  been  reached  at  this  time  but 
apparently  the  governor  yielded  to  the  terms  of  the  assembly, 
for  similar  laws  were  passed  from  time  to  time  without  difficulty 
until  1757,  when  the  governor  again  objected  to  the  legal  tender 
clause.  Once  more  the  assembly  petitioned  the  king.  Its  peti 
tion  was  considered  by  the  Board  of  Trade  which  reported 
adversely  in  November  of  that  year.27 

In  1758  Bernard,  who  was  then  governor,  sided  with  the 
assembly  and  asked  the  Board  of  Trade  for  permission  to  sign 
bills  for  issuing  legal  tender  paper.  He  urged  that  there  was 
now  no  legal  tender  money  except  British  gold  and  silver,  of 
which  there  was  practically  none  in  the  colony.  The  people,  he 
said,  carried  on  considerable  trade  with  Pennsylvania  and  New 
York  and  it  was  therefore  necessary  that  the  only  money  they 
possessed  should  be  made  a  legal  tender.  Whether  this  was 
sound  reasoning  or  not,  the  Board  of  Trade  accepted  it  and 
recommended  that  the  governor  be  instructed  to  sign  the  bills. 
Both  king  and  Privy  Council  acquiesced.28  The  usual  good  con 
duct  and  public  spirit  of  the  colony  no  doubt  contributed  to  this 
amicable  settlement. 

Barring  this  dispute  over  paper  money  the  assembly  mani 
fested  a  desire  to  do  all  that  the  colony  was  able  to  do  for  the 


26  #.  J.  Arch.,  ser.  1,  viii,  part  2,  36  et  seq.,  152;  Pa.  Arch.,  1748-56,  ii, 
269. 

27  N.  J.  Arch.,  ser.  1,  ix,  11-14,  34-38. 

28  Ibid.,  131-139,  147-148,  154-158. 


34  University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  1 

common  cause.  There  is  little  evidence  of  those  belligerent 
characteristics  so  common  in  the  neighboring  colonies.  On  most 
occasions  they  possessed,  as  Governor  Morris  of  Pennsylvania 
said  in  1755,  "a  due  regard  both  to  the  rights  of  Governm*  and 
the  Libertys  of  the  people.29 

PENNSYLVANIA 

Pennsylvania  offers  the  most  interesting  field  for  a  study  of 
the  contest  between  the  legislative  and  executive  branches  of 
government.  This  contest  was  already  in  progress  when  hos 
tilities  with  the  French  began,  and  it  continued  practically 
unabated  throughout  the  war  period. 

In  crown  colonies  there  were  but  two  opposing  interests  to 
harmonize — those  of  the  people,  represented  by  the  assembly; 
and  those  of  the  crown,  represented  by  the  governor.  In  a  pro 
prietary  colony  like  Pennsylvania  still  another  factor  was  added 
to  complicate  matters,  for  the  interests  of  the  proprietor  were 
usually  entirely  personal  and  did  not  harmonize  with  the  welfare 
of  either  of  the  other  parties  concerned.  The  Quaker,  also,  with 
his  aversion  to  war  and  his  fearless — often  arbitrary — disposi 
tion,  furnished  his  own  peculiar  contribution  to  the  difficult  task 
of  those  whose  duty  it  was  to  defend  the  colonies  from  the  attacks 
of  the  enemy. 

In  no  other  colony  was  obstinacy  carried  to  such  an  extreme 
on  either  side;  nowhere  else  was  there  such  open  defiance  of  all 
authority  not  derived  directly  from  the  people.  In  their  verbal 
contests  with  their  governors  succeeding  assemblies  of  Pennsyl 
vania  promulgated,  more  clearly  than  the  assembly  of  any  other 
colony,  the  colonial  opinion  of  their  relation  to  the  mother  coun 
try,  and  what  they  considered  to  be  the  rights  and  duties  on 
either  side.  During  this  war  their  criticisms  were  aimed 
primarily  at  the  validity  of  proprietary  instructions;  but  in 
discussing  these  the  assembly  covered  generally  the  entire  field 
of  colonial  government ;  the  rights,  duties,  and  limitations  of 


2»  Pa.  Arch.,  1748-65,  ii,  501.    Morris  to  Belcher,  Nov.  17,  1775. 


1911]  McCormac:  Colonial  Opposition  35 

crown,  Parliament,  and  colonies.  As  mentioned  elsewhere,  nearly 
every  argument  used  to  combat  the  Stamp  Act  and  those  which 
followed  it  may  be  found  in  these  discussions  of  the  Pennsyl 
vania  assembly.  Franklin  was  a  member  of  the  assembly  before 
his  departure  for  England.  He  admits  being  the  " penman"30 
of  some  of  the  addresses  of  the  assembly  and  he  was  usually 
credited  with  supplying  the  arguments  on  constitutional  ques 
tions.  His  hatred  of  proprietary  rule  was  very  pronounced  and 
he  was  ever  ready  to  use  his  influence  to  bring  about  its  over 
throw.  In  the  Historical  Review  of  Pennsylvania,  which  was 
probably  inspired  by  Franklin  and  certainly  endorsed  by  him, 
proprietary  government  is  described  as  one  with  an  "assuming 
landlord,  strongly  disposed  to  convert  free  tenants  into  abject 
vassals,  and  to  reap  what  he  did  not  sow,  countenanced  and 
abetted  by  a  few  desperate  and  designing  dependents,  on  the 
one  side;  and  on  the  other,  all  who  have  sense  enough  to  know 
their  rights,  and  spirit  enough  to  defend  them,  combined  as  one 
man  against  the  said  landlord,  and  his  encroachments."31  The 
assembly  denied  that  the  proprietors  had  the  right  to  obstruct 
legislation  by  rigid  instructions  to  the  governor.  All  the  ' '  public 
quarrels,"  said  Franklin,  were  caused  by  the  Penns,  who,  "with 
incredible  meanness,  instructed  their  deputies  to  pass  no  act  for 
levying  the  necessary  taxes,  unless  their  vast  estates  were  in  the 
same  act  expressly  exonerated;  and  they  had  even  taken  the 
bonds  of  these  deputies  to  observe  such  instructions."32 

Franklin's  hatred  for  the  proprietors  is  apparent  in  all  his 


30  Works,  i,  215.  In  another  place  he  wrote :  "I  was  put  on  every  com 
mittee  for  answering  his  (Morris)  speeches  and  messages,  and  by  the  com 
mittees  always  desired  to  make  the  drafts.  Our  answers,  as  well  as  his 
messages,  were  often  tart,  and  sometimes  indecently  abusive."  pp.  179-180. 

si  Franklin,  Works,  iii,  113 ;  i,  180-181. 

32  tl ,  .  .  .  every  proprietary  governor  ....  has  two  masters,  one  who 
gives  him  his  commission,  and  one  who  gives  him  his  pay;  that  he  is  on  his 
good  behavior  to  both;  that  if  he  does  not  fulfill  with  rigor  every  proprie 
tary  command,  however  injurious  to  the  province  or  offensive  to  the  assem 
bly,  he  is  recalled;  that  if  he  does  not  gratify  the  assembly  in  what  they 
think  they  have  a  right  to  claim,  he  is  certain  to  live  in  perpetual  broils, 
though  uncertain  whether  he  shall  be  able  to  live  at  all ;  and  that,  upon  the 
whole,  to  be  a  governor  upon  such  terms  is  to  be  the  most  wretched  thing 
alive. ' '  Franklin,  Works,  iii,  187. 


36  University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL. 1 

writings.  He  seemed,  however,  to  have  some  sympathy  for  their 
governors  whose  duty  it  was,  as  pointed  out  by  the  author  of 
the  Historical  Review,  to  serve  two  masters.33  During  the  most 
heated  quarrels  Franklin  kept  up  a  personal  friendship  with 
the  governors. 

It  is  evident  that  one  at  least  of  the  leaders  of  the  opponents 
of  the  proprietors  was  not  averse  to  using  money  for  the  purpose 
of  nullifying  proprietary  instructions  when  resistance  did  not 
have  the  desired  effect.  In  the  Historical  Review  the  author34 
pointed  to  Sir  William  Keith  as  one  of  the  best  and  wisest 
governors,  who,  having  the  same  instructions  as  others,  hinted 
to  the  assembly  that  "in  case  they  would  pay  him  well,  he  would 
serve  them  well."  Keith  was  recalled  by  the  proprietors,  and 
the  author  regretted  that  the  assembly  did  not  "set  a  lustre  on 
his  dismission,  by  accompanying  it  with  all  the  doucers  in  the 
power  of  the  province  to  have  heaped  upon  him,  that  other 
governors  might  have  thought  it  worth  their  while  to  proceed 
on  his  plan."  He  used  the  example  of  Keith's  administration 
to  show  that  Pennsylvania  "when  well  governed,  is  easily 
governed."  Well  governed  in  his  opinion  seems  to  have  meant 
an  all-powerful  assembly  and  a  hireling  governor.  In  another 
place  the  author  frankly  stated  that  "the  subjects'  money  is 
never  so  well  disposed  of  as  in  the  maintenance  of  order  and 
tranquility,  and  the  purchase  of  good  laws;  for  which  felicities 
Keith's  administration  was  deservedly  memorable."35  It  was 
to  a  naturally  stubborn  assembly,  led  by  men  who  openly  advo 
cated  buying  or  crushing  any  governor  who  opposed  them,  that 
the  British  government  must  look  for  men  and  supplies  to  carry 
on  the  war. 

It  was  only  in  times  of  war  and  of  extraordinary  expense 


ss  Franklin,  Works,  187-193. 

34  This  Eeview  was  published  by  Franklin   (Works,  i,  215)   and  it  was 
generally  supposed  that  he  wrote  it,  but  he  afterwards  denied  the  author 
ship   (Works,  vii,  208).     At  any  rate,  he  endorsed  it  and  published  it  to 
aid  his  cause.     Fisher  says  that  it  was  written  by  Franklin's  son.     Colony 
and  Commonwealth,  216. 

35  Franklin,  Works,  iii,  187-193. 


19n]  McCormac:  Colonial  Opposition  37 

that  the  question  of  taxing  proprietary  estates  became  an  import 
ant  issue,  for  ordinary  expenses  of  government  were  derived 
from  excises  and  interest  on  bills  of  credit  loaned  out.  A  land 
tax  was  not  levied.36  During  the  previous  war  a  land  tax  had 
become  necessary.  The  assembly  insisted  on  taxing  the  pro 
prietary  estates  for  public  purposes  whenever  other  lands  were 
taxed,  but  the  governor  under  instructions  from  the  proprietors 
had  refused  to  pass  bills  for  that  purpose.  In  1753,  the  assembly 
appealed  from  the  governor  to  the  proprietors  and  were  cen 
sured  by  the  Penns  who  asserted  that  the  assembly  had  raised 
the  claim  purely  as  an  election  cry  to  please  the  people.  The 
Penns  maintained  that  they  were  "under  no  greater  obligation 
to  contribute  to  the  Public  Charges  than  the  Chief  Governor 
of  another  Colony,"  and  referred  to  a  former  opinion  of  the 
Board  of  Trade  which  sustained  them  in  this  contention.37  But 
neither  the  proprietors  nor  the  Board  of  Trade  were  able  to 
convince  the  assembly  that  the  Penns  in  their  capacity  of  prop 
erty  owners  should  not  contribute  to  the  defense  of  that  property, 
simply  because  they  happened  also  to  be  proprietors  of  the 
province.  Not  being  convinced  the  assembly  insisted  on  taxing 
proprietary  estates  whenever  other  lands  were  taxed  for  pur 
poses  of  defense. 

The  constitutional  controversy  in  Pennsylvania  is  more  easily 
understood  after  a  brief  examination  of  the  documents  on  which 
the  claims  of  the  assembly  were  based. 

The  author  of  the  Historical  Review  states  in  his  opening 
chapter  that  the  constitution  of  Pennsylvania  is  derived  from 
three  sources:  "the  birthright  of  every  British  subject/'  the 
royal  charter  granted  to  Penn,  and  the  charter  of  privileges 
granted  by  Penn  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  colony  in  1701. 38 
This  puts  in  concise  form  the  oft-repeated  declarations  of  the 


36  Franklin,  Works,  i,  232. 

37  Thomas  and  Richard  Penn  to  House  of  Rep.,  Pa.  Arch.,  1748-56,  ii, 
109.     In   1750   the  Penns  told  the  assembly  that  they  did  not   "conceive 
themselves  under  any  obligation  to  contribute  to  Indian  or  any  other  pub- 
lick  Expenses. ' '    Pa.  Col.  Eec.,  v,  546. 

38  Franklin,  Works,  iii,  116. 


38  University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  1 

assembly.  The  last  two  are  more  tangible  than  the  first  and 
were  used  whenever  they  would  answer  the  purpose,  but  the 
first  was  an  important  asset  to  have  in  reserve  and  all  the  more 
valuable  because  of  its  indefinite  character.  For  example,  the 
same  author  after  asserting  that  the  proprietors  are  bound  by 
the  terms  of  the  charter,  points  out  that  even  the  "crown  is 
limited  in  all  its  acts  and  grants  by  the  fundamentals  of  the 
constitution  and  can  not  ....  establish  any  colony  upon,  or 
contract  it  within  a  narrower  scale,  than  the  subject  is  entitled 
to  by  the  Great  Charter  of  England. '  '39  Here  again  the  author 
simply  states  a  claim  often  used  to  good  advantage  by  the  assem 
bly.  The  royal  charter  and  the  charter  privileges  bound  the 
proprietor  in  matters  covered  by  them  and  were  good  as  far  as 
they  went,  but  the  rights  of  the  subject  transcended  both,  and 
both  were  void  wherever  they  abridged  the  privileges  included 
in  the  "birthright  of  Englishmen."  The  inconsistency  of  this 
claim  with  the  opinion  held  generally  in  the  colonies,  that  their 
only  connection  with  England  was  through  the  crown,  seems 
never  to  have  dawned  upon  those  who  made  it. 

The  parts  of  the  royal  charter  most  frequently  called  in 
question  were  those  which  related  to  the  enactment  of  laws  and 
to  the  royal  veto.  The  charter  states  in  a  general  way  that  with 
the  assent  of  the  freemen  Penn,  his  heirs,  and  their  deputies, 
may  enact  all  necessary  laws.  The  assembly  held  that  the  charter 
thus  gave  the  deputies  full  power  to  sign  laws  regardless  of 
proprietary  instructions,  and  that  such  instructions  were  indeed 
a  violation  of  the  charter.  It  is  worthy  to  note  that  in  many  of 
their  discussions  they  do  not  regard  proprietary  instructions  in 
the  light  of  a  veto,  but  represent  the  proprietor  as  attempting 
to  legislate  by  instructions  thereby  violating  the  charter. 

The  provision  made  in  the  charter  for  the  royal  veto  was 
roundabout  and  burdensome.  It  required  that  a  transcript  of  all 
laws  passed  in  the  province  must  be  sent  to  England  within  five 
years  after  their  passage.  If  not  vetoed  by  the  king  or  Privy 


39  Franklin,  Works,  iii,  121. 


1911]  McCormac:  Colonial  Opposition  39 

Council  within  six  months  after  reaching  England  the  laws  were 
to  be  valid  and  binding.  It  will  be  seen  at  once  that  this  elastic 
provision  if  rigorously  enforced  might  work  real  hardship  in 
the  colony.  A  law  went  into  effect  at  once  in  the  colony  and  if 
vetoed  several  years  after  its  passage,  making  business  trans 
acted  under  it  illegal,  much  damage  might  result.  There  is 
evidence  that  the  Board  of  Trade  sometimes  hesitated  to  recom 
mend  a  veto  provided  the  colony  would  agree  to  refrain  from 
passing  such  a  law  in  future. 

In  a  law  involving  the  finances  of  the  colony  such  as  an  act 
for  the  emission  of  paper  money  it  would  seem  that  a  clause 
suspending  its  operation  until  the  king's  approval  could  be 
secured  would  be  preferable  to  a  veto  after  the  money  had  been 
put  in  circulation.  But  the  assembly  took  a  different  view  of  the 
matter  and  considered  a  suspending  clause  an  oppressive  require 
ment.  Some  historians  hold  the  same  view.  Fisher  in  his  eulogy 
on  the  assembly40  goes  so  far  as  to  assert  that  the  incorporation 
of  a  suspending  clause  ''would  have  been  surrendering  one  of 
the  colony's  most  important  rights." 

In  the  charter  of  liberties  granted  by  Penn  in  1701  the  assem 
bly  found  other  safeguards  of  their  liberties.  This  document 
gave  the  assembly  the  privilege  of  initiating  laws  which  it  did 
not  possess  under  the  earlier  frames  of  government,  but  it  also 
in  some  respects  enlarged  the  powers  of  the  proprietor.  It  has 
been  asserted  41  that  this  charter  greatly  enlarged  Penn's  veto 
powers,  but  aside  from  giving  him  greater  control  over  council 
little  change  seems  to  have  been  made  by  the  document  itself. 
The  style  of  the  enacting  clause  in  either  case  might  be  inter 
preted  to  give  Penn  the  right  to  veto  laws. 

The  charter  of  privileges  permitted  the  assembly  to  "sit 
upon  their  own  Adjournments."  This  was  a  wholesome  con 
cession  to  popular  government  and  in  ordinary  times  seems  to 

•to  Fisher,  Pennsylvania  Colony  and  Commonwealth,  148. 

4i  Historical  Eeview  of  Pennsylvania,  in  Franklin,  Works,  iii,  157.  The 
author  says:  "Instead  of  having  but  three  voices  in  seventy-two,  he  was 
left  single  in  the  executive,  and  at  liberty  to  restrain  the  legislative  by 
refusing  his  assent  to  their  bills  whenever  he  thought  fit." 


40  University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VoL-  * 

have  caused  little  discord,  but  in  a  period  of  intense  feeling  like 
the  one  under  consideration  the  assembly  abused  this  privilege 
for  the  purpose  of  annoying  and  defeating  the  governor.  In 
stances  of  this  will  appear  in  the  following  pages. 

From  the  beginning  of  the  war  the  assembly  determined  to 
keep  control  of  all  funds  voted  for  defense.  Early  in  1754  they 
voted  £5,000  for  war  purposes,  but  instead  of  putting  it  at  the 
disposal  of  the  executive  they  placed  it  in  the  hands  of  five  of 
their  own  members.42  In  April  (1754)  the  governor  called  a  spe 
cial  session  to  consider  matters  of  defense  as  well  as  the  advis 
ability  of  sending  representatives  to  the  Albany  convention. 
Letters  on  the  needs  of  the  colonies  from  several  governors  were 
read  and  aid  was  asked  for  General  Shirley  in  his  northern  cam 
paigns.  On  the  abstract  question  of  granting  a  sum  of  money 
for  the  king's  service  the  assembly  voted  by  a  small  majority 
(18  to  16)  in  the  affirmative,  but  when  it  came  to  voting  any 
definite  sum— from  £20,000  down  to  £5,000— they  defeated  each 
proposal  by  a  large  majority.  The  only  thing  they  would  con 
sent  to  do  was  to  grant  £500  to  be  sent  as  a  present  to  the  Indians, 
after  which  they  adjourned  for  a  month,  despite  the  governor's 
protest,  for  the  purpose  of  consulting  their  constituents.43 

They  met  again  in  May  and  framed  a  bill  which  they  knew 
the  governor  could  not  approve,  because  it  embodied  the  fea 
tures  which  were  forbidden  by  his  instructions.  The  bill  pro 
vided  for  the  emission  of  £30,000  in  bills  of  credit  to  be  paid 
within  ten  years,  although  the  British  government  had  fixed 
five  years  as  the  limit  for  such  bills.  The  governor  asked  them 
to  shorten  the  time  to  four  years  but  they  refused  to  alter  it. 
In  another  respect  they  violated  the  rules  adopted  for  the  col 
onies.  Of  the  £30,000  only  £10,000  was  for  the  king;  the  remain 
der  was  to  be  used  for  the  redemption  of  old  bills.  The  governor 
was  obliged  to  accept  the  grant  with  the  attached  rider  or  go 
without  the  £10,000.  In  their  address  to  the  governor  the 
assembly  emphatically  asserted  that  "the  Representatives  of  the 

42  Pa.  Arch.,  1748-56,  ii,  114-115.     Hamilton  to  Sharpe,  Jan.  7,  1754. 
d.,  235;  Pa.  Col.  Eec.,  vii,  25-26. 


1911J  McCormac:  Colonial  Opposition  41 

People  have  an  Undoubted  Right  to  judge  and  determine  not 
only  the  Sum  to  be  raised  for  Use  of  the  Crown,  but  the  Manner 
of  raising  it."44  When  the  expected  veto  came  they  adjourned 
until  August  without  voting  a  shilling  for  the  common  defense. 
Before  adjourning  the  question  of  colonial  union  was  discussed, 
and  the  members  of  the  assembly  showed  the  independent  spirit 
of  the  colony  by  denying  the  binding  force  of  any  such  union.45 
In  the  August  session,  after  several  refusals  to  grant  funds,  they 
drew  a  bill  for  granting  £3,500  similar  to  the  one  that  had  been 
vetoed  in  May.46  The  governor  of  course  was  compelled  by  his 
instructions  to  veto  this  also,  and  the  question  of  supplies  and 
consideration  of  the  Albany  plan  of  union  were  postponed  to 
the  next  session,  when  the  new  governor,  Morris,  would  have 
arrived. 

Fisher,47  who  is  ever  ready  to  eulogize  the  assembly,  absolves 
that  body  from  all  blame  in  the  extreme  position  to  which  they 
adhered.  He  makes  the  unqualified  assertion  that  "It  was  not 
the  Pennsylvania  Assembly  that  was  to  blame,  but  her  governor, 
who  by  the  necessity  of  a  war  supply  wished  to  force  the  colony 
to  yield  its  rights  established  by  the  struggles  of  over  seventy 
years."  He  attributes  adverse  criticism  of  their  conduct  to 
ignorance  and  superficial  investigation  on  the  part  of  other  his 
torians.  While  the  selfishness  of  the  proprietors  stands  out  in 
bold  relief,  and  the  governors  in  many  cases  were  overzealous  in 
the  interests  of  their  masters,  he  who  would  prove  the  assembly 
faultless  and  unselfish  in  all  things  should  not  examine  too  closely 
the  records  of  their  proceedings. 

If  Governor  Morris  had  hopes  of  succeeding  where  Hamilton 
had  failed  he  was  soon  to  be  undeceived.  Before  he  had  been 
in  the  colony  long  he  had  reason  to  appreciate  the  feeling  of 
Governor  Shirley  of  Massachusetts  who  wrote  him  about  this 

44  Pa.  Col.  Eec.,  vi,  39-40. 

45  Ibid.,  45. 

46  Pa.  Arch.,  1748-56,  ii,  189,  235,  236.    This  provided  for  issuing  £35,000 
in  bills  of  credit — £15,000  for  military  purposes,  and  the  remainder  for 
cancelling  old  bills. 

47  Fisher,  147,  148. 


42  University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  1 

time  "I  have  no  leaf  in  my  books  for  managing  a  Quaker  As 
sembly."  The  only  remedy  which  Shirley  could  suggest  was 
union  and  control  "by  Act  of  Parliam*,  as  soon  as  possible."48 
Morris  told  Franklin49  that  he  "loved  disputing."  If  this  was 
true  his  administration  must  have  afforded  him  real  pleasure. 
When  he  met  the  assembly  in  December  he  encountered  the  same 
difficulties  that  had  marked  the  administration  of  Hamilton.  He 
urged  the  need  of  money  for  defense  and  the  assembly  sent  him 
a  bill  for  striking  £40,000  in  bills  of  credit— half  for  the  king's 
use  to  be  applied  as  the  governor  saw  fit,  the  other  half  to  be 
controlled  by  the  assembly.  All  was  to  be  sunk  by  an  excise  to 
run  for  twelve  years,  although  such  issues  were  limited  by  an 
act  of  Parliament  to  five  years.  Alleging  this  and  the  omis 
sion  of  a  suspending  clause  as  reasons,  Morris  refused  to  sign 
the  bill  and  the  assembly  refused  to  vote  funds  on  any  other 
terms.  His  real  reason  for  vetoing  the  bill,  he  told  Penn,  was 
that  it  gave  the  assembly  control  of  half  of  the  money,  but  he 
thought  it  better  to  use  all  possible  objections.50  He  finally 
agreed  to  sign  a  bill  without  a  suspending  clause  if  they  would 
reduce  the  term  to  five  years.  While  the  bill  was  being  passed 
back  and  forth  many  times  between  governor  and  assembly — 
each  trying  to  exhaust  the  other  into  compliance — the  latter 
gave  an  opinion  of  their  rights  as  Englishmen  which  could  hardly 
be  surpassed  during  the  Revolutionary  struggle.  They  told  the 
governor  that  in  a  small  matter  they  might  yield,  "yet  in  this 
Case  our  all  is  concerned,  and  if  we  should  not  act  becoming 
the  Rights  as  Englishmen  entitle  us  to,  we  might  appear  un 
worthy  the  Regard  we  have  already  experienced  and  have  good 
Reason  to  hope  for  hereafter  from  a  British  Parliament."  The 
people,  they  said,  "are  convinced  they  ought  not  to  be  governed 
by  Proprietary  Instructions  in  Opposition  to  their  Charter, 
which  is,  in  our  Opinion,  the  Foundation  and  Sanction  of  our 


48  pa.  Arch.,  1748-56,  ii,  181. 

49  Franklin,  Works,  i,  179. 

so  Letters  to  Penn;  Eobinson,  and  Sharpe,  Pa.  Arch.,  1748-56,  ii,   216, 
221,  224,  237. 


1911J  McCormac:  Colonial  Opposition  43 

Civil  and  Keligious  Liberties;  and  especially  if  these  Instruc 
tions  must  be  secreted  from  them,  and  by  that  Means  the  whole 
country  left  without  any  known  Rule  of  their  Conduct."51 
From  an  American  standpoint  this  is  good  constitutional  doc 
trine,  but  if  all  of  their  claims  had  been  conceded  it  would  have 
to  be  admitted  that  the  charter  had  given  them  virtual  inde 
pendence,  which  of  course  was  not  the  case. 

Having  prepared  an  appeal  to  the  king,  the  assembly  resolved 
to  borrow  £5,000  on  their  own  credit  to  be  spent  by  themselves 
for  defense.  They  then  adjourned  abruptly  without  the  gover 
nor's  knowledge  or  consent.52  Morris  despaired  of  coming  to 
any  agreement  with  men  who  were  willing  to  let  their  own 
province  be  overrun  by  the  enemy53  while  they  indulged  in  dis 
sertations  on  the  force  of  royal  and  proprietary  instructions.  It 
is  strange,  however,  that  it  seems  never  to  have  occurred  to  the 
governor  that  those  who  instructed  him  might  also  be  somewhat 
culpable  if  the  enemy  were  given  a  free  field  for  operations  in 
order  that  they  might  preserve  all  of  their  alleged  privileges 
intact  and  their  rent-roll  undiminished.  He  saw  only  the 
obstinacy  of  the  colonists,  and  he  hoped  that  Parliament  would 
unite  them  and  put  things  on  *  *  such  a  footing  as  to  leave  no  room 
for  future  contests  between  governors  and  assemblies."  Their 
inactivity,  he  said,  had  already  put  the  home  government  to 
"thinking."54 


si  Pa.  Col.  Eec.,  vi,  191  et  seq.,  207,  229. 

52  Ibid.,  295.    Morris  to  Dinwiddie. 

53  Pa.  Arch.,  1748-56,  ii,  231.     Morris  to   Shirley,  Dec.   29,    1754.     He 
wrote  to  Dinwiddie,  Jan.  7,  1755,  ' ' .  .  .  .  surely  there  never  was  a  set  of 
people  in  the  world,  so  stupidly  infatuated,  or  so  blind  to  their  country's 
danger   as  the   Assemblys  of  these  Colonys   have  been    upon    the    present 
occasion,  but  if  any  of  'em  are  entitled  to  stand  foremost  upon  the  infatu 
ated  List,  it  is  the  people  of  this  province,  who  are  rich,  flourishing  and 
numerous,  and   not   only   decline   taking   up   arms   upon   this   occasion,   but 
even  refuse   to   offer  the   assistance   or  supply  the   articles   expected  from 
them  by  the  Crown"  ....  "I  nave  no  expectations  from  a  set  of  men 
that   are,   or   pretend   to   be,   principal 'd   against   defending   themselves   or 
their  Country,  &  who,  at  such  a  time  as  this,  chuse  to  enter  into  a  dispute 
concerning   the   force   of  the   King's   Instructions,   and   pursuing   measures 
rather  calculated  to  aggrandize  their  own  power,  than  to  Promote  the  public 
service."    Ibid.,  226,  227. 

54  Ibid.,  227.     Morris  to  Dinwiddie. 


44  University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  1 

Morris  did  not,  perhaps,  state  the  entire  truth  when  he  in 
formed  Sir  Thomas  Robinson  that  the  assembly  had  "no  other 
design  but  to  furnish  a  pretence  for  not  acting  as  his  Majesty's 
service  and  the  safety  of  the  country  required, ' '  but  it  was  true 
as  he  said  in  the  same  letter,  that  '  *  Royal  &  Proprietary  Instruc 
tions  were  (are)  by  no  means  new  things  in  this  Government,  and 
if  they  had  been  destructive  of  the  Libertys  of  the  people,  they 
might  have  been  complained  of  in  a  time  of  less  danger."55  He 
had  still  better  ground  for  asserting  that ' '  if  a  house  of  Assembly 
by  their  own  Authority,  without  the  consent  or  Approbation  of 
a  Govr,  can  borrow  and  dispose  of  money  as  they  think  proper," 
they  could  easily  use  this  method  to  overthrow  their  dependence 
upon  the  crown.56  The  real  truth  seems  to  be  that  the  assembly 
and  their  constituents  were  actuated  not  so  much  by  a  wish  to 
shirk  entirely  their  duty  to  the  king  as  by  the  desire  to  show 
that  proprietary  government  was  detrimental  to  the  interests 
of  both  king  and  subjects.  This  they  hoped  to  do  by  maintain 
ing  that  arbitrary  instructions  alone  prevented  them  from  assist 
ing  the  king  in  the  defense  of  his  colonial  possessions.  They 
denied  that  the  proprietor  had  authority  to  issue  such  instruc 
tions,  and  for  that  reason  the  governor  was  not  bound  to  obey 
them.  Such  instructions,  they  said,  were  "distructive  of  their 
Libertys  and  infractions  of  their  charter."57  It  is  evident  also 
that  they  hoped  by  standing  firm  to  force  an  acknowledgment 
of  new  ' '  rights ' '  which  they  could  never  hope  to  secure  in  times 
of  peace. 

Thomas  Penn  fully  sustained  the  governor  as  a  matter  of 
course  and  expressed  deep  disappointment  because  the  people  for 
whom  his  family  had  done  so  much  were  now  trying  in  every 
way  to  injure  them.58  But  if  Penn  deceived  himself  with  respect 
to  the  gratitude  owed  him  by  the  colonists,  he  could  hardly  hope 


55  Still  it  should  be  remembered  that  a  land  tax,  including  a  tax  on  pro 
prietary   estates  which   caused   the   present   dispute,   became  an  important 
issue  only  in  times  of  war  or  other  heavy  expense. 

56  pa.  Arch.,  1748-56,  ii,  249-250. 

57  Ibid. 

ss  ibid.,  252-253. 


1911]  McCormac:  Colonial  Opposition  45 

to  deceive  others.  Whatever  the  motives  were  that  had  caused 
the  founder  of  the  colony  to  grant  quite  liberal  privileges  to  the 
settlers,  there  is  no  evidence  to  indicate  that  the  present  pro 
prietors  considered  the  interests  of  the  people  farther  than  their 
ability  to  afford  an  income  to  themselves. 

Penn  wrote  that  "it  is  not  believed  here  that  they  ever 
intended  to  give  a  shilling, ' '  and  that  he  saw  little  hope  of  getting 
money  for  defense  so  long  as  people  who  scruple  to  bear  arms 
were  permitted  to  sit  in  the  assembly.59 

To  induce  the  assembly  to  yield,  General  Braddock  sent  a 
special  letter  for  the  governor  to  lay  before  them.  He  pointed 
out  that  the  success  of  the  French  was  due  to  the  want  of  a 
proper  union  and  lack  of  support  in  the  British  colonies;  that 
Pennsylvania  was  amply  able  to  support  a  campaign  in  which 
she  was  so  directly  interested;  and  that  she  ought  not  to  take 
advantage  of  the  common  danger  for  the  purpose  of  making 
encroachments  on  the  king's  prerogative.60  A  similar  letter  from 
Lord  Halifax  was  shown  them  and  Morris  had  hopes  that  the 
two  would  "make  a  Proper  Impression,"  but  so  little  were  they 
heeded  that  the  assembly  refused  to  vote  new  supplies  except  on 
the  same  inadmissible  terms,61  and  the  commissioners  in  charge 
of  the  £5,000  above  mentioned  refused  even  to  advance  a  small 
sum  to  the  governor  for  the  purpose  of  returning  deserters.  Their 
excuse  was  that  their  instructions  from  the  assembly  did  not 
cover  that  point.62  It  had  at  last  reached  a  point  where  the 
governor  was  forced  to  ask  a  committee  of  the  assembly  for 
funds  to  cover  the  smallest  items  of  expense,  and  even  these 
humiliating  requests  were  often  denied. 

The  people  in  general  showed  the  same  attitude  as  the  mem- 


59  Pa.  Arch.,  1748-56,  ii,  252,  257. 

60  pa.  Col.  Eec.,  vi,  332. 

si  They  granted  £25,000  to  the  king,  only  £5,000  of  which  was  put  at 
this  disposal  of  Braddock.  The  remainder  was  to  be  used  by  the  assembly 
as  they  saw  fit.  When  the  governor  refused  to  pass  the  bill  the  assembly 
demanded  that  it  be  returned  to  them,  but  the  governor  kept  it  that  he 
might  send  it  to  the  king  for  the  purpose  of  exposing  the  conduct  of  the 
assembly.  Pa.  Col.  Eec.,  vi,  339,  353,  386,  389. 

62  Pa.  Arch.,  1748-56,  ii,  271,  272. 


46  University  of  California  Publications  in  History.     ITOL- I 

bers  of  the  assembly.  Their  indifference  if  not  hostility  to 
British  interests  is  shown  by  their  refusal  to  furnish  convey 
ances  to  British  troops,  even  for  pay,  and  by  their  trading  with 
the  French  and  Indians  in  powder  and  other  supplies.63  Frank 
lin  at  last  secured  authority  from  Braddock  to  advertise  for 
conveyances  and  urged  the  people  to  respond.  He  pointed  out 
that  in  this  way  they  might  procure  a  supply  of  much  needed 
specie.  He  warned  them  also  that  the  king's  officers  were  much 
exasperated  with  the  colony  and  would  take  what  they  needed 
if  they  could  not  buy  or  hire  it.64  Fear  and  the  influence  of 
Franklin  secured  some  assistance  from  both  the  people  and  the 
assembly  committee.  While  they  were  not  so  "determined  to 
assist  the  war,"  as  Fisher65  represents  them  to  have  been,  this 
and  their  aid  in  connection  with  the  military  road  seems  to  have 
appeased  the  wrath  of  Braddock  and  elicited  his  commenda 
tion.66 

In  June  (1755)  the  assembly  scored  a  victory  by  forcing  the 
governor  to  pass  a  bill  embodying  some  of  the  objectionable  fea 
tures.  Regardless  of  previous  vetoes  they  presented  a  bill  for 
granting  £25,000— £15,000  for  war  purposes,  and  £10,000  for 
sinking  old  bills  of  credit.  They  accompanied  it  with  a  copy  of 
a  similar  law  which  had  been  approved  in  England.  Yielding 
to  financial  pressure  the  governor  signed  the  bill  after  a  futile 
attempt  to  have  it  amended.67 

Braddock 's  defeat  in  July  caused  general  excitement  in  the 
colonies  and  nearly  all  of  them  responded  to  new  requests  for 
supplies  with  more  promptness  than  usual.  On  August  1,  the 
Pennsylvania  assembly  voted  £50,000,  but  knowing  the  governor  7s 
instructions  as  they  did,  it  is  not  at  all  probable  that  they  had  any 
expectation  that  the  grant  would  be  accepted,  because  of  the 
terms  on  which  it  was  offered.  The  amount  was  to  be  raised 


es  On  May  4,  1755,  Braddoek  ordered  Morris  to  put  a  stop  to  this  trade. 
If  it  were  not  stopped,  he  would  take  in  hand  himself.  Pa.  Arch.,  1748-56, 
ii,  299. 

e*  Ibid.,  294. 

65  Pennsylvania  Colony  and  Commonwealth,  155. 

66  Diary  of  Daniel  Fisher,  in  Pa.  Mag.  of  Hist.,  xvii,  272. 
e?  Pa.  Col.  Eec.,  vi,  437-447. 


1911]  McCormac:  Colonial  Opposition  47 

by  a  tax  on  all  estates,  including  those  of  the  proprietors,  and 
the  discussion  which  now  arose  over  this  question  was  one  of 
the  most  acrimonious  of  the  war  period.  The  addresses  of  the 
assembly  were  written  by  Franklin,  so  Governor  Morris  said,  and 
according  to  the  former's  own  writings  the  statement  is  no  doubt 
true.  Franklin  covered  in  considerable  detail  the  rights  and 
duties  of  the  people  as  well  as  their  relation  to  both  proprietor 
and  king.  The  discussion  is  too  long  and  technical  to  be  treated 
in  full,  but  the  main  points  will  be  considered. 

The  governor  based  his  objections  to  the  bill  mainly  on  three 
grounds.  First,  his  instructions.  Second,  the  proprietors  from 
the  very  nature  of  things  should  not  be  taxed.  Third,  former 
laws  had  exempted  these  estates  and  established  a  precedent. 
The  assembly  refuted  these  arguments  and  gave  many  reasons 
why  the  estates  should  be  taxed.  The  assembly  claimed  it  as  a 
right  to  have  all  money  bills  accepted  or  rejected  as  a  whole — 
without  amendment.  They  had  waived  this  right  at  times,  they 
said,  but  still  possessed  it.  Whence  they  acquired  the  right  they 
do  not  make  clear.  It  was  probably  a  derivative  of  the  "birth 
right  of  Englishmen,"  for  it  is  not  guaranteed  by  either  of  the 
charters  on  which  they  based  so  many  of  their  claims.  Propriet 
ary  instructions,  in  their  opinion,  could  be  no  valid  excuse  for 
the  governor's  refusal  to  sign  such  bills.  The  lieutenant-gov 
ernor,68  they  said,  had  been  given  full  power  to  act  by  the  royal 
charter,  therefore  proprietary  instructions  could  not  take  away 
this  right.69  They  maintained  that  general  proprietary  exemp 
tions  did  not  apply  in  the  case  of  a  land  tax ;  the  proprietor  was 
taxed  as  a  landholder,  not  as  proprietor  or  governor.  They  cited 


es  It  should  be  remembered  that  the  proprietor  was  also  governor.  His 
representative  in  Pennsylvania  although  usually  called  governor  was  technic 
ally  only  lieutenant-governor. 

69  The  charter  is  so  worded,  but  it  is  doubtful  that  it  was  the  intention 
to  make  the  deputy  independent  of  his  chief  or  to  give  him  power  to  enact 
laws  in  opposition  to  the  wishes  of  the  latter.  The  charter  reads :".... 
Doe  grant  free,  full  and  absolute  power,  ...  to  him  and  his  heirs,  and  his 
and  their  Deputies,  and  Lieutenants,  ...  to  ordeyne,  make,  Enact  and 
....  to  publish  any  Laws  whatsoever,  for  the  raising  of  money  for  the 
publick  use  of  the  said  province,  or  for  any  other  End  apperteyning  either 
to  the  publick  state,  peace,  or  safety  of  the  said  Countrey." 


48  University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [V°L- 1 

evidence  to  show  that  the  king  himself  was  subject  to  a  tax  on 
his  lands.  The  proprietor  could  not  claim  more  than  the  king. 
Far  from  being  entitled  to  exemptions  the  assembly  asserted  that 
the  proprietor  had  no  right  to  the  fees  and  licenses  which  had 
been  allowed  him  for  the  purpose  of  paying  the  lieutenant-gov 
ernor  's  salary.  The  founder  of  the  colony  had  been  permitted  to 
collect  quit-rents  in  lieu  of  a  salary  as  governor.  When  a  lieu 
tenant-governor  was  found  necessary  the  people  permitted  fees 
and  licenses  to  be  used  for  paying  his  salary,  but  it  had  been  a 
free  gift — nothing  which  they  had  been  obliged  to  pay.  They 
denied  all  desire  to  usurp  power.  They  claimed,  they  said,  only 
the  right  to  dispose  of  their  own  money — a  right  guaranteed  in 
their  charter,  the  natural  right  of  freeborn  Englishmen,  a  right 
never  before  denied.  They  pointed  out  that  it  was  impossible 
for  an  annually  elected  body  to  usurp  power  for  any  special 
class.  They  accused  the  governor  of  not  wishing  a  reasonable 
bill.70  He  wanted,  in  their  opinion,  to  kill  the  bill  and  throw 
the  blame  on  the  assembly,  and  he  was  glad  of  an  opportunity  to 
'  *  make  a  fine  speech ' '  and,  by  showing  his  zeal,  to  secure  a  better 
position.  What  the  governor  and  proprietor  asked,  they  said,  was 
worse  than  vassalage ;  vassals  fight  for  their  lord  while  he  pays 
the  bills  "but  our  Lord  would  have  us  defend  his  Estate  at  our 
own  Expense, ' '  which  is  ' '  even  more  slavish  than  Slavery  itself. ' ' 
The  proprietor,  they  continued,  asks  them  to  "encrease  and 
secure  his  Estate  at  our  own  Cost,  and  give  him  the  glorious 
Privilege  that  no  British  Nobleman  enjoys,  of  having  his  Lands 
free  from  Taxes,  and  defended  gratis."71  This  presentation  of 
their  side  of  the  case  was  about  as  strong  as  it  could  be  made. 


70  Morris  questioned  the  sincerity  of  the  assembly  as  much  as  they  did 
his.     In  a  letter  to  DeLancey  he  said  they  did  not  wish  to  furnish  assist 
ance  "and  purposely  started  these  disputes  to  furnish  a  pretence  for  their 
conduct.    Had  this  been  before  a  doubt,  their  last  long  message  and  refusal 
to  establish  a  Militia  would  have  made  it  clear/'     Pa.  Arch.,  1748-56,  ii, 
369. 

71  Pa.  Col.  Eec.,  vi,  510,  525,  526  et  seq.,  569-585.     They  told  Morris 
that  several  inhabitants  of  Philadelphia  had  offered  to  pay  the  proprietors' 
share  of  the  £50,000  and  rely  on  him  to  repay  them.     This  they  asserted 
was  another  proof  of  the  justice  of  the  tax,  and  they  now  hoped  that  the 
governor  would  sign  the  bill. 


19111  McCormac:  Colonial  Opposition  49 

It  was  clear  and  concise  although  considerably  overdrawn  in 
some  respects.  A  man  less  given  to  argument  than  Morris  might 
have  been  overwhelmed  by  such  an  array  of  historical  and  legal 
data,  but  he  was  unconvinced  and  adhered  to  his  demand  for 
amendments.72  Eefusing  to  accept  his  amendments  or  to  pass  a 
militia  act  the  assembly  adjourned  for  a  month,  leaving  the 
province  without  funds. 

When  they  met  again  in  September  the  controversy  was  re 
newed.  After  blaming  the  assembly  for  Braddock's  defeat,  the 
governor  answered  in  detail  the  charges  made  by  them  during 
the  preceding  session.  In  reply  to  their  statement  that  they  did 
not  enjoy  "disputations"  his  answer  was  "But  let  your  Minutes 
be  examined  for  Fifteen  years  past,  not  to  go  higher,  and  in 
them  will  be  found  more  artifice,  more  time  and  money  spent  in 
frivolous  controversies,  more  unparalleled  abuses  of  your  Gov 
ernors,  and  more  undutifulness  to  the  Crown,  than  in  all  the  rest 
of  his  Majesty's  colonies  put  together."73  The  governor's  state 
ment  was  in  the  main  true,  but  the  inference  which  he  wished 
to  have  drawn  from  it — that  the  assembly  was  entirely  in  the 
wrong — by  no  means  followed.  The  proprietors  whom  he  de 
fended  were  still  more  selfish  and  equally  as  unyielding  as  the 
assembly.  Excessive  stubbornness  on  either  side  was  responsible 
for  the  defenseless  condition  of  the  province.74 

While  the  quarrel  was  in  progress  Morris  appealed  for  aid  to 
both  Governor  Belcher  of  New  Jersey  and  General  Shirley  of 
Massachusetts,  now  commander  of  the  king's  forces,  but  both 
were  unable  and  unwilling  to  assist  a  people  who  refused  to 
defend  themselves.75 


72  Pa.  Col.  Eec.,  vi,  588. 

73  Hid.,  623. 

74  Whether  the  proprietors  should  be  taxed  or  not  the  governor  would 
no  longer  dispute,  declaring  that  it  was  sufficient  for  him  ' '  that  they  had 
given  him  no  power  in  that  case."     "Those  who  would  give  up  essential 
liberty   to   purchase   a   little   temporary   safety,"    answered   the   assembly, 
"deserve    neither    liberty    nor    safety."      Historical   Review,    in    Franklin, 
Works,  iii,  422,  429. 

75  Pa.  Arch.,  1748-56,  ii,  469,  471,  493  et  seq.,  502.     Shirley  a  few  days 
later  authorized  Morris  to  procure  some  ammunition  and  supplies  from  the 
king's  stores  at  Cumberland,  with  the  expectation  that  they  would  be  re 
placed  by  the  assembly. 


50  University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL. 1 

Later  in  the  session  a  compromise  was  arranged  whereby 
money  could  be  voted  while  either  side  maintained  practically 
its  original  ground.  After  the  news  of  Braddock's  defeat  had 
reached  England  the  Penns,  "intimidated,"  to  quote  Franklin, 
by  the  clamor  raised  against  them  "for  their  meanness  and  in 
justice  in  giving  their  governor  such  instructions,"  agreed  to 
contribute  £5000  as  a  free  gift  to  be  used  for  defense.76  On 
receiving  this  news  the  assembly  voted  £55,00077  in  bills  of  credit 
without  taxing  the  proprietary  estates,  ' '  in  consideration  of  their 
(proprietors)  granting  Five  thousand  pounds  in  lieu  thereof." 
They  made  these  bills  payable  within  four  years,  thereby  con 
forming  to  proprietary  instructions,  but  without  expressly  con 
ceding  the  point.  The  money  was  to  be  spent  by  a  committee 
named  in  the  act,  but,  for  the  first  time,  with  the  governor's 
approbation.  Both  sides  were  influenced  apparently  by  the 
defeat  of  Braddock  and  by  the  new  invasions  of  their  province 
by  the  French  who  had  won  over  tribes  of  Indians  formerly 
friends  of  the  English.78 

For  the  same  reasons  the  assembly  at  last  consented  to  enact 
a  militia  law,  which  is  an  interesting  example  of  Quaker  politi 
cal  doctrines.  Having  set  forth  their  conscientious  scruples 
against  bearing  arms  and  the  guarantees  in  their  charter  of 
privileges  against  being  compelled  to  do  so,  they  declared  that 
"as  the  World  is  now  Circumstanc'd"  they  did  not  wish  to 
condemn  the  use  of  arms  by  others.  The  act  was  drawn  by 
Franklin  and  simply  gave  legal  sanction  to  the  organization 
of  companies  from  among  those  who  should  desire  to  enlist.79 
Such  a  law  was  little  better  than  none  at  all,  and  Morris  aptly 
pronounced  it  "senseless  and  impracticable."  He  believed,  he 
said,  that  they  had  framed  the  bill  thus  for  the  purpose  of 
compelling  him  to  veto  it,  so  he  disappointed  them  by  signing 
it.80 


76  Works,  i,  196. 

77  Morris  said  £60,000  in  a  letter  to  Dinwiddie,  Nov.  29. 

78  Pa.  Arch.,  1748-56,  ii,  513-531.     Various  letters  of  Morris. 

79  Ibid.,  516.     The  act  itself. 

so  < (  They  have  indeed  passed  a  Militia  Bill,  but  with  no  other  view  but 
that  I  should  refuse  it  and  then  to  raise  a  clamour  against  me  on  that  acc't, 


1911]  McCormac:  Colonial  Opposition  51 

The  above  mentioned  adjustment  proved  but  a  temporary 
lull  in  the  controversy.  It  was  renewed  during  the  summer  of 
1756  and  continued  to  the  end  of  Morris's  administration. 
Pleading  his  instructions,  Morris  refused  to  sign  a  bill  for 
levying  an  excise  on  rum  and  other  articles.  His  main  objection 
was  that  the  act  did  not  give  him  any  voice  in  spending  the 
money  to  be  raised.  The  assembly  sent  him  resolutions  to  the 
effect  that  his  instructions  were  "an  infringement  of  their 
(our)  Just  rights,"  and  that  similar  laws  had  been  approved 
by  the  king,  but  no  settlement  could  be  reached.81 

Soon  after  this  the  new  governor,  Denny,  arrived,  bringing 
with  him  a  medal  awarded  to  Franklin  by  the  Royal  Society. 
He  made  an  effort  to  win  the  friendship  of  Franklin  who  was 
leader  of  the  assembly,  promising,  the  latter  says,  "adequate 
acknowledgements  and  recompenses"  if  the  assembly  could  be 
induced  to  drop  their  opposition.  Franklin  assured  the  gov 
ernor  that  his  circumstances  "were  such  as  to  make  proprietary 
favors  unnecessary"  to  him,  and  adds  that  "the  disputes  were 
renewed,  and  I  was  as  active  as  ever  in  the  opposition."82 

The  first  meeting  of  the  new  governor  with  the  assembly 
opened  with  more  harmony  than  usual.  One  of  the  grievances 
thus  far  had  been  that  former  governors  had  refused  to  show 
their  instructions  to  the  assembly.  That  body  had  often  ex 
pressed  doubts  that  governors  were  bound  by  instructions  to 
the  extent  which  they  pretended  to  be.  Morris,  especially,  had 
been  charged  with  exaggerating  his  instructions.  When  the 
assembly  asked  to  see  Denny's  instructions  on  money  bills,  he 
complied  at  once  with  their  request.  They  were  now  convinced 
that  there  had  been  no  misrepresentation.  They  assured  the 
governor  that  if  these  instructions  were  followed  there  could  be 
no  supplies  voted,  and  asked  if  he  could  not  sign  a  reasonable 
bill — such  as  the  king  had  formerly  approved — in  spite  of  pro- 

but  as  it  is  of  such  a  nature  as  cannot  be  carried  into  execution,  I  have 
disappointed  them,  and  given  my  consent  to  it."  Morris  to  Sharpe,  Nov. 
26,  1755.  Ibid.,  520. 

81  Pa.  Col.  Eec.,  vii,  181,  185. 

82  Worlcs,  i,  214,  215. 


52  University  of  California  Publications  in  History     (TOL- 1 

prietary  instructions.  Although  they  were  informed  by  Denny 
that  he  must  conform  to  his  instructions,83  his  yielding  to  their 
request  seems  to  have  made  a  good  impression  on  the  assembly. 
They  passed  an  act  for  striking  £30,000  in  bills  of  credit  to  be 
paid  by  an  excise  on  rum  and  other  spirits,  and  unlike  the 
similar  bill  presented  to  Morris,  it  was  now  provided  that  the 
governor  should  have  a  voice  in  spending  the  money.84 

This  harmony  was  short-lived.  Verbal  cannonading  was 
renewed  in  December  (1756)  over  the  quartering  of  British 
soldiers.  Lord  Loudoun  had  demanded  winter  quarters  for  his 
troops  and  the  governor  asked  the  assembly  to  furnish  them. 
After  some  delay  they  passed  a  bill  extending  to  Pennsylvania 
the  British  act  for  quartering  soldiers  in  public  houses.  They 
knew  of  course  that  there  was  not  a  sufficient  number  of  public 
houses  to  accommodate  the  army,  but  alleging  that  they  had  done 
all  that  had  been  asked  or  could  be  expected  of  them,  they 
refused  to  do  more.  So  intent  were  they  on  proving  their  con 
tention  against  the  governor  that  they  gave  no  thought  to  the 
comfort  of  the  troops  and  even  refused  sick  soldiers  the  use  of 
their  new  provincial  hospital.  When  at  last  the  governor 
ordered  the  sheriffs  to  find  quarters  in  private  houses  if  neces 
sary,  the  assembly  yielded  and  provided  the  necessary  quarters.85 

The  loss  of  this  battle  apparently  made  the  assembly  all  the 
more  determined  to  win  the  next.  Once  more  did  the  pro 
prietary  estates  become  the  paramount  issue.  In  January,  1757, 
the  assembly  voted  £100,000  for  the  king's  service  to  be  paid  by 
a  tax  on  all  estates,  including  those  of  the  proprietors.  On  the 
refusal  of  Denny  to  sign  the  bill  the  assembly  sent  him  a  vigor 
ous  remonstrance  demanding  that  the  governor  should  sign  it. 
The  bill,  they  said,  violated  neither  charter,  laws,  nor  royal 


ss  pa.  Col.  Eec.,  vii,  237-239. 

84  Ibid.,  viii,  40.  ' '  I  am  glad, ' '  said  Dinwiddie  in  a  letter  to  Denny, 
Nov.  12,  "your  Assembly  voted  £30,000  to  be  dispos'd  of  by  your  approba 
tion,  which  has  long  been  a  Bone  of  Content11/'  Pa.  Arch,,  1756-60,  iii,  50. 

ss  Pa.  Col  Eec.,  vii,  111-112,  364  et  seq.,  380.  "For  the  first  Time  since 
the  Charter,"  wrote  the  governor,  "they  sat  all  Saturday  Afternoon  and 
Sunday  Morning,  and  drew  up  a  long  abusive  Message"  on  this  subject. 
To  the  proprietors,  April  9,  1757. 


19n]  McCormac:  Colonial  Opposition  53 

instructions.  Proprietary  instructions,  they  maintained,  were 
not  laws,  nor  had  they  any  binding  force;  for  the  proprietors 
had  no  right  to  obstruct  grants  to  the  king.  Neither  side  would 
yield,  and  a  similar  bill  failed  for  the  same  reason  a  month 
later.86  It  may  be  noted  that  here  again  they  confuse  the  veto 
with  law-making. 

In  persistency  the  governor  was  quite  a  match  for  the  as 
sembly,  but  not  so  in  ingenuity.  Taking  advantage  of  the  fact 
that  a  former  and  similar  bill  of  theirs  had  been  approved  in 
England  because  of  extreme  need,  they  now  made  the  present 
grant  of  £100,000  a  supplement  to  the  former  act.  But  the 
Penns  in  the  meantime  had,  with  the  approval  of  the  Board  of 
Trade,  issued  new  orders  forbidding  the  governor's  assent  to 
an  act  like  that  which  the  assembly  had  just  supplemented.  The 
assembly  refused  to  make  any  alterations,  and  during  the  dis 
cussion  which  followed  they  stated  their  "rights"  in  no  un 
certain  terms.  By  the  terms  of  the  supplementary  bill  all  money 
not  specifically  appropriated  was  put  at  the  disposal  of  the 
assembly.  Because  it  was  a  money  bill  they  demanded  that  it 
must  be  passed  without  amendment  or  alteration,87  if  not,  the 
forces  must  be  disbanded.  They  denied  the  governor 's  authority 
to  prorogue  or  dissolve  them,  and  claimed  the  right  to  adjourn 
themselves  whenever  and  for  so  long  a  time  as  they  pleased, 
without  the  governor's  consent;  and  they  insisted  upon  naming 
disbursing  officers  in  their  money  bills.  "In  short,"  wrote 
Richards  Peters  of  the  council,  "the  Powers  of  Government  are 
almost  all  taken  out  of  the  Hands  of  the  Governor,  and  lodged 
in  the  Assembly;  and  as  to  what  little  remains,  scarce  a  Bill 
comes  up  without  an  Attempt  to  lessen  them."88  As  the  Penns 

se  Pa.  Col.  Eec.,  vii,  395-397,  409,  401-403. 

87  In  a  letter  to  the  proprietors,  April  9,  Denny  said  that  when  he  asked 
for  a  new  bill,  ' '  Instead  of  Compliance,  they  thought  proper  to  return 
to  me  the  Bill  with  a  Remonstrance,  demanding  it  of  me  as  their  Right, 
'to  give  my  assent  to  it  (and  as  it  was  a  Money  Bill  without  Alteration  or 
Amendment)  as  I  should  answer  to  the  Crown  for  all  the  Consequences  of 
any  Refusal  at  my  peril. '  ' '  Pa.  Arch.,  1756-60,  iii,  113. 

ss  pa.  Arch.,  1756-60,  iii,  157.  Penn  wrote  to  Peters  that  he  had  "often 
been  told  by  the  greatest  persons  that  there  is  no  Government  in  Pennsyl 
vania.  ' ' 


54  University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  1 

insisted  that  the  governor  should  not  allow  "one  Shilling"  to 
be  paid  out  without  their  consent  and  for  purposes  approved  by 
them,89  he  was  placed  in  a  very  difficult  position.  The  charter 
of  privileges  gave  the  assembly,  as  they  claimed,  the  right  to 
"sit  upon  their  own  Adjournments,"  but  if  a  strict  construction 
of  documents  was  to  govern  in  all  cases  it  would  have  to  be 
admitted  that  both  the  royal  charter  and  the  charter  of  privi 
leges  gave  the  proprietors  a  coordinate  power  with  them  in  the 
making  of  laws.  This  they  were  quite  willing  to  overlook  in 
their  argument  against  proprietary  instructions. 

Loudoun  now  wrote  to  Denny  that  six  months'  pay  was  due 
the  soldiers  and  that  many  were  disbanding.  Others  refused  to 
march  until  paid.  He  urged  either  side  to  yield  some  points  for 
the  present.  The  assembly  made  some  minor  alterations  without 
conceding  the  main  points  at  issue.  Denny  at  last  felt  obliged 
to  give  way.  In  a  verbal  message  he  informed  the  assemblv 
that  he  would  sign  their  bill  despite  his  instructions  rather  than 
involve  the  province  in  ruin.90 

Having  forced  the  governor  to  yield  on  this  bill  the  assembly 
passed  another  more  to  his  satisfaction  (March  29,  1757). 
Military  duty  was  made  compulsory  for  all  those  not  having 
scruples  against  bearing  arms,  except  papists  who  must  pay 
money  instead.  Control  of  the  troops  was  put  in  the  hands  of 
the  governor.91 

Controversies  in  Pennsylvania  were  not  confined  to  the  larger 
problems  of  government.  Insignificant  points  sometimes  led  to 
extended  constitutional  discussions  in  which  the  governors  were 
quite  as  sensitive  on  questions  of  prerogative  as  the  assemblies 
were  jealous  of  their  "rights."  When  Governor  Denny  was 
negotiating  a  treaty  with  the  Delaware  Indians  in  the  spring  of 
1757,  the  Quakers  wished  to  give  an  additonal  string  of  wampum 
to  the  Indians,  and  asked  the  governor  to  send  it  with  those 
given  by  the  government.  This  offer  he  indignantly  declined, 

89  pa.  Arch.,  1756-60,  iii,  157. 

»o  Ibid.,  99 ;  Col.  Eec.,  vii,  441,  453,  454,  448-449. 

»i  Pa.  Arch,  1756-60,  iii,  120  et  seq. 


1911]  McCormac:  Colonial  Opposition  55 

denouncing  it  as  an  attempt  to  infringe  upon  the  prerogative  of 
the  king,  who,  through  his  agents,  had  the  sole  right  to  make 
treaties.  The  refusal  was  answered  by  a  wordy  defense  of  the 
Quakers  by  Joseph  Galloway,  the  future  loyalist,  and  by  a 
remonstrance  from  the  commissioners.  In  these  documents  it  was 
asserted  that  most  of  the  discontent  on  the  part  of  the  Indians 
had  been  caused  by  bad  faith  on  the  part  of  the  Penns,  and  that 
the  attempt  of  the  Quakers  to  regain  the  good  will  of  the  Indians 
was  both  constitutional  and  laudable.92  Exaggerated  assertions 
were  made93  that  the  Quakers  were  inciting  the  Indians  to  make 
unreasonable  claims,  but  the  only  foundation  for  this  seems  to 
have  been  the  frequently  expressed  opinion  of  Quaker  members 
that  all  disputes  with  the  Indians  might  be  peaceably  settled  by 
giving  them  their  rights.  The  "religious  prepossessions"  of  the 
Quakers,  as  Franklin  said,94  were  "unchangeable"  and  "their 
obstinacy  invincible, ' '  but  there  is  no  evidence  of  secret  machina 
tions  on  their  part. 

If  the  governor  guarded  jealously  the  treaty-making  power 
of  the  king,  the  members  of  the  assembly  were  equally  alert  in 
defending  their  "rights"  against  executive  encroachments.  At 
one  of  the  regular  conferences  of  governors  called  by  the  British 
commander  in  the  summer  of  1757,  Governor  Denny  had  agreed 
with  Lord  Loudoun  and  the  southern  governors  to  send  two  hun 
dred  troops  from  Pennsylvania  to  assist  South  Carolina.  But 
they  had  not  reckoned  with  the  assembly,  which  body  in  a  mes 
sage  (June  17)  forcibly  denied  the  governor's  right  to  send 
troops  out  of  the  colony  until  a  law  for  that  purpose  had  been 
passed  by  the  assembly.95  As  other  assemblies  interposed  similar 
objections,  executive  and  military  officers  were  justified  in  think 
ing  it  unreasonable  that  valuable  time  must  be  lost  in  waiting  the 


92  pa.  Col.  Eec.,  vii,  109,  656,  661;  Pa.  Arch.,  1756-60,  iii,  214-215. 
»3  E.  g.,  ibid.,  319. 

94  Works,  iii,  16. 

95  Pa.  Col.  Eec.,  vii,  575.     Replying  at  the  same  time  to  a  request  for 
money  for   frontier  defense,  they  informed  the  governor  that  money  and 
laws  had  been  supplied  in  plenty;  if  the  frontiersmen  suffered,  it  was  due 
to  the  governor's  own  poor  management.     577. 


56  University  of  California  Publications  in  History     tv°L-  * 

pleasure  of  several  indifferent — often  hostile —  legislative  bodies. 
Custom  and  in  some  cases  the  charter  gave  the  assemblies  the 
right  to  decide  upon  sending  troops  outside  of  their  respective 
provinces,  but  they  often  carried  this  privilege  to  extremes  and 
it  was  but  natural  that  as  soon  as  peace  had  been  established  the 
British  government  should  turn  its  attention  to  a  general  re 
adjustment  of  colonial  control. 

The  old  militia  law  had  expired  and  an  attempt  to  renew  it 
in  the  summer  of  1757  added  another  item  to  the  controversy. 
Three  bills  which  were  sent  to  the  governor  were  vetoed  in  suc 
cession  on  the  ground  that  they  were  not  "equitable  and  con 
stitutional,"  but  the  main  objection  was  that  any  one  who  wished 
to  avoid  military  duty  might  plead  a  Quaker  conscience  and 
remain  at  home.  All  suggested  amendments  for  the  purpose  of 
remedying  this  defect  were  termed  religious  tests  worthy  only  of 
the  days  of  the  Inquisition,90  but  the  assembly  did  not  attempt 
to  explain  how  officers  were  to  distinguish  Quakers  from 
others  without  some  kind  of  examination.  They  withheld  from 
the  governor  the  privilege  of  appointing  officers  except  from  a  list 
of  persons  nominated  by  themselves,97  but  even  this  was  more 
liberal  than  their  former  practice  of  naming  officers  in  their  bills. 

A  charge  made  by  the  assembly  that  the  governor  was  partial 
to  the  lower  counties  (Delaware)  brought  a  scathing  denuncia 
tion  of  their  conduct  from  the  assembly  of  those  counties.  Our 
independence  of  the  province  of  Pennsylvania,  they  said,  we 
"esteem  no  small  part  of  our  Happiness."  They  resented  any 
dictation  from  the  province  concerning  the  amount  of  money 
to  be  raised  in  the  counties  for  defense.  Usually  the  assembly 
of  these  counties  maintained  friendly  relations  with  the  governor, 
but  in  1759  they  adopted  the  tactics  of  their  neighbors  whom  they 


06  <  <  What  the  Governor  means  by  an  equitable  and  constitutional  Militia 
Law  we  readily  perceive  by  his  amendments;  a  Law  that  will  oblige  the 
Inhabitants  to  take  a  Test  as  to  their  religious  and  Conscientious  Scruples; 
if  this  be  equitable  and  constitutional,  it  is  the  Equity  and  Constitution  of 
Portugal  or  some  other  Popish  countries  where  the  inquisition  is  in  use, 
and  not  any  free  Government,  where  the  People  enjoy  their  religious  Liber 
ties.  ' '  Pa.  Col.  Rec.,  vii,  744. 

»7  Pa.  Col.  Rec.,  vii,  744-745. 


1911 J  McCormac:  Colonial  Opposition  57 

had  criticized  and  forced  him  to  sign  bills  which  gave  them  full 
control  of  disbursements.98 

In  the  spring  of  1758  a  controversy  arose  which  continued 
during  the  rest  of  the  war.  The  points  at  issue  included  the 
taxing  of  proprietary  estates,  the  right  of  appointment  to  office, 
and  the  control  of  money  voted  for  defense.  At  first  the  as 
sembly's  professions  of  loyalty  to  the  king  were  profuse  and 
their  grants  of  money  liberal.  But  knowing  as  that  body  did 
that  the  governor  had  been  forbidden  to  sign  such  bills  as  they 
now  offered  him,  it  seems  evident  that  their  main  purpose  was 
to  break  the  power  of  the  proprietors  either  by  forcing  them  to 
accept  the  terms  of  the  assembly  or  by  showing  the  British 
government  that  the  Penns  alone  prevented  the  colony's  loyal 
support  of  the  crown.  This  they  failed  to  accomplish,  but  the 
controversy  is  of  interest  because  of  the  rather  full  discussion 
of  many  phases  of  constitutional  authority. 

In  March,  1758,  the  assembly  "earnestly  solicitous  that  this 
Province  may  be  distinguished  among  the  Colonies  for  Loyalty, 
Ardour,  and  Zeal  in  defense  of  America,"  passed  an  act  raising 
2700  men  to  be  united  with  troops  from  Virginia  and  Maryland 
under  the  command  of  General  Abercrombie.  They  recommended 
a  bounty  of  £5  for  each  volunteer.  They  granted  to  the  king 
£100,000  in  bills  of  credit  to  be  paid  by  a  tax  on  real  and  per 
sonal  property — including  the  proprietary  estates.  The  bill 
named  as  commissioners  to  spend  this  money  some  of  their  own 
members  who  had  quarreled  with  the  governor.  The  governor's 
approval  of  disbursements  was  not  required.  Governor  Denny 
of  course  opposed  the  bill  but  offered  to  sign  a  separate  bill  for 
taxing  proprietary  estates,  provided  the  owners  were  given  some 
voice  in  the  choice  of  assessors.  As  the  people  chose  assessors  to 
fix  the  tax  on  their  property  he  urged  that  the  Penns  were  en 
titled  to  a  similar  privilege.  The  assembly  for  a  time  refused  to 
make  any  alterations,  but  they  freely  gave  the  governor  their 
views  on  the  constitutional  points  involved.  His  demand,  they 


»8  Pa.  Arch.,  1756-60,  iii,  630,  634. 


58  University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  1 

said,  was  "inconsistent  with  the  Rights  of  the  people"  and  only 
a  scheme  to  exempt  the  proprietors  from  their  proper  share  of  the 
expenses.  The  House  of  Lords  had  never  claimed  the  right  to 
appoint  commissioners  to  deal  with  financial  matters;  this  was 
left  wholly  to  the  Commons.  Money  voted  was  a  '  *  free  gift  of  the 
People  of  this  Province  to  the  Crown,"  and  they  denied  the 
governor 's  right  to  obstruct  such  gifts,  for  the  purpose  of  benefit 
ing  the  proprietors.  It  is  doubtless  true  that  the  offer  was  not 
made  in  good  faith,  but  as  the  assembly  would  not  discriminate 
between  productive  and  unproductive  estates,  there  was  some 
justice  in  what  the  governor  asked.  The  assembly  agreed  at  last 
to  exempt  the  estates  altogether  in  the  present  bill — without  con 
ceding  the  right  to  impose  such  a  tax — but  they  insisted  that  the 
money  must  be  controlled  by  the  commissioners  appointed  by  the 
assembly  from  their  own  members.  To  give  the  governor  the 
privilege  of  rejecting  members  selected  to  serve  on  the  commis 
sion  as  he  suggested  was,  in  their  opinion,  equivalent  to  appoint 
ing  them,  for  he  could  reject  members  until  he  had  a  majority 
in  his  favor."  Denny  signed  the  bill  in  this  form,  but  under 
protest. 

The  assembly  replied  to  the  governor's  protest  by  denouncing 
severely  both  himself  and  the  proprietors.  The  latter,  they  said, 
claimed  greater  powers  and  exemptions  than  either  peers  or 
royalty  in  England;  the  former  had  "usurped  an  arbitrary 
Power  of  amending  Money  Bills,  and  thereby  repeatedly  violated 
one  of  the  most  essential  Rights  of  the  People."  He  had  pre 
vented  them  from  giving  assistance  to  the  crown.  He  had  made 
no  use  of  the  men  and  money  already  voted,  but  had  allowed  the 
inhabitants  to  be  butchered  and  permitted  the  enemies  to  go  un 
punished.  They  accused  the  governor  and  proprietors  of  being 
alone  responsible  for  the  weak  condition  of  the  colony.100 

Whatever  truth  there  may  have  been  in  these  charges,  their 

99  Pa.  Col.  Kec.,  viii,  53,  63,  64,  67-69,  82,  83. 

100  I~bid.,  102-110.     They  told  Denny  that  he  had  a  greater  eagerness  for 
' '  fingering ' '  the  public  money  than  they,  and  besides  he  is  only  a  ' ( Pas 
senger,  and  regards  not  whether  the  Barque  entrusted  to  his  Care  shall  sink 
or  S\vira,  provided  he  can  by  any  means  reach  the  shore." 


1911]  McCormac:  Colonial  Opposition  59 

own  acts  were  not  conducive  to  effective  military  operations. 
Holding  rigidly  to  a  "strict  construction"  policy  in  interpreting 
orders  from  the  home  government,  they  refused  to  supply  General 
Forbes  with  tents,  arms,  and  other  camp  necessaries  on  the 
ground  that  "the  whole  that  the  King  expected  or  required  from 
them  (us),  was  the  levying,  cloathing  and  paying  of  the  men." 
This  they  would  do,  but  nothing  more.1  In  December  they  again 
refused  to  vote  aid  to  Forbes  because  it  was  a  bad  time  of  year. 
Nothing  had  been  accomplished,  they  said,  with  the  money  pre 
viously  voted,  and  besides  they  would  be  expected  to  contribute 
to  the  general  fund,  therefore,  they  would  do  nothing  at  present.2 
It  matters  little  which  party  was  most  to  blame  in  these  conten 
tions.  It  is  of  greater  significance  that  either  assembly  or  pro 
prietor  possessed,  under  such  a  system  of  government,  the  power 
to  impede  military  operations  and  make  imperial  government 
both  impotent  and  farcical. 

In  the  fall  of  1758  Franklin,  who  was  then  the  assembly's 
agent  in  London,  presented  to  the  British  officials  a  document 
called  ' '  Heads  of  Complaints. ' '  Its  general  purpose  was  to  show 
that  the  Penns,  by  their  arbitrary  instructions  to  the  governor, 
were  preventing  Pennsylvania  from  contributing  toward  the 
defense  of  the  king's  domains.  These  complaints  were  answered 
by  F.  J.  Paris,  agent  for  the  Penns,  who  contended  that  only 
unreasonable  bills  had  been  vetoed.  But  the  Penns  evidently 
feared  that  the  complaints  might  have  some  effect  upon  the  atti 
tude  of  the  government,  for  they  now  declared  their  willingness 
to  contribute  whatever  amount  was  found  to  be  their  proper 
proportion.  It  was  their  opinion,  however,  that  they  had  already 
contributed  more  than  their  share.3  Before  the  Privy  Council 
gave  an  opinion  on  this  matter  other  disputes  had  arisen. 

In  December  Pitt  again  asked  aid  from  Pennsylvania  and  the 
southern  colonies,  and  assured  them  that  the  king  would  recom 
mend  reimbursement  by  Parliament.  The  Pennsylvania  assembly 

1  Pa.  Col  Eec.,  viii,  112.     Assembly  to  Governor  Denny,  May  3,  1758. 

2  Ibid.,  229. 

3  Ibid.,  279-281. 


60  University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  l 

considered  the  matter  until  March  (1759)  and  then  replied  that 
nothing  would  be  granted  until  their  grievances  had  been  re 
dressed.  These  grievances  were  illegal  quartering  of  soldiers  and 
taking  of  wagons  by  the  troops  without  settling  for  them. 

After  the  death  of  General  Forbes  the  assembly  refused  to  vote 
supplies  until  his  successor  should  be  ascertained.  They  had 
heard,  they  said,  that  the  command  was  to  be  given  to  Colonel 
Byrd  of  Virginia,  and  if  that  were  true,  it  would  be  useless  to 
vote  supplies,  for  no  one  would  serve  under  him.4  General  Stan- 
wix  was  appointed  to  the  command,  and  whether  his  appointment 
satisfied  the  assembly  or  not,  they  and  the  people  refused  to  give 
him  any  assistance.  Stanwix  informed  Governor  Denny  that  the 
people  would  not  sell  him  conveyances  for  ready  cash.  The 
assembly  was  urged  to  authorize  the  impressment  of  conveyances, 
but  that  body  simply  replied  that  had  the  late  General  Forbes 
paid  for  what  he  had  taken  the  people  would  now  readily  respond. 
Further  legislation  would  be  of  no  avail,  for  Stanwix  himself 
paid  little  attention  to  laws  or  the  people's  rights.5  Repeated 
appeals  led  only  to  repeated  refusals. 

The  last  controversy  during  Denny's  administration  resulted 
in  a  victory  for  the  assembly.  In  June  of  1759  they  passed  a  bill 
granting  a  loan  of  £50,000  to  Colonel  Hunter  of  the  king's  army 
and  authorizing  the  reissue  of  old  bills.  It  also  made  quit-rents 
payable  in  currency.  The  last  item  was  opposed  by  Richard 
Peters,  secretary  for  the  Penns  and  member  of  the  council,  who 
contended  that  this  was  a  breach  of  contract.  Both  governor  and 
council  opposed  the  bill  because  it  covered  several  distinct  sub 
jects,  but  the  assembly  would  not  alter  it.  The  governor  told  the 
council  that  as  he  must  accept  this  bill  or  nothing  he  intended  to 
sign  it.  The  council  advised  him  not  to  yield,  but  Denny  after 
accusing  that  body  of  having  more  solicitude  for  the  interests  of 
the  proprietors  than  those  of  the  king,  signed  the  bill  regardless 
of  instructions.6  This  independent  action  of  the  governor  was 


4  Pa.  Col.  Sec.,  viii,  282,  297. 

5  Ibid.,  298,  344,  373-374. 

e  Ibid.,  342,  343,  350,  357,  358,  360. 


1911]  McCormac:  Colonial  Opposition  61 

probably  due  to  the  fact  that  he  was  soon  to  retire  from  office.  It 
is  evident  also  that  he  had  become  tired  of  the  thankless  task 
of  defending  the  Penns  in  the  extreme  position  which  they  had 
taken. 

In  July,  1759,  Denny  was  succeeded  by  Hamilton  who  had 
been  governor  at  the  beginning  of  the  war.  According  to  a 
statement  of  Governor  Sharpe  of  Maryland,  Hamilton  made  it  a 
condition  of  his  acceptance  that  the  proprietors  permit  him  to  use 
his  own  judgment  in  the  matter  of  signing  bills.7  He  found  it 
necessary  to  make  use  of  this  privilege.  No  serious  differences 
arose  until  the  following  March,  when  the  assembly  voted 
$100,000  in  bills  of  credit,  part  of  which  was  to  be  paid  by  a 
tax  on  proprietary  estates.  Hamilton  seemed  sincerely  to  desire 
a  reasonable  settlement  of  the  tax  question.  He  proposed  several 
amendments  which  seem  fair  enough  to  both  of  the  contending 
parties.  He  no  longer  asked  that  the  proprietary  estates  be 
exempt  from  taxation,  but  that  they  should  be  rated  no  higher 
than  other  lands.  He  asked  also  that  commissioners  be  ap 
pointed  in  each  county  to  whom  the  proprietary  agents  might 
appeal  if  they  considered  the  tax  levied  by  the  assessors  unjust. 
Evidence  submitted  to  the  governor  by  Penn's  secretary  and 
receiver-general  seems  to  show  clearly  that  the  assessors  had 
either  carelessly  or  purposely  discriminated  against  the  pro 
prietors.  Besides  the  changes  just  mentioned  and  a  few  other 
minor  alterations  Hamilton  asked  that  disbursements  be  made 
with  his  approbation. 

The  assembly  declined  to  accept  any  of  the  proposed  amend 
ments,  and  although  Hamilton  thought  that  the  bill  had  been 
so  framed  for  the  purpose  of  compelling  his  veto  and  discredit 
ing  the  proprietors  in  England,  he  signed  it  rather  than  hamper 
military  operations  by  losing  the  money.8 

7  To  William  Sharpe,  July  8,  1760,  Corresp.  of  Gov.  Sharpe,  ii,  439. 
Sharpe  thought  that  the  Penns  "richly  deserved"  criticism,  for  they  made 
it  impossible  for  any  governor  to  deal  harmoniously  with  the  people.  ' '  The 
Proprietaries  &  their  Govern4  are  become  odious  to  the  People  &  I  believe 
some  of  the  Dirt  which  has  been  thrown  on  them  during  the  Contention  will 
stick  as  long  as  their  Names  are  had  in  remembrance. ' ' 

s  Pa.  Col.  Eec.,  viii,  460-482;  Pa.  Arch.,  1756-60,  iii,  715. 


62  University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL. 1 

So  far  the  British  government  had  taken  no  direct  part  in 
deciding  the  main  questions  at  issue,  but  in  June  of  1760  a 
committee  of  the  Privy  Council  took  under  consideration  a  bill 
which  had  been  passed  in  Pennsylvania  for  reemitting  old 
bills  of  credit  and  taxing  proprietary  estates.  This  committee 
held  that  it  was  unfair  to  tax  any  proprietary  estates  which  did 
not  produce  an  income,  or  to  tax  any  of  them  without  giving  the 
proprietors  some  voice  in  the  selection  of  assessors.  It  was 
equally  unfair,  in  their  opinion,  for  the  assembly  to  claim  the 
exclusive  right  to  spend  the  money  voted.  As  to  the  appoint 
ment  of  officers  created  by  their  acts,  the  committee  held  that 
this  was  more  than  the  House  of  Commons  had  ever  claimed, 
for  appointment  is  an  executive  power.  It  was  also  unjust,  they 
said,  to  pay  the  proprietors  in  depreciated  currency  when  ster 
ling  was  caller  for  in  the  contracts ;  and  the  bills  of  credit  were 
issued  for  too  long  a  term.  The  committee's  recommendation  was 
that  the  king  should  veto  the  reemitting  acts,  and  the  law  taxing 
proprietary  estates  also  unless  it  should  be  modified.  The  modi 
fications  required  were  to  tax  the  estates  the  same  as  other 
lands,  and  to  allow  the  governor  the  approval  of  all  disburse 
ments  of  money.  The  agents  of  the  assembly,  Franklin  and 
Charles,  agreed  to  these  changes,  but  when  the  matter  came 
before  the  assembly  they  flatly  refused  to  carry  out  the  agree 
ment,  giving  as  excuse  that  they  had  violated  no  law.9 

From  the  reception  of  the  king's  veto  until  the  end  of  the 
war  the  assembly  did  practically  nothing  to  assist  in  military 
operations.  They  either  refused  to  take  any  action  whatever  or 
else  defied  the  royal  veto  by  including  in  their  bills  measures 
which  had  been  disapproved  in  England.  Hamilton  was  of 
course  bound  by  the  decisions  of  the  Privy  Council  and  unable 
to  sign  bills  which  violated  them. 

In  September,  1760,  the  governor  urged  the  assembly  to  pass 
a  bill  for  reenlisting  troops  to  defend  posts  on  Lake  Erie  and 
the  Ohio,  but  after  considering  the  matter  for  three  days  they 


»Pa.  Col.  Eec.,  viii,  524-557,  584;  ix,  20. 


19n]  McCormac:  Colonial  Opposition  63 

decided  to  leave  it  to  the  next  assembly.10  They  refused  to 
respond  to  Pitt's  call  for  troops  in  December  because  the  king 
had  annulled  one  of  their  laws  and  required  amendment  to 
another.  It  would  be  sacrificing  their  rights,  they  said,  to  pass 
laws  of  the  kind  desired.11  In  April,  1761,  they  voted  £30,000, 
but  included  in  the  bill  those  points  which  had  already  been 
vetoed  by  the  king.  Hamilton  tried  to  induce  them  to  conform 
to  the  veto,  but  they  would  make  no  alterations.12  In  March, 
1762,  they  granted  £70,000  on  the  same  old  conditions  and  again 
the  governor  was  obliged  to  veto.  The  assembly  flatly  refused 
to  consider  any  amendments  proposed  and  the  matter  had  to  be 
dropped.13 

Nothing  further  was  asked  of  the  colony  for  hostilities  were 
soon  over.  The  king,  however,  was  greatly  incensed  because  of 
the  perverse  conduct  of  the  assembly.  After  the  preliminary 
peace  was  made  with  France  and  Spain,  the  Earl  of  Egremont 
sent  a  letter  to  Hamilton  (November  27,  1762)  in  which  he 
stated  that  although  the  war  had  ended  and  further  aid  would 
be  unnecessary,  the  king  wished  to  express  his  displeasure  with 
the  assembly  for  their  disregard  of  his  veto.  Their  manner  of 
framing  bills  on  impossible  terms,  he  said,  was  considered 
equivalent  to  refusing  aid  altogether.14 

MARYLAND 

In  Maryland  the  conditions  were  much  like  those  in  Penn 
sylvania.  Here  as  in  the  latter  colony  three  parties  figured  in 
the  controversy — the  assembly  which  represented  the  people,  the 
proprietor  with  his  own  special  interests,  and  the  home  govern 
ment  which  considered  only  the  interests  of  the  empire  as  a 
whole.  Not  only  were  the  conditions  similar  to  those  in  Penn 
sylvania  but  the  assembly  of  Maryland  watched  closely  the  acts 


10  Pa.  Col.  Eec.,  viii,  495-496. 

11  Ibid.,  588,  596  et  seq. 

12  Ibid.,  605  et  seq. 
is  Ibid.,  693  et  seq. 
i*  Ibid.,  ix,  15,  16. 


64  University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  1 

of  the  Pennsylvania  assembly  and  adopted  its  ideas  and  meas 
ures  of  resistance  to  executive  authority. 

The  governor,  whose  duty  it  was  to  secure  legislation  satis 
factory  to  each  of  the  opposing  parties,  had  a  very  difficult  task 
to  perform.  The  king's  secretary  of  state  would  send  orders  to 
the  governor  for  men  and  money.  The  governor's  power  to 
approve  laws  was  limited  by  proprietary  instructions.  The  as 
sembly  in  turn  demanded  the  passage  of  laws  which  were  con 
trary  to  those  instructions,  otherwise  they  would  not  vote  the 
assistance  desired  by  the  king.  As  in  Pennsylvania,  both  pro 
prietor  and  assembly  preferred  as  a  rule  to  let  the  colony  go 
defenseless  rather  than  yield  in  matters  under  discussion.  While 
the  desire  to  overthrow  proprietary  government  is  not  so  patent 
here  as  in  Pennsylvania,  it  appears  at  times,  and  there  is  little 
doubt  that  bills  were  often  presented  to  the  governor  with  the 
hope  that  their  expected  veto  would  discredit  the  proprietor  in 
England.  An  old  law  passed  in  1649  and  approved  by  Cecil 
Calvert  gave  the  assembly  a  means  of  hampering  general  mili 
tary  operations  whenever  they  saw  fit  to  use  it.  By  this  law 
the  proprietor  and  his  heirs  could  not,  without  the  consent  of 
the  assembly,  require  the  freemen  "to  Aid  or  Assist  with  their 
Persons  or  Estates"  in  a  war  outside  the  colony.15 

When  Governor  Dinwiddie  of  Virginia  was  planning  the 
Ohio  expediton  in  the  spring  of  1754  the  Maryland  assembly  at 
first  refused  to  vote  assistance.  They  granted  £3000  to  be  used 
at  the  Albany  convention  for  presents  to  the  Indians,  but  as  the 
amount  was  to  be  taken  from  the  income  from  fines  and  licenses 
claimed  by  the  proprietor,  the  bill  was  vetoed  by  the  governor. 
Later  in  the  summer  after  Washington's  defeat  the  assembly 
voted  £6000  toward  assisting  the  Virginians  against  the  French, 
but  as  they  would  vote  nothing  to  pay  for  conveyances,  the 
people  refused  to  furnish  them.  Both  horses  and  wagons  had 
to  be  pressed  into  service.  This  fell  unequally  on  the  inhabitants 
and  caused  much  bitterness.16 


Corresp.  of  Gov.  Sharpe,  ii,  475. 
Ibid.,  i,  56,  68,  71,  88,  211. 


19n]  McCormac:  Colonial  Opposition  65 

Governor  Sharpe  of  Maryland  was  appointed  commander-in- 
chief  of  the  forces  in  the  southern  colonies  and  at  the  end  of  the 
year  1754  he  had  but  a  single  company  which  had  been  raised 
in  his  own  province.17  Sharpe  wrote  to  Sir  Thomas  Robinson 
(January  12,  1755)  that  his  assembly  would  vote  nothing  because 
of  the  example  and  influence  of  Pennsylvania.  About  a  month 
later  they  voted  £10,000  for  the  king's  service,  but  as  it  was  to 
be  taken  from  the  income  from  fines  and  licenses,  the  bill  was 
rejected  by  the  council,  who  claimed  that  by  the  charter  this 
belonged  to  the  proprietor.18  This  income  from  fines  and  licenses 
was  the  chief  bone  of  contention  in  Maryland — the  obstacle 
which  most  frequently  delayed  or  prevented  the  passage  of 
money  bills.  It  was  a  disputed  question  whether  this  income 
rightfully  belonged  to  the  government  of  the  colony  or  to  the 
proprietor.  The  governor  himself  had  no  certain  knowledge  on 
this  point.  In  the  summer  of  1755,  while  he  was  contemplating 
the  veto  of  a  bill  just  passed  by  the  assembly  granting  £5000,  he 
wrote  to  his  brother  John19  asking  the  latter 's  authority  for 
deciding  that  this  money  belonged  to  the  proprietor.  In  his 
letter  Sharpe  gave  a  history  of  the  disposal  of  this  money  in  the 
past  which  seems  to  show  that  the  assembly  was  right  in  its 
claim  that  this  income  belonged  to  the  colony.  Originally,  he 
said,  the  income  from  fines  and  licenses  belonged  to  the  pro 
prietor,  but  had  been  taken  from  him  by  William  III.  On 
several  occasions  it  had  been  restored  to  the  Baltimores  by  tem 
porary  laws,  but  at  other  times  it  had  been  appropriated  by  the 
government  of  the  colony.  The  last  law  on  the  subject  was 
passed  in  1746  when  the  government  had  appropriated  this 
money  for  an  intended  expedition  against  Canada.  This  law 
was  still  (1755)  in  force.20  But  the  bill  just  enacted  by  the 
assembly  never  reached  the  governor,  for  the  council  rejected  it 


i?  Pa.  Arch.,  1748-56,  ii,  215.     Shirley  to  Morris,  Dec.  17,  1754. 
is  Corresp.  of  Gov.  Sharpe,  i,  165,  172,  360-362. 

is  John  Sharpe  was  a  member  of  Parliament.     His  advice  was  sought 
frequently  by  Secretary  Calvert. 
20  Corresp.  of  Gov.  Sharpe,  i,  235. 


66  University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  l 

on  account  of  the  provision  concerning  licenses.  Being  unable 
to  agree  on  a  law  members  from  both  houses  and  other  indi 
viduals  subscribed  money,  just  before  Braddock's  defeat,  to 
support  a  company  of  volunteer  rangers.21  Members  of  the  as 
sembly  declared  that  nothing  would  ever  induce  them  to  give  up 
the  income  from  fines  and  licenses,  and  those  of  the  council  were 
equally  unyielding.  Had  Baltimore  been  as  determined  as  the 
Penns  to  sacrifice  the  public  good  for  his  own  private  interests 
no  bills  could  have  passed,  but  after  Braddock's  defeat  he  gave 
up  all  claim  to  both  fines  and  licenses,  and  by  special  instructions 
ordered  the  governor  to  sign  bills  in  which  they  were  appro 
priated  to  the  common  cause.22 

Military  duty  afforded  another  element  of  discord.  When  the 
war  broke  out  there  was  no  adequate  militia  law  in  Maryland  and 
the  assembly  persistently  refused  to  enact  one.  Without  such  a 
law  the  governor  was  unable  to  carry  out  the  orders  of  the 
British  secretary  of  state  or  those  of  the  British  generals  in 
America.  Unless  in  very  urgent  cases,  the  inhabitants  could 
hardly  be  expected  to  neglect  their  business  affairs  and  leave  their 
families  exposed  to  attack,  without  some  guarantee  of  compen 
sation.  The  few  who  did  enlist  were  sadly  neglected.  Sharpe 
estimated  that  the  militia  numbered  from  16,000  to  20,000  menr 
but  there  was  no  law  which  compelled  them  to  serve  in  the  army 
or  authorized  discipline  for  those  who  did  enlist.23  One- third 
of  the  number  were  without  arms  of  any  kind  and  the  remainder 
had  very  poor  ones.  The  officers  who  recruited  troops  for  the 
British  regiments  had  to  resort  principally  to  indentured  serv 
ants,24  but  this  led  to  opposition  and  riots  on  the  part  of  the 
planters.  None  of  these  conditions  would  the  assembly  even 
attempt  to  remedy.  Sharpe  attributed  their  attitude  largely  to 
the  influence  of  Pennsylvania,  but  it  is  evident  that  they  needed 


21  Corresp.  of  Gov.  Sharpe,  i,  363,  368.   Copy  of  report  to  Board  of  Trade. 

22  Ibid.,  i,  368. 

23  Ibid.,   353.     Civil   officers,   tradesmen,   convicts,   and    Catholics    were 
exempt  from  military  duty. 

24  Ibid.,  211. 


1911J  McCormac:  Colonial  Opposition  67 

little  tutoring  when  it  was  a  question  of  opposing  authority.25 
One  of  the  leading  members  suggested  that  the  people  be  recom 
mended  to  provide  themselves  with  arms  and  to  learn  to  use  them, 
"but  that  every  Step  farther  than  that  would  abridge  the  Liberty 
to  which  as  Englishmen  they  have  an  inviolable  Right."26  If 
this  were  a  true  interpretation  of  English  rights,  Great  Britain 
would  soon  lose  her  place  among  the  powerful  nations  of  the 
world. 

Even  if  their  ' '  rights  as  Englishmen ' '  could  not  be  harmonized 
with  a  compulsory  militia  law,  it  is  difficult  to  understand  why 
those  rights  should  prevent  the  assembly  from  accepting  the 
assistance  of  several  tribes  of  Indians  who  offered  aid  if  the 
colony  would  supply  them  with  provisions.  But  they  were  so 
"excessively  parcimoneous"  according  to  Sharpe,  that  they 
would  allow  provisions  for  none  except  those  on  the  roll  of  the 
colony,  which  were  very  few.  The  governor  was  not  permitted 
even  to  entertain  Indians  as  guests  at  public  expense,  although 
much  depended  on  their  friendship.27 

The  laws  already  in  force  empowered  the  governor  to  compel 
every  individual28  of  military  age  to  march  to  any  part  of  the 
province  where  his  services  were  needed,  but  the  assembly  de 
clared  by  resolution  in  1758  that  this  applied  only  to  cases  of 
actual  invasion  by  the  enemy.29  Such  an  interpretation  of  the 
law  made  any  precautionary  measures  depend  entirely  on  the 
will  of  the  assembly,  which  was  not  always  in  session. 

After  Baltimore  gave  up  his  claim  to  the  income  from  fines 
and  licenses,  the  assembly  framed  their  money  bills  in  such  a 
way  that  he  would  have  to  yield  in  still  another  matter  or  be 
placed  in  the  undesirable  position  of  obstructing  grants  to  the 
king.  Again  influenced,  as  Sharpe  thought,  by  Pennsylvania, 
they  passed  a  bill  in  the  spring  of  1756  granting  £40,000  for 


25  Corresp.  of  Gov.  Sharpe,  i,  219,  222,  257,  353;  Pa.  Arch.,  1748-56,  ii,  397. 

26  Corresp.  of  Gov.  Sharpe,  i,  491.     Sharpe  to  Calvert,  Oct.  5,  1756. 

27  Ibid.,  549.    Sharpe  to  Dinwiddie,  May  5,  1757. 

28  Except  certain  exempted  classes. 

29  Corresp.  of  Gov.  Sharpe,  ii,  255. 


68  University  of  California  Publications  in  History 

the  king's  service.  Of  this  amount  £25,000  was  to  be  used  for 
an  expedition  against  the  enemy,  but  they  took  the  precaution  to 
provide  that  it  could  not  be  so  used  unless  Virginia  and  Penn 
sylvania  would  assist.  One  of  the  means  provided  for  raising 
this  amount  was  a  tax  on  lands,  including  those  of  Lord  Balti 
more.  With  respect  to  the  land  tax  Baltimore  was  quite  as 
selfish  as  the  Penns  and  had  ordered  the  governor  not  to  pass 
any  law  which  did  not  exempt  his  lands,  but  the  assembly  was 
determined  that  they  should  be  taxed.  By  adopting  a  con 
servative  course  Sharpe  avoided  a  prolonged  controversy  like 
that  in  Pennsylvania.  He  was  not  entirely  in  sympathy  with  the 
claims  of  the  assembly  and  considered  them  "too  opinionated" 
and  ' '  parsimoneous "  to  provide  sufficient  money  for  defense 
unless  they  could  ' '  subvert  in  a  great  measure  the  Constitution  & 
render  it  more  similar  to  that  of  Pennsilvania, "  but  he  did  not, 
he  told  his  brother,  feel  called  upon  to  follow  the  example  of 
Governor  Morris  and  uphold  unreasonable  proprietary  instruc 
tions  at  the  expense  of  the  welfare  of  the  province.  As  the 
upper  house  also  took  this  view  of  the  matter  the  bill  was  passed 
in  spite  of  instructions  to  the  contrary.30  Having  settled  this 
matter  amicably  the  assembly  a  little  later  voted  £3000  to  be  used 
in  raising  men  for  the  Eoyal  American  regiment,  and  £2000 
toward  furnishing  the  New  York  army  with  transports  and 
wheat.  But  they  refused  to  send  men  to  New  York  and  likewise 
to  grant  Secretary  Robinson's  request  for  a  compensation  to 
masters  whose  servants  had  been  enlisted  by  the  recruiting 
officers.31 

Besides  being  very  economical  in  voting  money  for  defense 
the  assembly  unreasonably  demanded  exclusive  control  of  the 
movement  of  troops.  Regardless  of  the  fact  that  efficient  mili 
tary  service  requires  executive  control,  and  in  spite  of  law  and 
custom  in  their  own  colony,  they  insisted  on  dictating  the  time 
and  place  in  which  the  troops  should  be  used  and  under  whom 
they  should  serve. 

so  Corresp.  of  Gov.  Sharpe,  i,  346,  391,  395,  399,  400,  403-404,  415,  424, 
425,  435;  Pa.  Arch.,  1748-56,  ii,  685. 
31  Corresp.  of  Gov.  Sharpe,  i,  494. 


1911]  McCormac:  Colonial  Opposition  69 

When  the  Earl  of  Loudoun  was  sent  to  command  the 
British  forces  in  America  the  colonies  as  usual  were  asked  to 
assist  him.  The  Maryland  assembly  voted  to  contribute  a 
small  sum  which  was  then  in  the  treasury,  but  no  more.  They 
inserted  a  clause  directing  how  and  where  Maryland  troops  must 
be  employed.  They  were  not  to  serve  under  Loudoun  either 
within  the  province  or  outside  its  borders.  Within  the  province 
Loudoun  must  not  have  even  indirect  control  over  the  men. 
Colonel  Stanwix,  but  no  one  else,  might  take  the  troops  out  of 
the  colony.  This  conflicted  with  the  plans  of  Loudoun  who  had 
ordered  the  Maryland  troops  to  garrison  Fort  Cumberland,  and 
it  is  difficult  to  see  why  he  was  not  justified  in  pronouncing  the 
act  "inconsistent  in  itself,  and  a  direct  infringement  of  the 
King's  undoubted  prerogative  ....  of  commanding  all  Troops 
in  his  Dominions";  but  the  governor  decided  to  accept  these 
terms  rather  than  lose  the  appropriation.  Governor  Dinwiddie  of 
Virginia  commended  Sharpe  for  accepting  the  grant  even  on 
these  terms,  but  added  that  the  "ill-natur'd  Opposition"  and 
"unmannerly"  conduct  of  the  lower  house  in  Maryland  had 
caused  him  much  trouble  with  his  own  assembly.32 

In  the  fall  of  1757  when  Loudoun  again  asked  Maryland 
to  furnish  provisions  for  troops  at  Fort  Cumberland  the  as 
sembly  declared  by  resolution  that  they  would  never  vote  a 
thing  for  them  as  long  as  they  remained  at  that  post.33  They 
formally  condemned  the  disposition  which  Loudoun  had  made 
of  the  troops  during  the  preceding  summer  and  announced  that 
they  were  about  to  reduce  the  entire  force  of  the  colony  to  three 
hundred  rangers  who  were  to  protect  the  frontier  settlements. 
Before  this  they  had  taken  into  their  own  hands  practically 
everything  connected  with  the  army.  A  committee  appointed 
by  the  assembly  had  entire  charge  of  feeding  and  clothing  the 
men.  The  governor  was  given  no  voice  in  this  or  in  the  dis- 


32  Corresp.  of  Gov.  STiarpe,  ii,  3,  24. 

33  Hid.,  91,  123,  126.     A  small  number  of  Maryland  troops  had  already 
been  taken  there,  but  it  was  a  disputed  point  whether  this  fort  was  situated 
in  Maryland.     The  lower  house  wanted  to  give  up  this  post  and  the  sur 
rounding  territory. 


70  University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  l 

bursement  of  other  public  money.34  Such  acts  were  more  than 
mere  precautionary  measures.  Such  a  policy  was  an  unreason 
able  and  unnecessary  impediment  to  any  general  campaign. 

A  law  of  the  province  provided  that  whenever  the  militia 
should  be  called  out  to  defend  the  province  the  expense  should  be 
paid  by  a  poll-tax.  Instead  of  employing  this  customary  tax  to 
support  the  three  hundred  rangers,  the  assembly  proposed  a 
tax  on  real  and  personal  property,  offices,  professions,  pro 
prietary  quit-rents  and  ecclesiastical  preferments.  Assessors 
were  to  be  appointed  by  special  commissioners  chosen  by  the 
people,  and  these  commissioners  were  to  have  absolute  control 
of  the  troops.35  The  governor  and  council  would  not  approve 
the  bill  on  these  terms,  and  the  former  wrote  Baltimore  that 
nothing  could  be  expected  from  the  colonies  until  they  were 
compelled  by  Parliament  to  furnish  their  respective  quotas.36 
Again  he  attributed  the  conduct  of  the  assembly  and  their  in 
fluence  over  the  people  to  the  teachings  of  the  Pennsylvania 
Gazette.  From  that  source  they  had  derived  the  doctrine  that 
"the  Upper  House  is  no  Part  of  our  Constitution,"  and  it  "is 
from  that  Quarter  that  all  our  Fine  Schemes  are  imported. '  '37 

In  order  to  get  around  the  law  which  gave  the  governor  con 
trol  of  the  militia  the  assembly  resorted  to  an  interesting  ex 
ample  of  strict  construction.  Sharpe  had  planned  to  garrison 
Fort  Frederick  with  militia,  but  the  assembly  presented  a  re 
monstrance  denying  his  authority  to  do  so.  The  militia,  they 
argued,  were  not  obliged  to  march  under  the  governor's  orders 
except  in  cases  of  actual  invasion.  Besides,  they  could  not  be 
compelled  to  garrison  forts  or  to  serve  in  arms  at  all  unless  there 
were  "an  Apparent  Enemy  within  the  Limits  of  the  Province." 
The  ravages  which  had  been  committed  on  the  frontiers  were 
not  "Invasions,"  but  "only  Incursions."  They  agreed  to  fur 
nish  Loudoun  with  two  hundred  men  provided  he  would  not  take 


34  Corresp.  of  Gov.  Sharpe,  ii,  31,  51. 

35  IMd.,  100-101. 
so  Hid.,  111-112. 

37  Ibid.,  120.    To  Calvert,  Dec.  27,  1757. 


1911]  McCormac:  Colonial  Opposition  71 

them  out  of  Maryland,  but  they  immediately  reconsidered  this 
generous  offer  and  withdrew  it.38 

Soon  after  this  the  assembly  granted  £45,000  for  military 
purposes  but  on  terms  which  the  council  pronounced  unconstitu 
tional.  A  conference  was  arranged  by  the  governor,  but  as  the 
representatives  of  the  lower  house  were  instructed  to  concede 
nothing,  the  conference  ended  in  failure  and  the  assembly  was 
prorogued  without  granting  anything  for  defense.  Nothing 
could  be  obtained  without  absolute  submission  to  the  will  of  the 
lower  house,  or,  to  quote  Sharpe  himself,  there  was  no  course 
left  for  the  governor  and  council  but  to  consider  how  they  might 
"yield  most  decently  to  every  demand  that  the  Lower  House  of 
Assembly  shall  think  proper  to  make."39 

There  is  apparently  much  truth  in  Sharpe 's  claim  that  the 
attitude  of  the  lower  house  was  influenced  in  a  large  measure  by 
a  desire  to  discredit  proprietary  government  in  the  eyes  of  the 
king.40  But  unlike  the  governors  of  Pennsylvania  Sharpe  did 
not  throw  the  entire  blame  on  the  assembly.  Toward  the  end  of 
the  war  he  wrote  his  brother  that  their  obstinacy  was  due  in  great 
measure  to  the  unreasonable  claims  of  the  proprietor.  Baltimore 
for  a  time  demanded  the  income  from  fines  and  licenses  which 
did  not  belong  to  him,  and  because  of  this,  said  Sharpe,  the 
assembly  determined  to  strip  him  of  as  much  power  as  possible. 
Both  Sharpe  and  his  brother  considered  it  the  duty  of  British 
generals — not  of  the  assembly — to  supply  money  for  the  com 
missary  department.41 

ss  Corresp.  of  Gov.  Sharpe,  ii,  141-142.  Sharpe  to  Loudoun,  March  2, 
1758. 

39  Ibid.,  146,  181,  186. 

•to  "The  Truth  is  that  their  leading  Men  (.  .  .  .)  are  anxious  to  bring 
every  thing  into  Confusion  in  hopes  that  the  Crown  will  then  think  it  neces 
sary  to  interfere  in  some  manner  or  other  that  might  be  disagreeable  to  his 
Lordship."  "Were  they  to  refuse  to  grant  any  money  for  His  Majesty's 
Service  their  Constituents  would  unanimously  condemn  their  Conduct,  but 
while  they  can  save  Appearances  so  far  as  to  appear  fond  of  granting  Sup 
plies  the  People  will  be  imposed  on  &  made  to  believe  that  the  Upper  House 
&  the  Governor  are  alone  to  blame,  &  it  is  entirely  owing  to  the  Govern 
ment  of  Maryland  &  Pens*  being  in  the  hands  of  Proprietors  that  Money 
for  His  Majesty's  Service  is  not  so  readily  granted  in  these  Provinces  as 
in  the  other  Colonies. ' '  Sharpe  to  Calvert,  May  14,  1756,  ibid.,  ii,  179. 

4i  Ibid.,  ii,  439-441.    Sharpe  to  William  Sharpe,  July  8,  1760. 


72  University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL. 1 

In  order  to  overcome  opposition  to  the  proprietor  in  the  two 
houses  of  assembly  Secretary  Calvert42  was  ready  to  employ 
measures  which  were  not  unlike  those  of  the  modern  political 
boss.  His  scheme  was  carefully  to  select  members  for  the  upper 
house,  and  to  bribe  those  of  the  lower  house  with  appointive 
offices.  In  a  letter  to  Sharpe,  March  17,  1760,  Calvert  outlined 
a  plan  to  be  followed  by  the  governor.  When  choosing  members 
of  the  upper  house  he  advised  the  governor  not  to  * '  admit  a  fool 
who  will  not  only  be  troublesome  &  Impertinent  but  will  Blabb 
every  thing  he  knows."  Neither  should  he  appoint  a  man  of 
ability  who  was  not  known  to  be  favorable  to  the  proprietor — 
for  in  that  case,  the  more  able  the  man  the  more  dangerous  he 
would  be  in  the  council. 

Having  provided  for  the  council,  Calvert  proceeded  to  show 
Sharpe  how  the  lower  house  might  easily  be  made  subservient. 
In  nineteen  out  of  twenty  cases,  he  said,  members  oppose  meas 
ures  from  private  interest,  "therefore  by  throwing  out  a  Sop  in 
a  proper  manner  to  these  Noisy  animals  it  will  render  them  not 
only  silent,  but  tame  enough  to  bear  stroking  &  tractable  enough 
to  follow  any  directions  that  may  be  thought  fit  to  be  given  to 
them."  This  "Sop"  he  explained  in  detail,  but  in  substance 
the  plan  was  that  members  of  the  lower  house  were  to  be  given 
to  understand  that  if  they  did  as  Calvert  desired  while  members, 
they  need  not  fear  the  people,  for  all  members  who  should  fail 
to  be  reflected  because  of  loyalty  to  the  proprietor  would  be 
rewarded  with  other  offices.  Among  these  were  the  offices  of 
sheriff,  farmer  of  the  quit-rents,  etc.  If  members  did  not  wish 
these  offices  for  themselves,  their  brothers  or  sons  would  receive 
the  commissions.  Calvert  had  calculated  to  a  nicety  just  the 
number  of  members  it  would  be  necessary  to  "Bait"  in  this 
way.43 

Whether  Lord  Baltimore  was  cognizant  of  this  plan  to  cor- 


42  Cecil  Calvert,  uncle  and  secretary  of  the  proprietor. 

43  There  are  58  members,  he  said,  but  usually  not  all  attend.     ' '  Now 
the  business  is  to  find  Baits  for  30  of  these;   which  is  a  clear  Majority, 
supposing  they  were  all  to  attend."     Calvert  to  Sharpe,  March  17,   1760. 
Corresp.  of  Gov.  Sharpe,  ii,  376-379. 


1911]  McCormac:  French  and  Indian  War.  73 

rupt  the  assembly  does  not  appear  in  the  records.  It  was  never 
put  to  a  test,  for  Calvert 's  suggestions  were  not  followed. 
Sharpe  opposed  the  elaborate  scheme,  not  on  moral  grounds  it 
would  seem  from  his  answer  to  Calvert,  but  because  he  con 
sidered  the  plan  impracticable.  Baltimore's  friends,  he  said, 
usually  get  all  such  offices  so  that  the  governor  has  none  to  dis 
tribute;  besides,  members  of  the  lower  house  as  a  rule  are  not 
qualified  to  fill  such  offices — many  of  them  can  scarcely  write.44 
The  last  item  of  information  is  of  interest  when  we  consider  that 
these  same  members  felt  themselves  fully  capable  of  deciding  all 
points  of  constitutional  law — better  qualified,  apparently,  than 
the  king's  attorney-general. 

Very  little  was  contributed  by  Maryland  during  the  last  year 
and  a  half  of  the  war.  Five  times  within  less  than  eighteen 
months  did  the  lower  house  pass  bills  embodying  points  which 
the  king's  attorney-general  had  pronounced  unlawful,  and  each 
time  the  upper  house  refused  to  concur.  Neither  would  give  way 
although  the  enemy  was  ravaging  the  frontier.  Whenever  the 
attention  of  the  lower  house  was  called  to  the  opinion  of  the 
attorney-general  their  answer  was  simply  that  they  did  not  agree 
with  him.45  His  opinion  seemed  to  impress  them  no  more  than 
that  of  the  least  able  of  their  own  members. 

There  was  little  apparent  loyalty  to  the  interests  of  the 
mother  country46  or  respect  for  authority.  On  the  other  hand  the 
proprietor  cared  only  for  his  own  interests.  The  end  of  the  war 
relieved  the  pressure  of  opposing  interests,  but  it  was  certain  to 
reappear  under  similar  conditions. 

While  proprietary  government  in  Itself  was  not  entirely 
responsible  for  the  discord  in  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania,  no 
small  part  of  it  is  traceable  directly  to  this  anomalous  creation 
of  British  rulers.  Attributes  of  sovereignty  combined  with 
ownership  of  the  soil  worked  badly  wherever  it  was  tried.  To 
obtain  sufficient  revenue  for  governmental  purposes  was  difficult 


44  Corresp.  of  Gov.  Sharpe,  ii,  423-431.    Sharpe  to  Calvert,  July  7,  1760. 

45  Hid.,  394,  Sharpe  to  Pitt,  April  14,  1760. 

397.     Sharpe  to  Baltimore,  May  4,  1760. 


74  University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  1 

enough  in  all  of  the  colonies,  but  the  introduction  of  another 
factor  to  separate  still  farther  sovereign  from  subject  added  to 
the  expense  and  confused  legitimate  requirements  with  pro 
prietary  greed,  in  the  minds  of  the  people. 

IV.  THE  SOUTHEBN  COLONIES 
VIRGINIA 

When  the  French  appeared  on  the  Ohio,  Virginia  had  a 
greater  interest  in  preventing  their  encroachments  than  any  other 
colony.  She  was  interested  in  extending  her  claims  westward 
and  the  presence  of  the  French  caused  her  much  concern.  As 
soon  as  the  plans  of  the  French  were  discovered  Governor  Din- 
widdie  took  steps  to  drive  out  the  invaders  and  hold  the  country 
for  England.  While  the  initiative  devolved  upon  Virginia,  the 
neighboring  colonies  were  asked  for  assistance.  It  has  already 
been  noted  that  for  some  time  Pennsylvania  and  Maryland 
would  do  absolutely  nothing,  and,  as  will  appear  further  on,  the 
southern  colonies  did  very  little. 

Dinwiddie  was  forced  to  rely  principally  on  his  own  colony 
for  sinews  of  war,  and  unfortunately  for  the  success  of  his  plans, 
the  conditions  were  not  favorable  even  there.  Without  the  co 
operation  of  the  assembly  the  governor  was  powerless,  for  that 
body  controlled  the  finances  of  the  colony;  and  the  members  at 
this  time  were  in  no  mood  to  cooperate  with  a  governor  who  was 
attempting,  in  their  opinion,  to  deprive  them  of  their  * '  inherent ' ' 
and  "British  rights."  A  controversy  was  already  in  progress 
when  the  enemy  made  his  appearance,  and  little  could  be  done 
in  defense  of  the  colony  until  constitutional  questions  had  been 
settled. 

In  1753  Governor  Dinwiddie  for  the  first  time  attempted  to 
collect  a  fee  of  one  pistole47  for  affixing  the  official  seal  to  land 
patents.  In  November  of  that  year  inhabitants  from  several 
counties  petitioned  the  house  of  burgesses  for  protection  against 
this  new  burden.48  The  burgesses  sent  an  address  to  Dinwiddie 


47  A  Spanish  coin  worth  about  $3.50. 

48  Journals  of  the  House  of  Burgesses,  1752-1758,  121,  129.     All  refer 
ences  to  the  Journals  refer  to  this  volume. 


1911]  McCormac:  French  and  Indian  War.  75 

asking  whether  the  fee  demanded  at  the  secretary's  office  had 
been  charged  by  the  governor's  order,  if  so,  by  what  authority.49 
Dinwiddie  replied  that  he  had  ordered  the  fee  collected  and  gave 
as  his  authority  the  advice  of  his  council  and  "Powers  from 
Home."50  The  first  part  of  his  statement  was  true,  but  the 
"Powers  from  Home"  were  largely  imaginary.  Not  convinced 
by  the  proofs  submitted  by  the  governor,  the  house  of  burgesses 
sent  him  a  vigorous  protest  declaring  his  action  unlawful.  They 
based  their  interference  in  the  land  question  on  the  "undoubted 
Eight  of  the  Burgesses  to  enquire  into  the  Grievances  of  the 
People,"  any  abridgment  of  which  would  be  dangerous  to  their 
liberties  and  to  the  constitution  of  the  colony.  "The  Rights  of 
the  Subject,"  they  asserted,  "are  so  secured  by  Law,  that  they 
cannot  be  deprived  of  the  least  Part  of  their  Property,  but  by 
their  own  Consent."  Upon  this  excellent  principle,  they  said, 
their  constitution  had  been  founded,  and  the  king  had  declared 
"  'That  no  Man's  Life,  Member,  Freehold  of  Goods,  be  taken 
away  or  harmed,  but  by  established  and  known  Laws.'  "51  It 
will  be  seen  at  once  that  the  burgesses  had  constructed  a  huge 
man  of  straw  for  the  purpose  of  demolishing  him.  The  excellence 
of  the  principles  invoked  can  not  be  gainsaid,  but  their  relevancy 
is  more  than  doubtful  as  Dinwiddie  pointed  out  in  his  answer.52 
However  unjust  the  imposition  of  the  fee  may  have  been  it 
related  solely  to  the  disposal  of  the  king's  lands — the  purchase 
of  which  was  optional  on  the  part  of  the  buyer — and  not  to 
taxation  or  the  administration  of  government. 

More  to  the  point  was  the  other  argument  of  the  burgesses 
based  on  precedent  and  royal  charter.  The  governor's  attention 
was  called  to  the  fact  that  no  such  fee  had  been  exacted  by  the  old 
Virginia  Company,  and  that  Charles  II  by  charter  had  ordained 
that  the  method  of  the  old  company  should  be  continued.  Lord 
Howard  of  Effingham  had  attempted,  they  said,  to  exact  a  fee 


49  Journals,  136. 

50/fcuL,  141. 

si  Ibid.,  143-144;   Dinwiddie  Papers,  i,  46. 

52  Journals,  154. 


76  University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  1 

for  the  use  of  the  seal,  but  had  been  forbidden  to  do  so  by 
William  III  and  his  Privy  Council.  Upon  this  representation 
the  governor  was  requested  to  withdraw  his  order  for  collecting 
the  fee. 

When  the  governor  declined  to  rescind  his  order  to  the  sec 
retary  and  declared  that  he  was  more  than  ever  convinced  of  its 
justice,  the  burgesses  were  so  incensed  that  they  passed  a  series 
of  resolutions  condemning  his  action  and  providing  for  an  appeal 
to  the  crown.  The  governor's  action  in  demanding  the  fee  they 
pronounced  "illegal  and  arbitrary" — a  violation  of  charter 
rights  and  a  subversion  of  their  constitution.  It  was  a  hinder- 
ance  to  settlement  and  therefore  detrimental  to  both  king  and 
subject.  They  resolved  to  send  Attorney-General  Randolph  to 
England  as  special  agent  to  protest  to  the  king  against  the  con 
duct  of  the  governor.  Although  they  pleaded  poverty  when 
asked  for  money  to  defend  the  colonies,  the  burgesses  agreed  to 
pay  Randolph  £2,500  for  his  services,  and  promised  him  a  pen 
sion  in  case  he  should  lose  his  office  of  attorney-general  on 
account  of  his  mission.  The  king,  however,  was  especially  peti 
tioned  to  continue  Randolph  in  his  office.  When  the  council 
refused  to  allow  this  salary  the  house  of  burgesses  on  their  own 
responsibility  voted  to  deduct  that  amount  from  the  crown 
revenues,  and  the  treasurer  was  directed  to  pay  it  without  the 
concurrence  of  either  council  or  governor.  The  treasurer,  who 
was  also  speaker  of  the  house,  expressed  his  willingness  to  carry 
out  their  order,  but  the  governor  would  not  issue  a  warrant  for 
the  money.53 

Their  appeal  to  the  crown  caused  Dinwiddie  considerable 
anxiety  and  he  admitted  to  his  agent  in  England  that  he  never 
would  have  taken  the  fee  had  he  known  that  so  much  trouble 
would  come  from  it.  He  was  particularly  annoyed  because  it  had 
made  "so  much  Noise  in  the  Coffee  Houses"  in  England.54  The 
Privy  Council  compromised  the  matter  by  rejecting  the  petition 
of  the  burgesses  but  forbidding  the  collection  of  a  fee  on  tracts 


53  Journals,  154-156,  167-169;  Din.  Pap.,  i,  72,  140,  160. 

s*  Din.  Pap.,  i,  137-139.    To  James  Abercromby,  April  26,  1754. 


McCormac:  Colonial  Opposition  77 

under  100  acres.  This  was  practically  what  the  burgesses  had 
asked.  Dinwiddie  now  threw  the  entire  blame  on  the  council  and 
declared  that  he,  personally,  had  never  desired  to  collect  the 
fee.55  The  payment  of  Randolph's  salary  still  remained  a  bone 
of  contention  and  impeded  the  voting  of  supplies. 

While  the  pistole  question  was  pending  in  England  the  house 
of  burgesses  voted  £10,000  for  frontier  defense,  although  one  of 
their  prominent  members  questioned  the  king's  title  to  the  Ohio 
Valley.56  With  this  first  war  bill  the  burgesses  adopted  a  prac 
tice  which  they  continued  to  follow  although  it  was  pronounced 
unconstitutional  by  the  governor.  In  the  body  of  the  bill  they 
named  directors  whose  duty  it  was  to  decide  how  the  money 
should  be  spent.  But  they  did  not  deprive  the  governor  of  his 
right  to  approve  appropriations  as  was  done  in  Pennsylvania. 
Their  "republican  Principles"  Dinwiddie  denounced  in  various 
letters,  and  he  declared  that  necessity  alone  induced  him  to  sign 
such  a  bill.57  Anxiety  over  the  pistole  affair  no  doubt  helped  to 
secure  his  signature,  but  aside  from  this  he  was  too  politic  to 
carry  resistance  to  extremes.  He  frankly  admitted  that  he  had 
no  influence  over  his  assembly58  and  a  year  later  he  expressed  his 
belief  that  crown  instructions  should  be  suspended  when  urgency 
required  it.59  He  thought  the  governor  and  assembly  of  Pennsyl 
vania  differed  over  trifles  while  the  colonies  were  in  danger,  and 
he  believed  that  proprietary  estates  should  be  taxed  the  same  as 
other  property.60  Although  Dinwiddie  met  with  opposition  at 
times,  he  secured  more  money  from  a  reluctant  assembly  than 
any  other  governor  south  of  New  England. 

Even  after  money  had  been  voted  by  the  assembly  great  diffi 
culty  was  experienced  in  getting  men  to  enlist  except  those  of 

55  Din  Pap.,  i,  262,  263,  370.     To  the  Board  of  Trade,  Oct.  25,  1754. 

56  Ibid.,  102;  Hening,  Statutes,  vi,  417  et  seq. 

57  Din  Pap.,  i,  103,  and  other  letters. 

58  < f  w  't  Influence  You  may  have  over  Y  'r  Assembly  I  know  not,  but  I 
frankly  tell  You  I  have  none  over  this  here,  further  than  arguing  on  the 
necessity  and  leaving  the  Quantum  to  them. ' '     To  Gov.  Glen  of  S.  C.,  April 
15,  1754.    Din.  Pap.,  i,  128. 

59  Ibid.,  ii,  29. 

eo /bid.,  i,  507;  ii,  181. 


78  University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  1 

the  poorest  quality,  and  the  militia  law  in  force  was  extremely 
inadequate.  Under  the  latest  militia  law,  passed  in  1748,61  the 
militia  could  not  be  taken  from  the  colony.  The  pay  of  the  troops 
was  small  and  they  were  obliged  to  equip  themselves.  Provisions 
and  conveyances  might  be  pressed  into  service  but  not  until  they 
had  been  appraised  and  proper  allowance  made  to  the  owners, 
all  of  which  consumed  considerable  time.  Many  of  the  soldiers 
feared  that  they  would  never  receive  even  the  small  pay  allowed 
by  this  law,  and  refused  to  serve.  Washington  frequently  com 
plained  of  the  bad  condition  of  those  already  in  the  ranks.62  The 
officers,  he  said,  were  threatening  to  resign  for  lack  of  pay.  He 
wished  to  serve  without  pay  rather  than  accept  such  a  small 
amount  and  be  uncertain  of  getting  that.  He  would  rather  '  *  dig 
for  a  maintenance  ....  than  serve  upon  such  ignoble  terms."63 
Little  could  be  accomplished  under  such  conditions,  and  it  was 
some  time  before  the  governor  and  assembly  could  sufficiently 
harmonize  their  opinions  on  constitutional  questions  to  provide 
for  defense.  Practically  no  assistance  was  received  at  first  from 
other  colonies,  and  Dinwiddie  proposed  to  Lord  Halifax  and 
other  British  officials  that  a  poll-tax  be  levied  in  all  the  colonies 
for  war  purposes.64 

When  the  assembly  met  in  August,  1754,  Dinwiddie  again 
asked  them  to  vote  money  for  defense.  The  burgesses  com 
mended  Dinwiddie  for  his  prudent  measures  in  defeating  the 
designs  of  the  French,  but  at  the  same  time  they  embraced  this 
opportunity  to  force  the  governor  to  accept  their  terms.  They 
voted  £20,000  for  the  king's  service  but  attached  as  a  rider  the 
payment  of  Randolph's  salary  of  £2,500  for  his  services  in  Eng- 


ei  Hening,  vi,  112  et  seq. 

62  Washington,  Writings  (Ford's  ed.)  i,  42.  ''We  daily  experience  the 
great  necessity  for  Cloathing  the  men,  as  we  find  the  generality  of  those, 
who  are  to  be  enlisted,  are  of  those  loose,  idle  persons,  that  are  quite  desti 
tute  of  house  and  home,  and,  I  may  truly  say,  many  of  them  are  cloathless; 
....  There  are  many  of  them  without  shoes,  others  want  stockings,  some 
are  without  shirts,  and  not  a  few  that  have  scarce  a  coat  or  waistcoat  to 
their  backs."  See  also  pp.  130  et  seq. 

es  Ibid.,  63-65. 

e*  Din.  Pap.,  i,  238,  251. 


1911J  McCormac:  Colonial  Opposition  79 

land — the  same  that  Dinwiddie  had  previously  refused  to  allow. 
The  governor  agreed  to  pass  the  rider  as  a  separate  bill  provided 
they  would  insert  a  clause  suspending  its  operation  until  the 
king's  will  should  be  ascertained,  but  the  burgesses  insisted  on 
the  passage  of  the  bill  as  it  stood.65  Accusing  them  of  hypocrisy 
and  severely  denouncing  their  conduct,  Dinwiddie  prorogued  the 
assembly  without  procuring  the  necessary  supplies.  I  ''See  you 
call'd  upon,"  said  he,  "in  ye  Day  of  your  Country's  Distress; 
hear  you  declaring  your  knowledge  of  her  Danger,  and  pro 
fessing  the  most  ardent  Zeal  for  her  Service;  yet  find  these 
declarat'ns  only  an  unavailing  Flourish  of  Words  ....  You 
withhold  Y'r  aid  and  thereby  leave  the  Enemy  at  full  Liberty  to 
perpetuate  their  destructive  and  unjust  designs. '  '66  Before  being 
prorogued  the  burgesses  asked  the  governor  to  express  their 
thanks  to  the  king  for  his  paternal  care  in  sending  his  independ 
ent  companies  from  New  York  and  South  Carolina  to  defend 
their  colony;  but  excused  themselves  from  granting  supplies  to 
these  same  companies  and  hoped  that  his  Majesty  would  be 
"graciously  pleased"  to  provision  them  himself.67 

The  assembly  convened  again  in  October  and  the  governor 
in  his  address  painted  the  impending  perils  in  glowing  colors, 
regretting  that  he  could  not  find  words  to  make  it  more  soul- 
stirring.  In  an  equally  effusive  reply  the  assembly  promised 
their  hearty  support,  assuring  the  governor  that  no  harm  would 
ever  come  to  the  colony  through  their  neglect.68  They  passed  two 
acts  which  they  considered  very  magnanimous,  but  which  were 
not  conducive  to  successful  military  operations.  Both  conformed 
to  old  principles,  and  the  militia  act  very  largely  counteracted 
the  benefits  derived  from  the  other.  The  militia  act69  permitted 
the  enlistment  of  "such  able  bodied  men,  as  do  not  follow  or 
exercise  any  lawful  calling  or  employment,  or  have  some  other 


65  Journals,  198;  Din.  Pap.,  i,  298-300,  328. 

ee  Journals,  205;  Din.  Pap.,  i,  302,  328;  Col.  Eec.  of  N.  C.,  v,  138. 

67  Journals,  200. 

es  Ibid.,  209,  211. 

69  Hening,  Statutes,  vi,  438-439. 


80  University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  l 

lawful  and  sufficient  support  or  maintenance, ' '  for  that  particu 
lar  expedition.  All  who  were  entitled  to  vote  for  members  of 
the  house  of  burgesses  were  exempted  from  service.  The  act  was 
to  remain  in  force  for  one  year.  So  jealously  did  the  burgesses 
guard  the  "rights"  of  the  people  that  only  vagrants  could  be 
enlisted  for  duty  outside  of  the  province,  and  even  they  could 
not  be  forced  to  enlist.  This  house  opposed  all  draft  laws  as 
violating  their  rights  as  Englishmen.  Such  was  the  kind  of 
soldiers  sent  to  defend  the  empire ;  it  is  little  wonder  that  Wash 
ington  continually  complained  of  the  personnel  of  his  army. 

By  the  other  act  the  assembly  granted  £20,000  toward  the 
expenses  of  the  expedition.  As  usual  the  disbursement  was  put 
in  the  hands  of  directors,  but  all  payments  required  the  gov 
ernor's  approval.  Dinwiddie  accepted  the  grant  on  these  terms 
more  graciously  than  before  and  "parted  with  the  (our)  Assem 
bly  on  very  good  Terms. '  'T0 

Little  assistance  came  from  the  surrounding  colonies.71 
Neither  their  country's  interests  nor  their  own  danger  could 
overcome  the  indifference  of  the  people  or  their  representatives  ;72 
but  they  were  keenly  alive  on  questions  relating  to  their  rights 
and  privileges.  But  the  executives  who  criticised  the  assem 
blies  were  equally  headstrong  and  unyielding.  While  the  strife 
continued  the  inhabitants  were  being  butchered  and  their  prop 
erty  destroyed. 

The  arrival  of  Braddock  caused  nearly  all  of  the  colonies  to 
vote  some  additional  assistance.  But  the  general's  first  experi 
ence  with  Virginia  was  not  a  happy  one.  On  May  15,  1755,  he 
sent  a  letter  to  Dinwiddie  stating  that  he  would  remove  all 
effective  troops  from  Fort  Cumberland  and  asking  the  governor 


™  Din.  Pap.,  i,  409.     To  James  Abercromby,  Nov.  16,  1754. 

"l  Dinwiddie  wrote  on  March  17,  1755,  that  the  neighboring  colonies  had 
not  granted  ' '  any  Assist  'ce  either  in  Money,  Men  or  Provis  ;s,  except  N. 
York,  ab't  3,000  St'g;  No.  Car.,  6,000,  their  money;  M'yFd  the  same  sum; 
So.  Car.  and  Pensylv'a,  not  a  Farthing."  Col.  Eec.  of  N.  C.,  v,  394-395. 

?2  <• '  but  truly  I  think, ' '  wrote  Dinwiddie  to  Halifax  concerning  all  the 
colonies,  ' '  in  gen  '1,  they  have  given  their  Senses  a  long  Holliday. ' '  Din. 
Pap.,  i,  513. 


McCormac:  Colonial  Opposition  81 

to  garrison  it  with  militia.  The  assembly  at  once  protested  that 
such  a  measure  was  contrary  to  law,  as  the  fort  was  located  in 
Maryland,  and  also  that  the  expense  would  "tend  to  the  utter 
Ruin  of  this  Colony."  Dinwiddie  reminded  them  that  Fort 
Cumberland  had  been  built  to  protect  the  colonies  in  general  and 
rightly  said  that  "it  is  of  no  Consequence  whether  it  is  in  Vir 
ginia  or  Maryland;  it  is  the  King's  Fort,  and  the  Guns  mounted 
there,  are  those  sent  by  his  Majesty  for  such  Uses."  The  bur 
gesses  yielded  temporarily  to  the  extent  of  introducing  a  bill  to 
draft  not  more  than  fifty  men  for  this  purpose,  but  the  bill  was 
rejected  at  its  third  reading.73  For  the  western  expedition  the 
burgesses  granted  £10,000  and  agreed  to  raise  two  hundred  men 
for  frontier  defense.74 

The  defeat  of  Braddock  in  July  caused  great  consternation 
in  Virginia,  and  for  a  time  aroused  some  enthusiasm  for  the 
British  cause.  When  the  assembly  met  in  August  they  readily 
voted  another  £40,000  and  enacted  a  more  effective  militia  law.75 
The  last  two  amounts  voted  were  in  bills  of  credit  instead  of 
sterling,  but  payable  within  the  five  year  limit  fixed  by  the  British 
government.  As  there  was  great  need  of  money  for  war  purposes 
the  governor,  although  opposed  to  paper  money,  signed  the  bills 
without  protest. 

The  militia  bill  just  passed  proved  inadequate.  At  the  Octo 
ber  session  the  governor  urged  the  passage  of  a  law  similar  to 
the  British  militia  act,  but  his  recommendation  was  disregarded. 
Up  to  this  time  controversies  over  paper  money,  so  frequent  in 
some  of  the  other  colonies,  had  not  appeared  in  Virginia,  but 
during  this  session  the  house  of  burgesses  seemed  to  have  caught 
the  contagion.  They  passed  an  act  for  issuing  £200,000  in  paper 
money  to  be  current  for  eight  years.  This  would  impair  the 
credit  of  the  colony  to  a  degree  that  the  governor  was  not  willing 
to  permit  and  he  refused  to  sign  the  bill.  After  several  alterca- 


73  Journals,  267,  268,  272,  284. 

74  Din.  Pap.,  ii,  86. 

75  Honing,  Statutes,  vi,  521  et  seq.;  Din.  Pap.,  ii,  142;  Journals,  314. 


82  University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL. 1 

tions  concerning  the  constitutionality  of  the  bill,  Dinwiddie  dis 
solved  the  assembly  and  waited  for  a  new  election.76 

At  the  beginning  of  1756  little  had  been  done  to  prevent  the 
encroachments  of  the  enemy.  The  money  which  had  been  raised 
could  not  be  used  effectively  so  long  as  the  people  refused  to  enter 
the  service.  Dinwiddie  recommended  to  the  Lords  of  Trade  that 
convicts  sentenced  to  transportation  should  be  sent  to  serve  at 
the  frontier  forts.77  The  militia  according  to  the  governor 's  esti 
mate  numbered  about  3,600,  but  nearly  all  of  them  were  free 
holders  who  insisted  on  their  privilege  of  not  serving  except  in 
cases  of  imminent  danger,  and  then  only  within  the  province. 
With  the  enemy  at  their  door  it  took  four  months  to  enlist  less 
than  five  hundred  recruits,  and  these  were  of  an  inferior  class.78 
Washington  wrote  from  the  frontier  of  the  distress  of  the  in 
habitants,  and  saw  nothing  ahead  but  "inevitable  destruction" 
unless  the  assembly  should  adopt  more  vigorous  measures.79 

When  the  new  assembly  met  in  March,  1756,  General  Shirley's 
call  for  troops  to  serve  at  Niagara  and  Crown  Point  was  placed 
before  them  by  the  governor.  The  burgesses  at  once  pronounced 
it  "impracticable  and  imprudent"  to  send  troops  so  far  at  this 
time,  and  the  council  agreed  with  them.80  But  on  account  of  the 
recent  massacres  on  their  own  frontiers  they  voted  £25,000  and 
included  in  the  act  a  provision  for  drafting  militia.81  This  pro 
vision,  however,  was  practically  valueless,  for  any  one  who  had 
been  drafted  might  escape  service  by  paying  £10,  and  we  are 


™  Journals,  319;  Din.  Pap.,  ii,  269. 

77  Feb.  23,  1756.    Din.  Pap.,  ii,  339. 

78  Dinwiddie  to  Halifax,  Feb.  24,  1756.     Din.  Pap.,  ii,  346.     See  also 
p.  339. 

79  To  Dinwiddie,  April  22,  1756.    Writings  (Ford's  ed.)  i,  249.    On  April 
16,  he  had  written  to  John  Eobinson,  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Burgesses, 
that  the  people  would  do  nothing  to  help  themselves.     ' '    ....  the  timidity 
of  the  inhabitants  of  this  country  is  to  be  equaled  by  nothing  but  their  per- 
verseness.     Yesterday  was  the  time  appointed  for  all  to  meet  who  were  in 
clined  to  join  for  this  desirable  end,  and  only  fifteen  came,  some  of  whom 
refused  to  go  but  upon  such  terms  as  must  have  rendered  their  services 
burthensome  to  the  country."     Ibid.,  241. 

so  Din.  Pap.,  ii,  379-380 ;  Journals,  345. 
si  Hening,  Statutes,  vii,  9  et  seq. 


1911]  McCormac:  Colonial  Opposition  83 

told  by  Dinwiddie  that  many  availed  themselves  of  this  privi 
lege.82  No  drafted  troops  could  be  taken  to  serve  outside  of  the 
province.  As  other  colonies  had  similar  laws  restricting  their 
troops  to  service  within  their  own  borders,  offensive  warfare  was 
practically  impossible.  Discipline  was  equally  impossible  under 
existing  laws.  Deserters  turned  their  guns  against  their  own 
officers  and  defied  their  authority.83  '  *  They  go  off  in  twenties, ' ' 
wrote  Washington,  "and  all  threaten  to  return  (home),  if  they 
are  not  relieved  in  a  very  short  time  or  discharged. '  '8*  Desertion 
was  made  easier  by  the  connivance  and  assistance  of  the  very 
inhabitants  who  most  needed  protection.85  The  feeling  of  com 
mon  interest  was  so  utterly  lacking  that  the  inhabitants  of  one 
county  would  refuse  aid  to  those  of  another.86 

In  the  matter  of  money  Virginia  was  liberal  for  the  time. 
Even  Dinwiddie  admitted  that  the  burgesses  had  granted  as  much 
as  the  colony  could  afford,  and  more  than  the  assembly  of  any 
other  colony;87  but  at  best  they  were  "only  keeping  the  expedi 
tion  alive."  Each  colony  preferred  to  act  by  itself  and  in  its  own 
way,  therefore  little  was  accomplished.88  As  a  result  of  the  militia 
laws  in  force  the  enemy  could  attack  one  province  at  a  time  with 
out  fear  of  being  molested  by  troops  from  another  colony.  The 
feeling  in  Virginia  is  well  illustrated  by  her  vote  of  £8,000  for 
enlisting  troops  for  the  king's  regiment  of  Royal  Americans  and 


82  Corresp.  of  Gov.  Sharpe,  i,  444. 

83  Washington,  Writings  (Ford's  ed.)  i,  269-276. 

84/Znd.,  286.  On  October  10,  1756,  he  wrote  Dinwiddie:  ''The  militia 
are  under  such  bad  order  and  discipline,  that  they  will  go  and  come  when 
and  where  they  please,  consulting  solely  their  own  inclinations. ' '  Writings, 
i,  357. 

se  <•  <  When  Hampshire  was  invaded, ' '  wrote  Washington  to  Lord  Fairfax, 
"and  called  on  Frederick  for  assistance  the  people  of  the  latter  refused 
their  aid,  answering,  'Let  them  defend  themselves,  as  we  shall  do  if  they 
come  to  us. '  Now  the  enemy  have  forced  through  that  county,  and  begin 
to  infest  this,  those  a  little  removed  from  danger  are  equally  infatuated; 
and  will  be,  I  fear,  until  all  in  turn  fall  a  sacrifice  to  an  insulting  and 
merciless  enemy. ' '  Writings,  i,  331. 

**IUd.,  326;  Pa.  Arch.,  ser.  2,  ii,  694. 

87  Din.  Pap.,  ii,  420.  Up  to  June,  1756,  Virginia  had  granted  at  various 
times  £150,000.  Ibid.,  437. 

ss  Corresp.  of  Gov.  Sharpe,  i,  407.     Sharpe  to  Albermarle,  May  5,  1756. 


84          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     tv°L- 1 

transporting  them  to  New  York,  accompanied  by  a  refusal  to 
permit  a  single  man  to  be  drafted  for  that  service.89  No  authority, 
no  emergency  could  induce  the  burgesses  to  yield  what  they  con 
sidered  their  constitutional  rights.  Men  who  enjoyed,  as  they 
claimed  to  do, ' '  the  Blessings  of  a  British  Constitution,  reduced  to 
its  original  Purity"90  could  hardly  be  expected  to  submit  to 
compulsory  military  service. 

The  relations  between  governor  and  assembly  during  the  year 
1757  seem  to  have  been  more  harmonious  than  usual.  At  the 
close  of  the  session,  which  lasted  from  April  to  June,  the  gov 
ernor  informed  Sharpe  that  the  assembly  had  "generously 
granted  every  Thing"  he  had  asked  of  them.91  They  voted  to 
increase  their  regiment  to  1200  men  and  granted  £80,000  to 
maintain  them.  An  additional  sum  of  £3,000  was  voted  for  the 
purpose  of  buying  presents  for  the  Indians.  In  order  to  com 
plete  the  regiment,  drafting  was  permitted,  but  again  it  was 
restricted  to  non-freeholders — that  is,  "vagrants  and  dissolute 
persons."  Two  companies  were  to  be  sent  to  assist  South  Caro 
lina,  and  two  additional  companies  if  the  British  commander 
should  deem  it  necessary.92  This  was  a  notable  departure  from 
their  former  exclusive  policy,  but  as  these  troops  were  all  vag 
rants  their  "rights"  were  not  quite  so  sacred.  Pitt's  vigorous 
war  policy  and  a  promise  of  reimbursement  seem  to  have  im 
pressed  the  assembly  favorably.  But  recruiting  was  still  diffi 
cult.  Washington  despaired  of  filling  the  ranks  unless  the  officers 
were  permitted  to  enlist  indentured  servants.93 

Another  act  passed  during  this  session  imposed  the  death 
penalty  for  mutiny  and  desertion,94  and  still  another  provided 
for  mustering,  training  and  equipping  the  militia  for  defense 
within  the  province.95  They  still  refused  to  subject  their  troops 

89  Din.  Pap.,  ii,  524. 

so  Journals,  404. 

si  Din.  Pap.,  ii,  639;  Corresp.  of  Gov.  Sharpe,  ii,  25. 

92  Hening,  Statutes,  vii,  70,  75. 

93  Writings,  i,  474. 

94  Hening,  Statutes,  vii,  87  et  seq. 
as  Ibid.,  93  et  seq. 


McCormac:  Colonial  Opposition  85 

to  regular  British  army  discipline,96  but  the  provisions  adopted 
marked  a  distinct  advance  over  the  old  regulations.  Another 
element  of  discord  was  removed  during  the  same  year  when  Din- 
widdie  ordered  Fort  Cumberland  evacuated.  It  was  thought 
that  the  Maryland  assembly  would  provide  for  this  post,  but 
they  indignantly  refused  to  do  so.97 

In  1758  the  burgesses  adopted  a  still  more  liberal  policy. 
They  voted  to  augment  the  forces  of  the  colony  to  2000  men  to 
be  used  wherever  the  British  commanding  officer  should  think 
best.98  Money  was  freely  voted  at  both  sessions  held  during  that 
year.  This  policy  was  continued  during  the  remaining  years  of 
the  war.  There  had  been  a  heavy  drain  on  the  resources  of  the 
colony  and  the  money  grants  wrere  not  large,  but  a  greater  spirit 
of  liberality  was  shown  in  putting  the  troops  under  control  of 
British  generals  to  be  used  in  offensive  warfare. 

By  too  jealously  guarding  the  rights  of  freeholders  and  the 
special  interests  of  their  own  province,  the  burgesses  had  seri 
ously  impaired  the  military  efficiency  of  the  colony,  but  on  the 
whole  their  conduct  compared  favorably  with  that  of  the  neigh 
boring  governments.  The  valuable  services  rendered  toward 
the  close  of  the  war  only  emphasized  the  necessity  of  some  general 
authority  with  adequate  power  to  act  in  military  affairs,  unham 
pered  by  local  prejudices. 

NORTH  CAROLINA 

In  North  Carolina  conditions  were  not  favorable  for  active 
participation  in  the  war.  A  jealous  guarding  of  charter  rights,99 
factious  disputes,  and  a  vicious  financial  system  all  tended  to 
prevent  a  proper  support  of  the  general  cause. 


96  Din.  Pap.,  ii,  692.    Dinwiddie  to  Gov.  Littleton  of  S.  C.,  Aug.  27,  1757. 

97  Washington,  Writings,  i,  434,  notes. 
»8  Hening,  Statutes,  vii,  163  et  seq. 

»9  The  charter  granted  by  Charles  II  was  liberal,  and  after  it  had  been 
abrogated  in  1728  the  assembly  still  claimed  rights  under  it.  "To  them, 
Magna  Charta,  'the  great  charter,'  was  not  the  one  granted  by  King  John 
to  the  English  Barons  at  Kunnymede,  but  the  one  granted  by  Charles  the 
Second  to  the  Lords  Proprietors  of  the  Province  of  Carolina."  Prefatory 
notes  to  vol.  vi,  Col.  R&b.  of  N.  C.,  p.  iii. 


86  University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  l 

Some  energy  was  displayed  by  the  assembly  at  the  beginning 
of  the  war,  North  Carolina  being  the  first100  to  send  aid  to  Vir 
ginia  when  that  colony  was  making  preparations  to  repel  the 
French.  Unfortunately  this  aid  proved  of  little  value.  In 
March,  1754,  the  assembly  voted  750  men  for  the  assistance  of 
Virginia,  and  £12,000  for  their  maintenance,1  but  it  was  procla 
mation  money  which  Dinwiddie  pronounced  "nearly  worthless."2 
The  officers  were  unable  to  raise  the  whole  number  of  troops 
voted,  but  those  who  did  enlist  were  joined  to  the  British  inde 
pendent  companies  without  opposition  and  paid  a  larger  allowT- 
ance  than  troops  of  other  colonies.  The  assembly  doubtless  meant 
well  in  allowing  large  pay  to  the  troops,  but  as  a  result  of  this 
and  the  slowness  of  recruiting  the  money  was  spent  before  the 
troops  were  ready  for  service,  and  they  became  a  burden  rather 
than  an  aid  to  Virginia.  The  officers  of  the  independent  com 
panies  would  not  serve  under  Virginia  officers  and  the  troops 
deserted  as  soon  as  the  money  was  gone.3 

Recruiting  in  North  Carolina  as  in  other  colonies  was  slow 
and  difficult.  Little  power  was  given  to  the  governor  to  enforce 
the  few  regulations  which  had  been  established  by  law.  A  law 
was  passed  authorizing  the  drafting  of  unmarried  men,  but  they 
avoided  the  draft  by  open  defiance  or  hiding.  County  officials 
neglected  or  refused  to  make  proper  returns  to  the  governor, 
thereby  aiding  the  delinquents  and  nullifying  the  laws  in  a  great 
measure.4  It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  when  the  assembly 
did  vote  troops  they  did  not  restrict  the  place  and  time  of 
their  service.5  North  Carolina  stood  quite  alone  in  this  freedom 
from  local  prejudice. 


100  Din.  Pap.,  i,  162. 

1  Col  Eec.  of  N.  C.,  v,  738.    Jas.  Abercromby  to  Board  of  Trade. 

2  So  much  complaint  was  made  by  British  merchants  because  this  money 
was  made  a  legal  tender  in  the  province  that  in  1759  the  Privy  Council 
ordered  Governor  Dobbs  to  recommend  the  repeal  of  the  legal  tender  law. 
Col.  Eec.  of  N.  C.,  vi,  43-45. 

s  Dinwiddie  to  Secretary  Fox,  July  24,  1754;  Same  to  Secretary  Kobin- 
son,  Sept.  23.    Din.  Pap.,  i,  246,  327. 

4  Col.  Eec.  of  N.  C.,  v,  571.    Dobbs  to  Board  of  Trade,  March  15,  1756. 
s  Ibid.,  738-739.    Abercromby  to  Board  of  Trade. 


1911J  McCormac:  Colonial  Opposition  87 

Factional  quarrels  continued  through  nearly  the  entire  period 
of  the  war.  At  first  the  trouble  was  not  with  the  governor,  but 
hostile  factions  were  contending  for  supremacy.  Governor  Dobbs 
wrote  that  when  he  came  to  the  colony  he  "  found  it  had  been 
divided  into  Parties,  and  in  a  very  low  state ;  and  one-half  of  the 
Province  not  obeying  the  laws  made  by  the  other,  nor  attending 
the  Assemblies,  refusing  to  pay  the  Taxes  which  the  Assembly 
raised,  so  that  the  Colony  was  in  debt,  and  obliged  upon  the 
present  breaking  out  of  this  war  to  raise  £40,000  in  paper  of 
this  Currency  (£30,000  Sterling)  which  half  of  this  Province 
would  not  receive  nor  circulate. '  '6 

But  disputes  between  governor  and  assembly  were  not  want 
ing.  In  January,  1759,  Governor  Dobbs  complained  to  the  Board 
of  Trade  that  the  lower  house  claimed  full  control  over  all  money 
voted  by  themselves  as  well  as  that  granted  by  Parliament.7 
The  lower  house  in  May  of  that  year  voted  £6,000  for  troops, 
but  the  money  was  to  be  controlled  by  themselves.  The  bill  was 
rejected  by  the  governor  and  council  after  futile  attempts  to 
induce  the  lower  house  to  alter  it.8  The  lower  house  then  pre 
ferred  a  series  of  charges  against  the  governor.  Among  other 
things  he  was  accused  of  illegally  collecting  license  fees,  and  of 
taking  a  toll  from  the  money  sent  from  England.  He  had  with 
out  lawful  authority  appointed  his  nephew  paymaster  with  no 
duty  except  to  collect  these  fees.  The  money  already  voted  had, 
they  said,  been  wasted  by  incompetent  officers  appointed  by  the 
governor.9  No  doubt  there  was  much  truth  in  these  charges ;  at 
any  rate  they  served  as  an  excuse  for  exclusive  control  of  finances 
by  the  lower  house.  Both  sides  were  censured  by  the  Lords  of 
Trade  for  haggling  over  trivial  points  at  such  a  time,  and  Dobbs 
was  especially  criticised  for  attempting  to  dictate  the  choice  of 
an  agent  to  represent  the  colony  in  England.10  Similar  disputes 


6  Col.  Eec.  of  N.  C.,  v,  595.    Dobbs  to  Loudoun,  July  10,  1756. 

7  IUd.,  vi,  1-7. 
s  Ibid.,  32. 

» Ibid.,  410  et  seq. 

.,  538  et  seq.    Board  of  Trade  to  Dobbs,  April  4,  1761. 


88  University  of  California  Publications  in  History 

occupied  the  time  during  the  first  session  of  1760,  and  after 
several  failures  to  agree,  a  bill  was  finally  passed  in  June  for 
raising  300  men.11  That  so  small  an  amount  of  money  was  sent 
them  from  England  the  assembly  attributed  to  the  want  of  an 
agent  in  London;12  and  they  had  no  agent  at  this  time  because 
Dobbs  claimed  the  right  to  dictate  the  choice.  In  the  spring  of 
1761  the  lower  house  attached  the  appointment  of  an  agent  as  a 
rider  to  a  bill  granting  £20,000  for  the  king's  service.  But  the 
house  lacked  the  resisting  power  possessed  by  some  of  its  con 
temporaries,  and  when  this  bill  was  rejected  by  the  governor  and 
council  they  withdrew  the  rider  and  granted  the  money.13  As  the 
war  soon  ended  nothing  further  was  asked  of  them.  Discord  con 
tinued,  but  the  disputes  were  now  confined  to  local  matters. 

SOUTH  CAROLINA 

Before  the  war  period  the  South  Carolina  governor  had  been 
deprived  of  many  of  the  powers  usually  enjoyed  by  the  governor 
in  other  colonies.  The  war,  therefore,  did  not  materially  alter 
the  situation.  The  council  had  already  curtailed  his  legislative 
powers  and  the  lower  house  had  usurped  the  power  of  appointing 
administrative  officials.14  James  Glen,  who  had  assumed  the 
government  in  1743,  attempted  to  regain  the  lost  powers  but  with 
little  success.  The  claim  of  the  commons  (lower  house)  that  their 
money  bills  must  be  passed  or  rejected  by  the  council  caused 
discord  between  the  two  houses.  A  dispute  on  this  question 
arose  in  1756  over  the  refusal  of  the  council  to  concur  in  a  bill 
granting  £41,000  for  a  frontier  fort  and  other  purposes.  Glen 
seems  to  have  resented  the  usurpations  of  the  council  more  than 
those  of  the  commons,  for  in  this  matter  he  gave  his  support  to 
the  latter.  A  writer  of  the  time — champion  of  the  commons — 
proved  to  his  own  satisfaction,  and  doubtless  to  that  of  the 


11  Col.  Eec.  of  N.  C.,  vi,  257,  266. 

12  Ibid.,  477. 

is  Ibid.,  654,  659. 

I*  McCrady,  South  Carolina  under  the  Eoyal  Government,  254-259. 


1911]  McCormac:  Colonial  Opposition  89 

people,  that  the  council  had  no  legitimate  claim  to  the  functions 
of  an  upper  legislative  house.15 

Like  other  southern  colonies  South  Carolina  did  not  take  a 
very  active  part  in  defending  the  British  domains.  The  British 
independent  company  of  300  men  which  she  supported  partici 
pated  with  the  Virginia  forces  in  the  battle  of  Great  Meadows, 
and  £6,000  was  voted  for  the  Braddock  expedition,16  but  during 
the  greater  part  of  the  war  her  activities  were  confined  prin 
cipally  to  the  defense  of  her  own  frontiers.  Disputes  between 
the  assembly  and  Governor  Glen  delayed  action  even  on  the 
frontiers,  and  little  had  been  accomplished  when  he  retired  from 
power  in  June  of  1756. 17 

The  currency  of  the  colony  was  so  badly  depreciated18  that 
the  money  voted  was  practically  worthless  as  a  purchasing 
medium.  As  there  was  practically  no  metal  money  in  the 
province  and  Governor  Glen  would  not  sign  bills  for  increasing 
the  amount  of  currency,  little  effective  aid  could  be  given  while  he 
remained  in  office.  Even  Dinwriddie  criticised  Glen  for  adhering 
too  closely  to  his  instructions19  and  thereby  obstructing  money 
grants;  but  private  grievances  no  doubt  influenced  the  former's 
opinion  as  the  two  men  were  not  on  the  best  of  terms. 

Greater  harmony  prevailed  during  the  administration  of  Gov 
ernor  Littleton.  Money  was  voted  for  frontier  forts  and  British 
army  rules  of  discipline  were  adopted  for  the  troops  of  the 
colony.20  The  latter  measure  was  remarkable  for  the  time  as 
other  colonies  jealously  guarded  the  privilege  of  maintaining 
discipline  in  their  own  way. 

GEORGIA 
Little  military  assistance  could  be  expected  from  Georgia, 


is  McCrady,  op.  cit.,  282-287. 

is  Din.  Pap.,  i,  249.    Dinwiddie  to  Earl  of  Granville. 
17  Din.  Pap.,  ii,  508. 

is  Dinwiddie  stated  in  a  letter  to  Hamilton,  April  27,  1754,  that  £100,000 
S.  C.  money  was  not  quite  equal  to  £20,000  in  Va.  currency.  Din.  Pap.,  i,  143. 
is  Din.  Pap.,  ii,  28,  29. 
20  Ibid.,  508,  692. 


90          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL. 1 

for  she  was  unable  to  protect  even  her  own  borders.  When  in 
1755  Governor  Keynolds  placed  before  the  commons  house  a 
letter  from  Secretary  Robinson  asking  for  aid,  that  body  replied 
that  if  their  "Abilitys  were  equal  to  their  (our)  Inclination" 
they  would  contribute  liberally,  but  they  were  able  to  ' '  contribute 
Little  or  Nothing  either  as  to  men  or  Money"  to  the  general 
defense.21  On  the  contrary  they  requested  the  governor  to  ask 
the  king  for  means  of  defense.22 

Their  military  weakness  was  not  exaggerated,  for  as  late  as 
1757  their  entire  army  consisted  of  forty  rangers  of  their  own  and 
a  few  troops  sent  there  from  the  independent  companies  of  South 
Carolina.  Their  forts  were  in  such  a  dilapidated  condition  that 
on  celebration  days  the  guns  had  to  be  taken  from  them  for  fear 
the  shock  of  the  discharge  would  cause  them  to  collapse.23 

While  Georgia  figured  little  in  disputes  over  war  supplies, 
she  furnished  another  phase  of  the  controversy  over  constitutional 
rights  which  was  both  interesting  and  unique. 

Georgia  became  a  royal  colony  in  1755  and  therefore  did  not 
possess  a  long  list  of  accumulated  "rights"  which  must  be 
respected.  The  task  of  her  legislature  was  to  procure  rights  and 
privileges,  not  to  preserve  old  ones. 

Profiting  by  the  example  of  other  rebellious  colonies  the 
British  government  circumscribed  the  privileges  of  the  Georgia 
assembly  within  very  narrow  limits.  The  usual  privilege  of 
admitting  members  at  their  discretion  and  fixing  the  qualifica 
tions  for  voters  was  denied  the  commons — lower  house  of  assembly 
— and  large  powers  were  given  to  the  governor.  Naturally  this 
was  resented  by  the  commons.  They  first  asked  for  privileges 
usual  in  American  governments,  and  when  the  request  was  denied 
they  proceeded  to  assume  them  in  defiance  of  authority. 

During  the  very  first  session  of  the  assembly  under  the  new 
government  they  prepared  a  series  of  remonstrances  to  be  sent 
to  the  king.  They  complained  that  the  fixing  of  fees  of  public 


21  Col  Eec.  of  Ga.,  xiii,  47. 

22  Ibid.,  61. 

23  Ibid.,  130.    Report  of  a  committee,  Jan.  25,  1757. 


McCormac:  Colonial  Opposition  91 

offices  is  entirely  in  the  hands  of  the  governor  and  council,  and 
asked  that  such  fees  be  * '  settled  by  Act  of  General  Assembly  and 
not  otherwise  as  is  the  Custom  of  all  your  Majesty's  other  Prov 
inces  in  America."24  The  royal  instructions  required  that  all 
voters  must  possess  a  freehold  of  at  least  50  acres  of  land,  and 
no  one  could  be  a  member  of  the  commons  house  unless  he  pos 
sessed  a  freehold  of  500  acres.  Both  of  these  requirements  were 
opposed  by  the  commons.  They  asked  for  the  privilege  of  fix 
ing  qualifications  in  both  cases  by  law.25  At  first  the  governor 
approved  these  requests  and  expressed  a  desire  to  have  them 
granted,26  but  when  he  received  a  negative  reply  from  England 
he  immediately  adopted  the  English  point  of  view. 

The  governor's  instructions  also  required  him  to  see  that  the 
number  of  members  in  the  commons  should  neither  be  increased 
nor  diminished,  but  before  the  commons  received  an  answer  to 
their  remonstrance  they  proceeded  to  unseat  members  at  will 
and  thereby  cut  down  the  membership.27  As  soon  as  the  gov 
ernor  heard  from  England  he  announced  the  new  policy  of  the 
ministry.  The  ministry  admitted  that  by  "long  Usage"  other 
colonies  were  exercising  the  privileges  desired  by  the  commons 
of  Georgia,  but  they  also  declared  such  practices  to  be  "incon 
sistent  with  all  Colony  Constitution  whatever,  contrary  .... 
to  the  Express  direction  of  His  Majesty's  Commission,  by  which 
alone  this  Assembly  is  Constituted."28  Here  is  a  direct  denial 
of  all  inherent  rights,  and  an  announcement  that  colonial  rights 
in  future  must  be  limited  to  concessions  made  by  royal  instruc 
tions.  In  Georgia  this  new  policy  could  be  first  and  most  easily 
applied,  for  a  new  form  of  government  was  just  being  instituted. 

The  governor  informed  the  commons  that  none  of  their  acts 
would  be  considered  valid  until  they  had  complied  with  the 
king's  instructions,  but  his-  warnings  were  unheeded.  When 


24  Col.  Eec.  of  Ga.,  xiii,  72-73. 

25  IUd.,  73-75. 


27  IUd.,  91-92.    Message  to  assembly,  Feb.  12,  1756. 

28  Hid.,  92. 


92  University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [TOL- 1 

the  governor  adjourned  the  assembly  for  refusing  to  comply 
with  his  demands,  the  commons  held  the  speaker  in  the  chair 
by  force,  and,  proceeding  to  transact  business  regardless  of  the 
governor's  order,  compelled  the  speaker  to  affix  his  signature. 
The  books  of  the  clerk  were  seized  and  the  records  altered  to  suit 
the  commons.29  For  a  time  all  communications  between  the  two 
branches  of  government  ceased,  and  the  governor  ended  the  con 
troversy  by  dissolving  the  commons  and  calling  a  new  election. 
The  commons  did  not  again  resort  to  such  violent  measures.  At 
various  times  they  claimed  privileges  which  the  governor  under 
his  instructions  was  unable  to  allow,  but  as  no  contributions 
were  asked  of  them  comparative  harmony  prevailed  during  the 
remainder  of  the  war  period. 

That  the  colonial  administrative  system  of  England — if 
indeed  it  can  be  said  that  there  was  any  system — was  inadequate 
and  impotent  was  apparent  to  every  one  whose  duty  it  was  to 
carry  it  into  operation.  The  acts  of  defiance,  evasion,  and  insub 
ordination  in  the  colonies  during  the  war  had  made  this  suffi 
ciently  clear.  In  nearly  every  clash  of  authority  the  colonists 
had  been  victorious,  that  is,  they  had  either  secured  that  for 
which  they  contended  or  subverted  the  plans  of  the  prerogative 
party.  Each  colony  had  its  own  peculiar  interests  and  was  indif 
ferent  in  a  great  measure  to  questions  of  general  welfare.  The 
colonists  were  glad  that  they  were  Englishmen  and  there  is  no 
evidence  of  a  conscious  desire  for  independence.  They  were 
even  willing  to  contribute  aid  to  the  common  defense,  provided 
it  could  be  done  in  their  own  way.  It  must,  however,  be  accepted 
as  a  free  gift  with  a  distinct  understanding  that  coercion  was 
unlawful  and  not  to  be  tolerated.  Royal  or  proprietary  instruc 
tions  which  abridged  this  freedom  were  resented  and  ignored. 
A  refusal  to  obey  instructions  naturally  led  to  denial  of  author 
ity  to  issue  them.  The  degree  of  freedom  from  authority 
demanded  by  some  of  the  colonies  was  incompatible  with  the 
status  of  dependencies  as  generally  understood  at  the  time.  The 


29  Col.  Eec.  of  Ga.,  xiii,  99-101.    Message  of  the  governor,  Feb.  19,  1756, 
and  statement  of  the  speaker. 


1911]  McCormac:  Colonial  Opposition  93 

degree  of  liberty  demanded  could  be  secured  only  by  virtual  in 
dependence.  England  recognized  this  fact  more  clearly  than 
the  colonies  did  and  was  preparing  to  check  these  independent 
tendencies. 

It  is  easy  to  look  back  and  see  that  instead  of  employing 
coercive  measures  England  might  have  been  more  successful 
had  she  adopted  an  autonomous  colonial  system  like  that  in  force 
in  Canada  and  other  colonies  today.  Nothing  of  the  kind  could 
have  reasonably  been  expected  in  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth 
century.  Such  a  relation  between  colonies  and  mother  country 
was  yet  unknown,  and  England  naturally  adopted  the  policy 
with  which  she  was  most  familiar. 

Colonial  governors,  British  generals,  and  British  adminis 
trative  officers  had  but  one  remedy  to  offer,  and  from  the  begin 
ning  of  the  war  this  was  urged  upon  the  home  government  on 
every  possible  occasion.  Their  remedy  was  parliamentary  con 
trol  and  parliamentary  taxation  to  support  it.  This,  they  urged, 
was  the  only  method  of  insuring  obedience  and  order  in  the 
colonies.  The  attempt  of  Parliament  to  act  upon  this  advice  and 
inaugurate  a  new  system,  it  is  needless  to  add,  led  directly  to 
the  Revolution. 

Briefly  surveying  the  struggle  already  given  in  detail,  it  may 
be  observed  that  the  extent  of  opposition  to  imperial  govern 
ment  varied  considerably  in  different  colonies,  and  increased  in 
proportion  to  the  amount  of  outside  restraint.  In  Connecticut 
and  Rhode  Island  where  the  people  enjoyed  virtual  independ 
ence  they  were  usually  public  spirited  and  ready  to  cooperate 
with  the  mother  country.  Proprietary  colonies  on  the  other 
hand,  subject  to  double  restrictions  from  proprietor  and  king, 
were  the  ones  which  did  most  to  obstruct  imperial  administra 
tion.  In  later  years  this  might  have  pointed  the  way  to  a  suc 
cessful  solution  of  the  administrative  problems,  but  it  could 
hardly  be  expected  that  Great  Britain  at  that  time  would  adopt 
the  homeopathic  treatment  of  permitting  greater  freedom  in 
order  to  forestall  independence. 

No  summarized  statement  of  the  degree  of  autonomy  and  the 


94  University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  1 

grounds  upon  which  it  was  based  can  be  made  that  will  apply 
to  all  of  the  colonies  separately.  Both  depended  in  a  great 
measure  on  local  conditions  and  the  relation  of  each  individual 
colony  to  the  mother  country.  By  combining  items,  however,  it 
is  possible  to  state  what  the  colonies  collectively  demanded  from 
the  central  administrative  authority.  The  colonies  as  a  rule 
kept  in  close  touch  with  controversies  in  other  places,  therefore 
independent  views  of  any  particular  assembly  soon  found  an 
echo  in  the  neighboring  provinces. 

Except  in  colonies  where  the  people  elected  all  officers  the 
popular  branch  of  the  legislature  claimed  exclusive  control  over 
financial  matters.  All  money  voted  was  a  free  gift  of  the  people, 
therefore  money  bills  must  not  be  amended.  If  all  money 
granted  was  a  free  gift,  it  followed  that  the  peoples'  representa 
tives  should  have  the  exclusive  right  to  determine  how  it  should 
be  raised — that  is,  the  right  to  dictate  the  method  and  extent 
of  taxation.  They  also  claimed  exclusive  control  of  the  raising, 
disciplining,  and  the  movement  of  colonial  troops.  Many  colonies 
as  we  have  seen,  were  inclined  to  restrict  their  troops  to 
defensive  service  within  their  own  borders,  making  defensive 
warfare  difficult  and  offensive  campaigns  practically  impossible. 
The  privilege  of  adjourning  at  will,  wholesome  in  itself,  was 
often  abused  by  assemblies  in  critical  times. 

They  based  their  claim  to  exclusive  control  of  financial  mat 
ters  on  precedent  and  the  "rights  of  Englishmen."  Parliament 
possessed  this  right  in  England  and,  being  Englishmen,  the 
colonists  claimed  a  similar  right  for  their  assemblies,  within 
their  own  jurisdiction.  As  Parliament  did  not  represent  English 
men  in  America  its  taxing  power  did  not  extend  to  America. 
In  short,  they  desired  all  the  rights  of  Englishmen,  but  com 
paratively  few  of  the  duties.  Some  colonies  claimed  additional 
rights  based  on  their  charters,  and  held  that  such  rights  once 
given  were  an  irrevocable  bar  against  both  king  and  Parliament. 
In  this  they  made  no  distinction  between  rights  and  privileges. 
All  maintained  that  their  "rights  as  Englishmen"  and  "natural 
right"  entitled  them  to  the  privileges  of  government  without 


1911]  McCormac:  Colonial  Opposition  95 

any  outside  interference  with  their  internal  affairs.  In  a  word, 
they  had  developed  practically  all  the  arguments  that  were  used 
after  the  passage  of  the  Stamp  Act. 

Whether  and  to  what  extent  the  claims  of  the  colonists  were 
just  we  need  not  here  discuss.  The  significant  fact  is  that  they 
were  radically  incompatible  with  the  British  colonial  policy,  one 
of  which  must  give  way.  The  American  ideal  was  government 
by  the  consent  of  the  governed.  Like  all  Anglo-Saxons  they  did 
not  take  kindly  to  the  role  of  a  subject  people.  Prerogative 
they  were  unwilling  to  recognize.  England  had  either  to  recog 
nize  this  ideal  and  be  satisfied  with  nominal  sovereignty  or  the 
ideal  must  be  shattered  by  a  reorganization  of  the  colonial  sys 
tem.  Aside  from  the  new  general  policy  of  George  III  and  his 
Tory  supporters  and  the  changed  conditions  caused  by  the 
expulsion  of  the  French,  the  defiance  of  the  colonies  and  the 
inability  of  England  to  enforce  its  authority  were  sufficient  to 
make  alterations  in  the  old  system  desirable  if  not  imperative. 

The  attempt  at  reorganization  lies  without  the  scope  of  this 
paper.  It  began  as  soon  as  the  war  ended  and  resulted  in  the 
independence  of  the  colonies.  The  colonies  were  prepared  to 
meet  the  issue.  During  the  seven  years  of  controversy  they  had 
formulated  their  theories  and  were  now  ready  to  defend  them. 
There  was  a  unity  of  ideas,  but  up  to  this  time  there  had  been 
no  unity  of  strength  and  action.  Added  pressure  by  the  antag 
onist  was  certain  to  produce  such  a  unity.  So  long  as  the  policy 
of  England  remained  weak  and  vacillating ;  so  long  as  the  admin 
istration  was  left  to  individual  governors  whose  means  of  sub 
sistence  depended  on  the  good  will  of  the  colonies  themselves, 
each  assembly  was  able  to  cope  with  the  situation  and  preferred 
to  do  so.  Up  to  this  time  local  prejudice  outweighed  any  desire 
for  union.  But  when  Parliament  assumed  control  and  began 
to  subject  the  colonies  to  one  general  scheme  of  taxation  and 
administration,  concerted  action  on  the  part  of  the  colonies 
became  necessary.  This  characteristic  marks  the  principal  change 
of  conditions  after  the  passage  of  the  Stamp  Act.  Unity  of 
action  was  practically  the  only  new  element.  Their  doctrines, 


96  University  of  California  Publications  in  History     ITOL- 1 

theories,  and  arguments  were  the  same;  the  policy  of  England, 
not  that  of  the  colonies,  had  changed.  A  more  definite  policy  of 
England  simply  caused  a  united  resistance,  and  at  last  the  col 
onies  came  to  see  that  nothing  but  independence  could  procure 
for  them  the  desired  freedom  from  restraint. 


1911]  McCormac:  Colonial  Opposition  97 


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Pennsylvania  Archives,  1748-1756,  1756-1760.    Philadelphia,  1853. 
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AMERICAN  ARCHAEOLOGY  AND  ETHNOLOGY.— A.  L.  Kroeber,  Editor.     Price 

per  volume  $3.50  (Volume  1,  $4.25).    Volumes  1-9  completed. 
Vol.  8.      1.  A  Mission  Record  of  the  California  Indians,  from  a  Manuscript 
in  the  Bancroft  Library,  by  A.  L.  Kroeber.    Pp.  1-27.    Mav 
28,  1908 1      .25 

2.  The  Ethnography  of  the  Cahuilla  Indians,  by  A.  L.  Kroeber.    Pp. 

29-68,  plates  1-15.    June  20,  1908 .75 

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T.  Waterman.    Pp.  13-44,  plates  1-5.    November  15,  1911 45 

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ber.    Pp.  45-96,  plates  6-20.    November  11,  1911 .65 

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